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Chapter 1 – Risk Perception and Financial Literacy 
1.1 Motivation & Introduction 
The financial environment that consumers face today has become more complex, and has 
expanded dramatically, in just a generation. Over the past 20 years consumers have been given access to 
exotic mortgages and financial derivative product offerings, as well as increased access to credit and 
borrowing options. The baby boomers1 in the U.S. have had a front row seat to this changing financial 
environment. At the same time there has been a five-fold increase in personal bankruptcy filings in the 
US in the last 30 years (White 2009). Boomers have also experienced a dramatic change in the options 
available to build savings for retirement compared to mechanisms enjoyed by their parents. The defined 
benefit pensions of the boomers’ parents are being replaced by voluntary defined contribution 
retirement systems, such as 401(k) and 403 (b) offerings. This transition simplified the balance sheets of 
employers, but shifted the cognitive burden to employees to decide how much to save, where to invest, 
and how to make lump sum payouts or annuity streams last throughout retirement (McKenzie and 
Liersch 2011; Yoong 2011).  
With the shift in retirement planning, how are individuals managing these costly and risky 
processes themselves? In many households, not well; one study reports that about one-third of adults in 
their 50s have done little or no planning for retirement (Lusardi 2003). Further studies argue that poor 
planning for retirement, low levels of wealth accumulation (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007), and a lack of 
participation in stock markets (Yoong 2011) may be a direct result of financial illiteracy.  
Many academics, experts, and politicians, observing the changing landscape of financial planning 
and decision making coupled with low rates of financial literacy, have prescribed the same remedy: 
increased financial literacy and financial education. In fact, in 2010 President Obama declared the month 
                                                 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition) defines a baby boomer as “a person born during the baby boom following 
the Second World War,” and is commonly viewed as those children born between 1946 and 1964. The baby boomer 
generation makes up nearly 20% of the American population. 
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of April as National Financial Literacy Month, dedicated “to teaching ourselves and our children about the 
basics of financial education” (Johnson 2010).    
There is a clear need to study financial literacy. However, there remain fundamental 
methodological issues about how to define, classify, and measure financial literacy that the current 
literature has not coherently addressed. This thesis fills that niche, presents a clear definition of financial 
literacy, and demonstrates how to measure it using a rigorous framework. That framework is then 
deployed in a lab and an artefactual field setting to measure financial literacy at various levels of agency: 
an individual decision-maker, a group of two individual decision-makers, and decision-makers in a 
naturally formed household. Further, we study the effect that having access to the Internet has on the 
financial literacy of individual decision-makers.   
The conceptual framework for the elicitation of measures of literacy is a set of procedures to 
elicit subjective belief distributions from individuals. These procedures have a theoretical basis, and have 
been applied in recent literature. The conceptual framework for the treatments, generating hypothesized 
changes in literacy, is the broad literature on “scaffolding.” That literature spans philosophy, 
developmental learning, psychology, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides an introduction to 
the concept of financial literacy, differentiates financial literacy from financial capability, provides a brief 
survey of the literature, and introduces an applied experimental method of eliciting individuals’ risk 
attitudes and subjective beliefs in order to measure financial literacy; Section 1.3 reviews the 
methodology behind subjective belief elicitation and operationalizes the framework used in this research; 
Section 1.4 introduces some hypotheses and proposed applications using the elicitation methodology in 
both laboratory and field settings; and Section 1.5 concludes.   
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1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 What is Literacy? 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the adjective “literate” as someone who is “acquainted with 
letters or literature; erudite, learned, lettered.” Here this literal  literacy is the ability to read written text. 
However, the idea of literacy has grown to include domain specific topics and skill sets: health literacy, 
computer literacy, statistical literacy, and financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, 2008; Di Girolamo 
et al. 2015; Huston 2010) as well as other domains. These extensions can be collectively viewed as 
metaphorical literacy, each referring to a particular cognitive competence in a particular domain.  
Agencies of Literacy 
Literacy can be considered at different levels of agency, which begin with an individual decision-
maker. When one starts to consider the combined literacy of n ≥ 2 individual decision-makers in a group 
or household, which we will call “effective literacy,” there are two important new dimensions of literacy 
that need to be defined. 
The first dimension of literacy associated with thinking about the literacy of groups or 
households is what economists refer to as “common knowledge.” In game theory this refers to the idea 
that each member of the group, or each player in the game, shares some knowledge of the game with the 
other player and, further, that this knowledge survives an infinite regress. In other words, I know that 
you know that I know that you know…the facts about the game. Clearly, knowledge is a logically 
demanding concept, but it is also suggestive of a weaker concept which addresses the extent to which 
individuals in a group share the same understanding of some fact. This topic has been studied in many 
disciplines, apart from economics and game theory. For example, it is a major issue in linguistics, where 
the notion of “semantics” refers to the meaning of a word, phrase, sentence, or text, and the notion of 
“pragmatics” refers to dealing with language in use and the contexts in which it is used. For example, 
Putnam (1975, pg. 143) cites that he cannot personally differentiate an elm from a beech tree, and 
further claims that his “concept” of a beech is the same as his “concept” of an elm. However, he goes 
on to say that his word “elm” applies only to elms and his word “beech” applies only to beeches. If he 
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points at an elm and asserts “That’s a beech”, he speaks incorrectly. Does he therefore not know what 
elm and beech mean? Putnam (1975, pg. 144) uses that example to motivate “that there is a division of 
linguistic labor” and points to the fact that there are experts who can tell these trees apart when the need 
arises, and that users of the words know (roughly) how to find these experts. Thus Putnam’s effective 
literacy is wider than his “private” literacy; it is scaffolded by the existence in his environment of the 
experts. 
We can see that the moment that one considers the literacy of several individuals engaged in 
some activity, the extent to which they share knowledge about a web of concepts is a dimension of the 
concept of literacy. Literacy, is then a kind of social knowledge. One way to measure this shared literacy 
is in terms of a “concordance correlation coefficient,” which is a measure from the biostatistics literature 
to measure the extent to which two distributions are the same as each other. This statistical concept 
provides an immediate formal characterization of what is meant by shared literacy in the context of 
studying the literacy of groups and households. 
The second dimension of literacy associated with thinking about the literacy of groups and 
households is the concept of domain specific literacy. This refers to the idea that one might be literate, 
however measured, in one domain of activity and understanding, and yet be illiterate in another domain 
of activity and understanding. Much of the literature on literacy has considered different domains in 
isolation (e.g. health literacy, risk literacy, computer literacy, financial literacy, etc.). The point is that 
when one considers groups or households, one needs to consider the complementarity or substitutability 
of domain specific literacy at the level of individual, group or household. In other words, the literacy of 
the household might depend on the distribution of domain specific literacies within the household. If 
there is a household that is composed of two individuals that are financially literate, but health illiterate, 
then their effective literacy in one domain might be expected to be high, but their effective literacy in the 
other domain might be expected to be low. Now consider the possibility that one member of the 
household is literate in one domain and illiterate in the other domain, and the other member of the 
household is the perfect complement: illiterate in the domain where the partner is literate, and literate in 
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the domain where the partner is illiterate. Again, one would expect that the potential literacy of the 
household is high in both domains, but it is far from obvious that the effective literacy of the household 
will be high in both domains. The difference between potential and effective literacy has to do with the 
extent to which the members of the household share their knowledge in these two domains, which in 
turn has to do with the extent to which the members of the household make joint decisions. In the 
“economics of the household” literature this is referred to as the bargaining problem within the 
household; an extensive survey of this literature can be found in Economics of the Family by Browning, 
Chiappori, and Weiss (2014). It is not always assumed that members of the household agree on every 
joint decision, so in the example considered here it could be that the members of the household do not 
acknowledge their distribution of comparative advantage. If the members of the household do not 
exhibit this “meta-awareness,” either because they do not know one another’s varying literacies or 
because they are acting strategically with respect to this knowledge, then it is possible that the effective 
literacy that is produced by the household in a joint decision could fall well short of the potential literacy 
of that household. 
 A particular channel for failure of shared knowledge and consequent coordination failure of the 
literacy of groups and households is the possibility that this bargaining problem fails for reasons related 
to stereotyped expectations, or bias based on some characteristic such as gender. The result could easily 
be a situation in which the effective literacy of the household is significantly lower than the potential 
literacy of the household. Of course, this failure of efficiency within the household can lead to 
differences between potential and effective literacy even within one domain. But it might be exacerbated 
if the members of the household have significantly different levels of literacy across the domains that 
households make joint decisions about.  
Effective Literacy 
Building on agencies of literacy, the idea and measure of effective literacy was introduced by Basu 
and Foster (1998) as a new approach to evaluate the aggregate literacy level in a country or region. They 
6 
 
note that literacy is typically measured by taking the number of adults who are literate2 as a percentage of 
the total number of adults in a country. However, they argue that effective literacy should account for the 
intrahousehold externality arising from the presence of a literate member. As long as a household has at 
least one literate member, then it is assumed to raise the effective literacy of the household. In these 
households an illiterate member of a household has immediate access to some portion of the 
functioning typically associated with literacy if the other household member is more literate. The 
assumption is that the production of literacy within a household is a simple matter: it is equal to the 
highest individual literacy over the members of the household. Thus, literate members generate a 
positive externality, or local public good, for illiterate members of a household.  
Basu and Foster (1998) distinguish between two types of illiterate persons when assessing the 
effective literacy rate, as shown in Figure 1.1: 1) a proximate illiterate, an illiterate person who lives in a 
household with at least one literate member; and 2) an isolated illiterate, an illiterate person whose 
household has no literate member. Although this characterization measures literacy in a crude binary 
fashion, the logic is general. They show that the effective literacy measure can fluctuate widely based on 
the actual dispersion of literate individuals within a society. Indeed, if all literate individuals lived only 
with other literate individuals then the effective literacy measure collapses and is equal to the traditional 
literacy level. However, if literate individuals are dispersed in a society and households are comprised of 
both literate and illiterate individuals then the effective literacy measure will be higher than the traditional 
literacy measure. 
                                                 
2 This study is about literal literacy, as determined by some measure of reading ability. The measure of literacy is not 
fundamental to the notion of effective literacy.  
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Figure 1.1 - Effective Literacy Composition of a Household with Literate and Illiterate Members 
 
The Effects of Scaffolds on Literacy 
 Scaffolding has been defined generally by Clark (1997, pg. 45) as “exploitation of external 
structure” by an agent. The idea is that the mind of an agent can be extended by using external structure: 
indeed, “the extended mind” thesis proposed by Chalmers and Clark (1998) and central in Clark (2011) 
argues that the mind isn't reducible to or "inside" the brain. Your mind, according to them, is the 
integrated set of all your gear for forming, testing, and adapting beliefs, some of which is biologically 
inherited but many that is engineered. What is meant by external structure is not just limited to physical 
tools either, although they play a role (e.g., computers, paper and pen). It includes language and concept 
formation, as stressed by Vygotskij (1962) and Bruner (1968). Vygotskij (1962) focused on the manner in 
which concept formation and language helped experts communicate with and teach novices, and Bruner 
(1968) focused on the acquisition of oral language by infants. Each viewed scaffolding as aiding an agent 
in learning things. As Vygotskij (1987, pg. 210) put it, “what the child is able to do in collaboration today 
he will be able to do independently tomorrow.” However, scaffolding can include the use of external 
structure that is ongoing, as in the use of language itself in social interaction. 
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 The first clear statement of what is now thought of as scaffolding comes from the critiques by 
Dreyfus (1965, 1972) of the so-called “classical” approach to Artificial Intelligence (AI).3  The attack on 
AI that Dreyfus launched was aimed the idea that we could design AI systems that contained all of the 
information they needed, and just had to “look up” this information when making a decision. Intelligent 
systems, Dreyfus argued, must be embedded in, and learn on the basis of dynamic interaction with, 
external environments.  
 Bruner (1968) picked up the early ideas of Dreyfus (1965) and applied them to developmental 
learning, as noted above. This extension was important for moving the notion of scaffolding to include 
social interactions, although not requiring that the external context be social. This extension is important 
for another reason: it allows us to see how scaffolds need not always be Pareto-improvements, even if 
they are costless to implement. For example, consider the use of the word “boat.” What if the definition 
of a boat required that it be made of wood, drawing on historical precedent when the only boats were 
made of wood. Then when someone comes along to suggest making a boat of steel, one might expect a 
chorus of complaints that “that is not a boat!” Even more seriously, this concept of a boat, as scaffold, 
might inhibit one drawing inferences from the history of wooden boats to help inform the design of 
steel boats. 
 “Embodied cognition” means two different things, one of which is related to scaffolding. The 
unrelated item is a generalization of the idea of “muscle memory.” The related item is: knowledge that 
we build into artifacts, so we can then “forget” it. For example: users once knew how to program their 
word processors, but not anymore because the knowledge is “embodied” in the interface. So that sense 
of embodied cognition is a form of scaffolding.  
We should also be aware that even controlled experiments entail the use of some scaffolds, 
because of the use of language to convey questions and possible responses. A particularly striking 
example in time discounting experiments is when one tells the subject the interest rates implied by their 
                                                 
3 This refers to AI based on pre-loaded axioms and factual knowledge, as opposed to more contemporary approaches based 
on deep learning of statistical patterns. See Graubard (1988). 
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choices between “smaller, sooner” amounts of money and “larger, later” amounts of money (e.g., 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014)). Individuals have varying field experience with what 
interest rates are, and hence treat that information as a scaffold to varying degrees. Indeed, the history of 
behavioral economics, particularly when focused on framing anomalies, is largely about manipulating, in 
a controlled manner, the nature of the scaffold provided to subjects. An open issue, which is a major 
theme of the comparison of lab and field experiments, is whether behavior in the context of artefactually 
provided scaffolds is the same as behavior in the context of natural scaffolds, including scaffolds that are 
endogenously sought out by agents (e.g., checking Google or Wikipedia). In a related vein, there is some 
evidence that humans process probabilities better when presented as “natural frequencies” rather than as 
probability statements, reflecting the intuition that humans have used frequencies more generally over 
time as a scaffold than they have used probabilities (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby (1996) and Gigerenzer 
and Hoffrage (1995)). 
 Scaffolding can both promote and detract from efficiency, depending on the context. 
Wisdom of the Crowd 
The “wisdom of the crowd” is a hypothesis that a diverse collection of independently deciding 
individuals is likely to make certain types of decisions and predictions better than a given individual or 
single expert. The wisdom of the crowd seeks to compare the quality of the collective opinion of a group 
of people with that of a single person. An extensive survey of this literature and its applications can be 
found in The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societiesces by Scott 
Page (2007). The wisdom of the crowd results when social scaffolding produces a net gain in effective 
literacy. 
The logic behind the wisdom of the crowd hypothesis can be traced back to a theorem that was 
first conveyed by the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) in his work Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la 
probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability 
of Majority Decisions). The Condorcet Jury Theorem, as it is known, in its most reduced form assumes 
that a group (or jury) is required to reach a decision by majority vote. Summarizing from Weisstein 
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(2018), each individual in the group has one vote that is counted and can either be correct with probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 or incorrect with probability (1− p). The theorem goes on to ask how many voters should be 
included in the group to maximize the chances of a correct majority decision. Here it can be shown that 
the result depends on whether the value of p is greater than or less than 0.5. The two outcomes can be:  
• p > 0.5, so that each voter is more likely to vote correctly. In this case we can show that 
adding more voters to the group increases the probability that the majority vote is 
correct. In the limit, the probability that the majority votes correctly will approach 1 as 
the number of voters increases. 
• p < 0.5, so that each voter is more likely to vote incorrectly. In this case, adding more 
voters to the group makes things worse, and the optimal jury consists of a single voter. 
We can show mathematically, for the case of 3 voters, that the probability of a correct majority vote is 
higher than the probability of a correct decision by any given individual in the group for any p > 0.5. 
Consider the case of p = 0.6 and n=3. Here we see that, for each voting outcome that results in a correct 
decision by the group, (0.6*0.6*0.6) + (0.6*0.6*0.4) + (0.6*0.4*0.6) + (0.6*0.6*0.4) = 0.648 is the 
probability of a correct majority decision, which is indeed greater than the individual p = 0.6. 
Additionally, using Mathematica and code from Saito (2018) we can show this concept graphically for the 
case of p = 0.6 as n  100 in Figure 1.2. Note in the bottom panel of the figure, the probability that the 
correct choice wins approaches 1 as the number of voters increases. 
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Figure 1.2 - Illustration of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem 
An often cited early example of the wisdom of crowds is an application by social scientist and 
statistician Sir Francis Galton to find a point estimate from a continuous distribution in his article “Vox 
Populi” in Nature (1907). Here he was interested in the results of a weight-judging competition that was 
carried out at the 1906 annual show of the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition held in 
Plymouth, England.  The event sold tickets for a sixpenny fee to competitors who were shown a 
preselected fat ox. Individuals would then provide their best estimates of what the ox would weigh after 
it had been slaughtered and dressed; they also included their personal information to be contacted later. 
Prizes were awarded to those with the most accurate predictions. There were 787 valid tickets sold 
during that show, which Francis Galton was granted access to, and he analyzed the written responses. 
He reported that the median guess was 1,207 pounds and that it was accurate within 0.8% of the true 
weight of 1,198 pounds of the slaughtered and dressed ox. He contrasted that with the probable error of 
a single observation picked at random, which would have been off by 3.1% of the true weight, or a 37-
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pound difference. He noted that “[the median result] is…more creditable to the trustworthiness of a 
democratic judgment than might have been expected,” meaning the point estimate of the group was 
better than that of a randomly selected individual.  
Groupthink 
Although the wisdom of the crowd approach involves aggregating subjective beliefs across 
numerous individuals that can often hold different and varied beliefs, the concept of groupthink, 
pioneered by Janis (1971, p. 43), posits  “a mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-
seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of 
alternative courses of actions.” In other words, groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs 
within a group in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in irrational or 
dysfunctional decision-making outcome. Group members seek to reach a consensus decision with 
minimal conflict and without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints by actively suppressing 
dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences. Groupthink arises when 
social scaffolding produces a net loss in effective literacy 
Peck (1996, p. 32) summarizes Janis (1972, 1982) noting that common characteristics of 
groupthink “include: an illusion of invulnerability; an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent 
morality; collective efforts to discount warnings; stereotyped views of the enemy as evil; self-censorship 
of deviations from group beliefs; a shared illusion of unanimity; suppression of dissent; and the 
emergence of self-appointed mind-guards who screen the group from dissidents.”  
Sunstein and Hastie (2015) examine several ways in which groups fall victim to groupthink and 
offer strategies to improve decisions made in group settings. They first review challenges they find 
contribute to poor group decisions. Four pertinent factors they cover are collective myopia, following 
the lead, closing ranks, and ignoring outliers. Collective myopia describes a lack of foresight on the part 
of the group and can occur for many reasons; for example, a group’s tendency to be overoptimistic 
about future forecasts, a group’s bias for the most familiar outcome, or even the unrecognized impacts 
of common mental shortcuts. Following the lead refers to the influence of what is discussed first and 
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who speaks first. Sunstein and Hastie (2015, p.63) refer to these as cascade effects, which can be 
informational and reputational. Closing ranks in a group occurs when members become more polarized 
and skewed in a particular direction based on prior discussions, thereby making it more difficult to offer 
a dissenting view. Lastly, ignoring outliers can be described as a group giving little attention to what may 
be known only by a few.    
Measurements 
Measurements of literacy can be sorted into two main classifications: qualitative and quantitative. 
The work presented in this thesis will focus on quantitative results. However, it is worth mentioning two 
qualitative measures that are found in the literature. One measure involves focus groups which comprise 
either a group or an individual being interviewed. The interview process in a focus group provides 
structure and a narrative in order to understand issues that are identified for a cross section of the 
population being interviewed. Two examples of focus groups recruited to study financial planning are 
Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sundén (1996), using high net-worth individuals, and Turnham (2010), 
using low-income populations. The second qualitative measure to mention is the “teach back” method 
that is widely employed in the health literacy literature (see Denny and Grady 2007; Kripalani et al. 2008; 
Nigolian and Miller 2011; Seley and Weinger 2007). The technique behind the teach back method, in a 
healthcare setting, is for a healthcare provider to check the understanding or comprehension of the 
patient, or their care-giver, by asking them to demonstrate or repeat in their own words what they 
believe are the take away points of the session. This process should not be done in quizzing or shaming 
way, and offers the provider an opportunity to check if the patient is health literate in order to be able to 
adhere to the protocol of care prescribed. Both qualitative methods described above have the capability 
of generating further insights and potentially improve validity of outcomes and results. They are often 
viewed as complimentary to quantitative data.   
Quantitative research is based on quantities elicited using a specified measurement process.  
There is no one standard measure that is used across studies and the types of measurements vary across 
disciplines. For our purposes we will talk about measurements that are found in literacy literature. 
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Literacy at its most fundamental refers to a person’s ability to read and write. Here there is often a binary 
measure if an individual can read and write or not, respectively coded as 1 or 0. Other literacy measures 
follow the same classification scheme in the sense that if some individual answers a fill-in-the-blank or 
multiple-choice question correctly then they are deemed literate with respect to the topic of that 
question. Indices of how literate the individual is, by a simple sum of the correctly answered questions, 
are then often constructed and used in estimations to test downstream behavior. We will explore the 
literature regarding quantitative measurements with respect to financial literacy in subsection 1.2.2.  
These literacy measures elicit a point estimate rather than recovering the full distribution of a 
subject’s beliefs about an answer to a question. Merkle and Weber (2011, p.264) correctly illustrate this 
concept, which is reproduced as Figure 1.3. The top panel of the figure represents a belief distribution 
about a skill or ability over different quantiles (e.g. deciles). Shown in that panel is a person that assigns 
positive weights to deciles 4 through 10 as believed to contain the true value of their skill or ability. They 
assign less weight to deciles 4,5, 9, and 10, and more weight to deciles 6, 7, and 8. The point to note here 
is that the subject believes that their skill or ability falls somewhere across those 7 deciles. The bottom 
panel of the figure shows what a person may report as their point estimate, here in decile 7, which is in fact 
distilled from their entire underlying belief distribution. Merkle and Weber (2011) use this design to test 
various causes of overconfidence. The research presented in this thesis uses an improved method to test 
financial literacy in participants where a true answer is known. The method also allows for a rich 
characterization of the belief distribution underlying an individual’s elicited response, a test for any bias, 
and an evaluation of their confidence of response with respect to a known, true, answer.   
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Figure 1.3 - Aggregation of beliefs. Full distribution (above). Point estimate (below). 
Bias and Overconfidence 
We can say that someone’s subjective beliefs exhibit bias when the weighted average belief is 
different from the true outcome. Take the bottom panel of Figure 1.3 for instance, which shows an 
individual’s point estimate belief in the 7th decile. Now consider that the true answer is located in the 9th 
decile: here we observe that the individual’s belief was biased from the true answer by 2 deciles. This 
definition mimics the definition of bias in statistics, where the estimated expected value of the parameter 
being estimated differs from the true underlying quantitative parameter being estimated. Thus bias per se 
is a strict concept, and does not even “speak to” the statistical significance of any bias. Of course, the 
latter is what concerns economists, so we must always have a concern with the confidence with which a 
belief is held. A related concept in statistics is “consistency,” which is the idea that bias disappears as 
samples get asymptotically large. Thus an estimator may be consistent, but still exhibit “small sample 
bias” if it is applied with a small sample. The concept of bias presumes, of course, that a true outcome 
exists and is defined. Our experimental design ensures this is the case and will be covered in Section 1.3.  
Figure 1.4 illustrates this idea of bias. The two panels on the left exhibit zero bias, and the two 
panels on the right exhibit bias. In each case the true outcome on the horizontal axis is marked by a 
(green) diamond shape equal to 100 on the vertical axis. 
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Figure 1.4 - Characterizing Responses Using Bias and Confidence 
What does it mean when we say that someone displays overconfidence? The term 
overconfidence is meant to describe a bias whereby a person systematically overrates their subjective 
confidence in their judgements compared to the objective accuracy of those judgements. 
Overconfidence is one possible characteristic of a miscalibration of subjective probabilities. 
Summarizing Moore and Healy (2008), overconfidence has been defined in three distinct ways: (1) 
overestimation of one’s actual performance; (2) overplacement, or the “better than average effect”, of 
one’s performance relative to others; and (3) overprecision by expressing unwarranted certainty in the 
accuracy of one’s beliefs. 
Moore and Healy (2008, p.508), Merkle and Weber (2011, p.264) and Benoît and Dubra (2011, 
p.1605) explain why elicited subjective belief distributions are needed to evaluate hypotheses about 
overconfidence in the third sense defined above. Moore and Healy (2008) and Merkle and Weber (2011) 
explicitly recognize the need to elicit subjective belief distributions using proper scoring rules. They both 
apply variants of the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR), but their procedures are limited in several respects 
by comparison to the ones employed here. First, their interface is not as intuitive as the one we use. 
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Second, and most critically, they do not correct for the fact that preferences concerning risk will lead 
subjects to report beliefs that reflect those risk attitudes (Harrison and Ulm 2016).  
Figure 1.4 illustrates this idea of confidence. The two panels on the top exhibit high confidence, 
and the two panels on the bottom exhibit low confidence. Note that we carefully do not label these as 
overconfidence and underconfidence, respectively. To do that one has to ascertain the appropriate level 
of confidence, and that depends on the priors that an individual has as well as the precision of the data 
that the individual has seen. For instance, just as we expect that an econometric estimator should have a 
large standard error when the sample is small, an individual should often have a large variance in their 
beliefs when they do not know much about an event contingency. In Figure 1.4 we implicitly associate 
confidence with variance, but that is just for illustration. 
1.2.2 What is Financial Literacy? 
Overview 
What is it then to say that someone is financially literate? Table 1.1 illustrates a sample of the 
varied definitions that occur in the literature. The first 8 rows of Table 1.1 are taken from Huston’s 
(2010) meta-analysis covering 71 published studies that included financial literacy/financial knowledge 
measures over the years 1996 to 2008, while the last 4 rows are further supplements from my review of 
the literature.   
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Definitions of Financial Literacy Found in the Literature 
1 Financial literacy is the ability to make informed judgments and to take effective decisions 
regarding the use and management of money (Noctor, Stoney, and Stradling (1992), definition 
used by Beal and Delpachitra (2003) and ANZ (2008)). 
2 Personal financial literacy is the ability to read, analyze, manage and communicate about the 
personal financial conditions that affect material well-being. It includes the ability to discern 
financial choices, discuss money and competently to life events that affect everyday financial 
decisions, including events in the general financial issues without (or despite) discomfort, plan for 
the future and respond economy (Vitt et al. (2000); also cited by Cude et al. (2006)). 
3 Financial literacy is a basic knowledge that people need in order to survive in a modern society 
(Kim 2001). 
4 Financial literacy refers to a person’s ability to understand and make use of financial concepts 
(Servon and Kaestner 2008). 
5 Financial literacy is the ability to use knowledge and skills to manage financial resources 
effectively for lifetime financial security (Jump$tart Coalition 2007). 
6 Financial literacy is the ability to use knowledge and skills to manage financial resources 
effectively for a lifetime of financial well-being (U.S. Financial Literacy and Education 
Commission 2006). 
7 Financial knowledge is defined as understanding key financial terms and concepts needed to 
function daily in American society (Bowen 2002). 
8 Consumer literacy, defined as self-assessed financial knowledge or objective knowledge 
(Courchane and Zorn 2005). 
9 Financial literacy determines how well people make and execute financial decisions, including 
saving, investing, borrowing from one’s retirement account, and planning for retirement (Lusardi, 
Mitchell, and Curto 2010). 
10 Financial literacy as having the knowledge, skills and confidence to make responsible financial 
decisions (Task Force on Financial Literacy, Office of the Canadian Minister of Finance 2009). 
11 By the most basic definition, financial literacy relates to a person’s 
competency for managing money (Remund 2010). 
12 Characterize [financial] literacy in terms of the subjective beliefs that someone has over possible 
responses to some question (Di Girolamo et al. 2015). 
Table 1.1 - Definitions of Financial Literacy Found in the Literature 
After reading through Table 1.1, one can see that the literature has not yet arrived at a unified 
voice as to how to define financial literacy. Partly because of this lack of unification and precision, the 
literature often treats the terms financial literacy and financial capability as synonymous, when they are not.  
Financial capability can mean more than just understanding concepts, and refers to the capability 
of the individual to make financial decisions coherently, and to manage their financial well-being 
(Holzmann 2010). One of the first national financial capability surveys to be administered was by the 
United Kingdom’s Financial Saving Authority with their “Financial Capability in the UK: Establishing a 
Baseline Survey” in 2005. Instead of only looking at financial knowledge in a narrow sense, the UK 
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survey focused additionally on 5 content domain areas: making ends meet, keeping track of your 
finances, planning ahead, choosing financial products, and staying informed about financial matters 
(Atkinson et al. 2006).  
While a consensus definition of financial literacy and financial capability is unlikely due to the 
evolving nature of the literature, Remund (2010) makes a contribution by categorizing financial concepts 
into five areas. They are: (1) knowledge of financial concepts, (2) ability to communicate about financial 
concepts, (3) aptitude in managing personal finances, (4) skill in making appropriate financial decisions, 
and (5) confidence in planning effectively for future financial needs. When these 5 categories are 
assessed together they account for financial capability.  
Figure 1.5, from Huston (2010), offers a graphical representation of her conceptual framework 
and definition of financial literacy. Here we see that category (1) from Remund (2010) maps cleanly into 
Huston’s (2010) “Knowledge Dimension”, while categories (2) through (5) map broadly across what she 
refers to as the “Application Dimension.” She incorrectly defines the two dimensions taken together as 
financial literacy. I suggest that the area labeled “Financial Knowledge” is actually financial literacy, and 
the “Application Dimension” should be referred to as financial capability.  
The difference between literacy and capability is that literacy is rote knowledge and testable in a 
rigorous setting, whereas capability is the application of that knowledge in some field context. That is the 
key distinction between literacy and capability, but it is often blurred.  Our research adopts the definition 
that financial literacy is rote financial knowledge that is testable and can be evaluated against a known, 
true answer.  
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Figure 1.5 - Concept of Financial Literacy 
 
Financial Literacy Measurement 
Moving from a conceptual definition of financial literacy to its measurement, the literature falls 
into two sets. The first category is manipulated financial literacy, studies involving experimental and quasi-
experimental methods to analyze the effects of financial education interventions. The second area of the 
literature is measured financial literacy, studies including correlation analysis and econometric studies that 
measure financial literacy by the percent of correct answers on tests of financial knowledge and/or 
predicted downstream financial behaviors (Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer 2014).    
 Manipulated financial literacy is the smaller of the two literatures. One example is Clark, Morrill, and 
Allen (2011), which examined data on over 1,000 retirement-eligible workers, focusing on their 
hypothetical preferences for either a lump sum or an annuity stream of retirement income before and 
after their participation in a retirement planning seminar. The participants came into the study belonging 
to either a group that owned a defined contribution (DC) plan (401(k), 403(b), or 457) or a defined 
benefit (DB) plan (employer pension). The authors note that the unique characteristics of the default 
options of the different plans were akin to an annuity stream for the DB and a lump sum for the DC.  
However, there are provisions in both plans according to which a worker, upon retirement, can opt for 
the other payment method; e.g. buying an annuity stream from the lump sum of their DC.  
 Before the seminar the individuals were asked what type of payment option they would 
hypothetically prefer: lump sum or annuity. The same individuals then participated in an employer-
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provided pre-retirement seminar, which ranged from a half-day to two days in duration. After the 
seminar the individuals were asked again what their hypothetical preference was. Results were shown for 
both groups (DB and DC); however, I will only focus on those with DB plans. Prior to the workshop, 
70.5% said they would stay with the annuity stream and 29.5% preferred the lump sum. After the 
seminar, 72.4% preferred the annuity stream and 27.6% the lump sum. This shows that the preferences 
of some individuals reversed, presumably from the information presented in the seminar. However, this 
could just be statistical noise. Strictly speaking, they all could have reversed, but in opposite directions.  
Measured financial literacy is the more pervasive of the two types of literature, as it has gained 
the attention and funding of governments, non-profit organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
and special interest groups on a large scale. A well-known example of measured financial literacy is the 
Personal Financial Survey, which is administered in the United States by the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal 
Financial Literacy. Jump$tart is often credited with the first large scale financial literacy survey of American 
youth.  Their nationwide survey is conducted with 12th grade students to determine the financial ability 
of young people. The survey is presented in a multiple choice format and covers topics surrounding 
income, money management, saving and investing, and spending and credit. A student is deemed literate 
for a specific question if they answer the question correctly. Mandell (2008), the study author, claims that 
students are financially literate if they score 75% or more; however, how he arrives at that specific value 
is not discussed.  
The first Jump$tart survey was conducted in 1997-1998 and was then repeated in years 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. In 2008 it was expanded to include a survey of college students as well.  The 
average grades for all those sampled are listed in Table 1.2 as follows: 
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Year Number of High School students 
polled 
Average Grade 
(defined as amount of questions answered 
correctly out of 31 total questions) 
1997 1,532 57.3% 
2000 723 51.9% 
2002 4,024 50.2% 
2004 4,074 52.3% 
2006 5,775 52.4% 
2008 6,856 48.3% 
2008 (full-time college) 1,030 62.2% 
Table 1.2 - Financial Literacy of 12th Grade Students - Results from Jump$tart 
This is only one example of measured financial literacy, but most follow the same classification 
scheme in the sense that if an individual answers a multiple-choice question correctly then they are 
deemed financially literate with respect to the topic of that question. Indices of how literate the 
individual is are then often built and these indices are tested on downstream behaviors such as whether 
or not an individual saves for retirement, enters into a stock market, takes out payday loans, or any 
number of other behaviors.    
Despite the widespread inclusion of financial literacy questions in various surveys and research, 
there have been only few attempts at developing a rigorous methodology for its measurement and to 
standardize the approach.     
1.2.3 Risk Perception 
In the same way that it is necessary to define financial literacy and how it is measured, it is also 
necessary to define risk and how it can be measured. Risk can be categorized in two classes: objective 
risk and subjective risk. Objective risk is associated with random physical systems such as roulette wheels, 
rolling dice, or flipping coins. An example of objective risk is flipping a fair two-sided coin 100 times and 
computing that it lands on heads with probability 0.5. Subjective risk, however, refers to an individual’s 
personal judgment or perception about how likely an event is to occur.4 Subjective risk will differ from 
person to person due to many factors, such as past experience, risk attitudes, expert knowledge, or 
personal bias. Continuing from the example above, since subjective risk varies by individual, one person 
                                                 
4 Even though we define subjective risk at the level of the individual, one can also enquire about the subjective risks of groups 
of agents, such as households. Indeed, the “effective literacy” concept, discussed in Section 1.2.1 and also in later chapters, 
does precisely that.  
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could state that their subjective belief that flipping a fair two-sided coin and observing it landing on 
heads on their next flip is a 25% chance, whereas another person may state a belief in an 80% chance.  
1.2.4 Subjective Belief Elicitation  
The von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of completeness, transitivity, independence, and 
continuity, which define a rational decision maker under Expected Utility Theory (EUT), were originally 
formulated to be used with objective probabilities. However, Savage (1954) adopted the theory to 
characterize the fact that different people make different decisions because they have may have different 
utility functions and/or different beliefs about the probabilities of different outcomes for event 
contingencies, or different beliefs about some verifiable answer. Savage (1954) developed the standard 
theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU).  
SEU builds on EUT by adding additional structure which states that a rational decision maker 
can believe that an uncertain event has possible outcomes with differing probabilities and each of these 
possible outcomes has a utility associated with it. Choices can then be characterized by a function in 
which an individual believes that there is a subjective probability over each outcome and the subjective 
expected utility is simply the subjectively evaluated expected value of the utility. In effect, SEU assumes 
that people behave as if they take the average of their subjective belief distribution when placing bets on 
binary events. Which decision an individual prefers depends on which subjective expected utility is 
higher.  
 Savage (1971) showed that under the conditions of SEU, and using a proper scoring rule, it is 
possible to elicit a person’s subjective probabilities and other expectations over binary events. Matheson 
and Winkler (1976) develop families of scoring rules for the elicitation of probability distributions over 
continuous events. Building on these studies, Andersen et al. (2014) operationalize a method to recover 
an individual’s subjective probabilities using the incentive-compatible Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) 
over binary events, adjusting for distortions generated by risk aversion. Harrison et al. (2017) 
operationalize the QSR over continuous events, and characterize the QSR theoretically and empirically.  
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1.2.5 Behavioral Welfare Economics Approach to Financial Literacy 
Bernheim and Rangel (2009) and Bernheim (2009) present an approach to behavioral welfare 
economics that recognizes the methodological challenge of evaluating welfare when one does not accept 
that one can rely on (naive) revealed preference. Their approach is a generalized method that defines 
welfare directly in terms of observed choice. Ambuehl et al. (2014, 2017, and 2018) utilize the Bernheim 
and Rangel (2009) and Bernheim (2009) framework to develop two frames with which to ask a question 
bearing on financial choices, where two conditions are met, and are couched here in terms of a financial 
literacy application: 
1. Each frame is a priori presumed to generate actions that have the same welfare consequences for 
the individuals. 
2. But where one frame is simple and transparent to understand, so a priori does not require any 
significant degree of literacy to comprehend, and the other frame requires some degree of 
financial literacy to comprehend. 
Note that both conditions rely on a priori judgments. There is nothing wrong with this, but of course the 
“proof is in the pudding” when one gets to specific applications, and different readers might have 
different priors on the validity of these two conditions.5 The application of these ideas in Ambuehl, 
Bernheim, and Lusardi (2014)(2017) and Ambuehl, Bernheim, Ersoy and Harris (2018) provide just such 
an instance, focused squarely on financial literacy. 
                                                 
5 This is the approach adopted in Ambuehl, Bernheim, and Lusardi (2014), to view one of the frames as revealing true, latent 
valuations. In Ambuehl, Bernheim, and Lusardi (2017) this position was qualified, allowing that there might be some 
normative metric that does not lead one to accept that either frame represents the true, latent valuation. The example 
provided is when subjects exhibit Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting in response to both questions, with Exponential discounting 
a priori deemed to be normatively attractive and Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting deemed a priori to be normatively unattractive. 
In this case, they claim, both responses might be “contaminated” by the “passion for the present” one expects from Quasi-
Hyperbolic responses. They then present a formal mathematical result that essentially says that if the responses to statements 
A and B are equally contaminated, then as one takes the limit of the difference between the responses as that difference goes to zero, then a 
first-order approximation to a valid welfare measure can be obtained. But that says nothing about whether the difference 
between the responses that are non-zero, or not close to zero, have any valid interpretation, unless one wants to invoke 
stringent path-independence assumptions from welfare economics (see Broadway and Bruce (1984, pg. 199) or Harrison, 
Rutherford, and Wooton (1993)). The bulk of responses of interest are decidedly non-zero, and not close to zero, as 
illustrated in Ambuehl et al. (2018, Figure 1, pg. 16). The general methodological issue of concern here is discussed directly by 
Harrison and Ng (2016, pg. 115ff) and Harrison and Ross (2017). Bernheim (2016) provides a general statement of his 
approach to behavioral welfare economics, including discussion of the application to financial literacy.  
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The application in each case is the same, and tests comprehension of the concept of compound 
interest as it affects intertemporal choices between a smaller, sooner (SS) amount of money and a larger, 
later (LL) amount of money. This is a canonical task for the elicitation of time preferences: see Coller 
and Williams (1999) for an extensive review of the older literature and clean experimental 
implementation of this task. To illustrate, consider these two statements, which very slightly paraphrase 
those actually used: 
A. You will receive $88 in 72 days. 
B. We will invest $22 at 3% interest, compounded daily, for 72 days. 
Subjects are then asked, in response to one of these statements, to say “what is the present amount that 
is equivalent?” Responses are elicited using an Iterative Multiple Price List (iMPL) procedure developed 
by Andersen et al. (2006), and can be assumed for present purposes to lead subjects to reveal their true 
answer in an incentive compatible manner. 
If subjects exhibit financial literacy they “should” give the same answers in response to 
statements A and B, since we observers know that the amount of money in B will end up being $88 in 
72 days. If the answers to A and B differ, then we have identified a financial literacy gap, and can take 
the absolute value of the difference in valuations as a measure of the welfare loss from that gap. Since 
the present value amounts are stated in deterministic form, this welfare loss is in the form of a certainty-
equivalent. In effect, here, the observed choice is a willingness to exchange the LL amount mentioned or 
implied by statement A or B for the SS amount stated in the response elicited by the iMPL procedure.  
Now consider if statements A and B meet the conditions required for inferences about welfare 
loss due to financial illiteracy. 
One immediate concern is that statement B might be interpreted, from a conversational 
perspective, as already providing the answer: surely it is $22. The interpretation is that you have been 
asked what amount of money today would generate the implied $88 in 72 days, and this must be a “trick 
question” because the statement already tells you that it was $22. Of course, we analysts are expecting 
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subjects to tell us the present discounted amount that is equivalent to $88 in 72 days, where the discount 
rate need not be the same as the interest rate, but that is just one interpretation of the question. One 
might expect, if inspecting the raw data, to see many respondents simply say $22 in this instance.  
Another, subtler interpretation issue concerns the information about a 3% interest rate. A 
subject might reasonably presume that this is taken to be the market (borrowing and lending) interest 
rate for this question. Then we know from the Fisher Separation Theorem that we cannot recover 
estimates of the subjective discount rate due to censoring: see Coller and Williams (1999), Harrison, Lau, 
and Williams (2002),  Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004) for extended discussions. All that we 
would recover is their knowledge of the interest rate, which is again included in statement B, hence we 
would again expect a spike of responses at $22. 
Extending this point, the mere mention of interest rates provides a scaffold that might affect 
responses differently for statement B compared to statement A. In effect, statement B offers a scaffold, 
mentioned earlier in Section 1.2.1, that could be expected to change the response compared to statement 
A, where there is no such explicit scaffold mentioned. Thus what is claimed to be the welfare effect of 
literacy might just be the welfare effect of having access to a scaffold, and that is ambiguous as a 
theoretical matter. 
Finally, any difference between responses to statements A and B might simply reflect an inability 
to apply the principle of compound interest in evaluating statement B, to arrive at the implied $88 
correctly. A subject might understand what compound interest is, and just not be able to “do the math” 
on the spot, even with a calculator provided. The issue here is whether one labels any difference in 
present value responses a welfare-significant failure of literacy with respect to the concept of compound 
interest or a welfare-significant failure of the ability to apply the correct concept (recall the earlier 
distinction between literacy and capability). And the focus throughout Ambuehl, Bernheim, and Lusardi 
(2014)(2017) and Ambuehl et al. (2018) is on the effect of an intervention to improve decision-making, 
whether or not it is literacy or capability that is driving the effect. 
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The general concern here is that to apply the method of Bernheim and Rangel (2009) one must 
find frames that convince readers that they meet the two conditions noted earlier, and this is not likely to 
be an easy task across domains. 
1.3 Methodology 
The research presented here follows in the footsteps of Merkle and Weber (2011), Andersen et 
al. (2012), Harrison and Phillips (2014), Di Girolamo et al. (2015), Harrison and Ulm (2016), and 
Harrison et al. (2017) utilizing Subjective Belief Elicitation to characterize and measure the financial literacy 
of an individual by eliciting their entire subjective belief distribution. This method ascertains how precise 
an individual’s knowledge is in response to some question, controlling for their attitude to risk. This 
thesis uses these methods to measure financial literacy in a rigorous manner that compares participants’ 
responses to a known, true answer. This approach allows for richer and more rigorous characterization 
of financial literacy compared to multiple-choice questions or “fill-in-the-blank” responses.   
 Harrison and Phillips (2014) and Harrison et al. (2017) document in detail the subjective belief 
elicitation procedure that will be followed to test financial literacy in the lab and field. The approach 
procedurally as follows: a study participant in our research will be exposed to a task in which they will be 
paid according to how accurate their beliefs are about certain financial literacy questions. They will be 
asked to place bets based on their beliefs about the answers to each question.  Figure 1.6 is an example 
of the display of a response screen.   
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Figure 1.6 - Belief Elicitation Interface – Tokens Evenly Distributed 
The participant has 10 sliders to adjust, shown at the bottom of the screen, and has 100 tokens 
to allocate across the sliders. Each slider allows them to allocate tokens that reflect their belief about the 
answer to the question. They must allocate all 100 tokens, and in this example they start with 0 tokens 
allocated to each slider. As they allocate tokens, by adjusting sliders, the payoffs displayed on the screen 
will change as shown in Figure 1.7.  
 
Figure 1.7 - Tokens Distributed According to Individual’s Belief 
Participants’ earnings are based on the payoffs, which is generated by the QSR applied to their 
token allocation and displayed in real time as they re-allocate all 100 tokens. A participant is paid the 
displayed amount above an interval if and only if that interval contains the true answer.  
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It is therefore up to the participants to balance the strength of their personal beliefs with the 
possibility of them being wrong. Their belief about the correct answer to each question is a judgment 
that depends on the information they have about the topic of the question. The participant is also 
incentivized to give statements about their subjective belief distribution. Their choices might also 
depend on their willingness to take risks. Harrison et al. (2017) prove several theorems characterizing the 
optimal responses of an SEU agent, including results that suggest that risk averse SEU agents will 
effectively reveal their true beliefs for plausible levels of risk aversion. Procedures for identifying non-
EUT, and hence presumptively non-SEU, individuals will be employed to check on the empirical 
robustness of this assumption for each individual.6 
1.4 Applications – Lab & Field  
This section introduces proposed applications using subjective belief elicitation in both 
laboratory and field settings. Here it is important to note the complementarity of experiments conducted 
in the laboratory and field. The laboratory provides greater control over the administration of an 
experiment, is faster to implement, and is usually less costly than going directly into the field. It is in the 
lab that we can test with more precision the experimental design and methodology, and the effect of 
word choice or framing on the results of an experiment. The lab is the easiest place to ensure internal 
validity of tests of hypotheses. Going through this process allows for an efficient feedback mechanism 
to inform and understand experimental results. It is after an experiment and results are understood in a 
lab setting that we can then venture out with greater confidence to administer the experiment in the 
field, where there is often less control and mistakes can be costlier in terms of both time and money. Of 
course, the field experiment has greater potential to establish external validity than the lab experiment.7 
This dissertation uses the latest state-of-the-art advances in subjective belief elicitation to 
evaluate the financial literacy of individuals in several settings. Chapter 2 opens with an introduction to 
                                                 
6 Harrison and Phillips (2014) employ a “binary lottery procedure” to offset, in theory, the effects of risk aversion on the 
incentive to report truthfully. This procedure is evaluated by Harrison et al. (2015). 
7 Internal validity reflects the extent to which a study minimizes systematic error relative to some theory or causal hypothesis. 
External validity is the extent to which the results of a study can be generalized to other situations and to other people.  
30 
 
the techniques and tools used throughout this work and evaluates the financial literacy of individuals in 
the lab. Chapter 3 goes further and introduces a new measure of extended financial literacy when individuals 
in the lab have accesses to some external cognitive “scaffold”; in this example, access to the internet is 
the external scaffold.  Chapter 4 builds on the concepts in the previous chapter and introduces the idea 
and measure of effective literacy, as introduced by Basu and Foster (1998), and uses their approach to test 
the financial literacy of individuals when they are part of a group. Chapter 5 transitions the techniques 
developed in the lab to the field and evaluates the financial literacy of naturally occurring households in 
Denmark.  
1.5 Summary 
In the beginning literacy measures were a simple metric of whether an individual could read and 
write, which is often now referred to as “reading literacy.” Here we could simply count up the total 
number of reading literate in a country and divide by the total population to compute the percentage of 
literate individuals in that country. However, this simple approach ignores the situation in which an 
illiterate person has access to a literate person that could read to them. This was the premise of Basu and 
Foster (1998), introducing the new measure of effective literacy that accounts for the potential positive 
externalities that could arise from access to a literate individual. The research in this thesis builds on 
effective literacy as a measure and introduces a new measure of literacy called extended literacy, which gives 
a decision-maker access to an external scaffold during the decision-making process.  
The next distinction is that literacy does not equal capability, despite the fact that the 
management communication literature often confounds the two as being the same. This would be like 
saying that because someone can read a word they are capable of understanding it and using it correctly 
in a sentence, or being able to numerically calculate a return on an investment and being capable of 
investing their money reliably using that calculation. The distinction between literacy and capability is 
that literacy is rote knowledge and testable in a rigorous setting, whereas capability is the application of 
that knowledge in some field context.  
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The research presented in this thesis measures financial literacy at different levels of decision-
making: individuals, individuals given access to scaffolds, and groups or households. The techniques 
involved in the measurement of literacy reflect state-of-the-art advances in subjective belief elicitation 
that allow for the recovery of a decision-maker’s entire underlying subjective distribution. This technique 
generates a rich characterization of beliefs and allows us to talk about bias and confidence with respect 
to a known, true answer. We have the tools and use them to answer interesting questions.   
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Chapter 2 – Toolbox: How to Measure Financial Literacy 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on deriving a “toolbox” of experimental and econometric methods that 
will be used throughout this thesis. It will introduce the experimental design and financial literacy 
questions being examined throughout Chapters 2, 3, and 4, and provide results for a group of control 
subjects. It develops a theoretical framework of how and why risk attitudes and the elicitation methods 
for subjective belief distributions are used, along with a discussion of their properties. There is a detailed 
discussion on how to interpret the econometric estimations and draw inferences from those 
experimental tasks.  
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Financial Literacy 
After conducting a review of current literature, an initial 16 questions were identified that test 
financial and statistical knowledge that were both topically relevant and well fit to be answered using 
subjective belief elicitation.8 Questions were drawn from various sources throughout the literature and 
Table 2.1 provides a listing of those questions, the correct answer at the time of the initial ask, and the 
two different bin labeling schemes used in this research; see Appendix A for more information on labels. 
An asterisk is placed beside the correct answer in both the initial and new bin labels. All questions were 
asked to university students in the United States and answers are US-specific.  
Table 2.1 - Financial Literacy Questions, Answers, and Bin Labels 
• fin1: Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per year. 
After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to 
grow?  
Actual:   $110.41 
Initial bin labels:  [ $92, $94, $96, $98, $100, $102, $104, $106, $108, $110*] 
Newer bin labels:  [$102, $104, $106, $108, $110*, $112, $114, $116, $118, $120] 
                                                 
8 “Fit” in this context means that each question has an objectively correct response and could be incorporated into the 
software display. Further, the financial literacy questions that were selected for this research was guided by the types of 
questions used in the literacy study by Di Girolamo et al. (2015), which was circulating as a CEAR working paper in 2013. 
They introduced the idea of asking questions that evaluated knowledge of facts, as one component of a broader notion of 
literacy.  
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• fin2: What is the earliest age at which you can start Social Security benefits?  
Actual:   62 (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [54, 56, 58, 60, 62*, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72] 
Newer bin labels:  [62*, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80] 
 
• fin3: What is the age that you can receive a full or unreduced Social Security benefit?  
Actual:   66 (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66*, 68, 70, 72] 
Newer bin labels:  Not applicable, this question was dropped.  
 
• fin4: If you start Social Security benefits at the earliest possible age, you will receive a benefit that 
is X percent of the benefit that you would have received at the normal retirement age. What is 
X?  
Actual:   75% (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%*, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, 100%] 
Newer bin labels:  Not applicable, this question was dropped. 
 
• fin5: What is the earliest age at which you will be eligible for Medicare?  
Actual:   65 (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65*, 67, 69, 71, 73] 
Newer bin labels:  [49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65*, 67] 
 
• fin6: Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 20 percent per year, 
and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you have 
in this account in total?  
Actual:   $248.60 
Initial bin labels:  [$90, $100, $125, $148, $173, $196, $207, $233, $249*, $271] 
Newer bin labels:  Not applicable, this question was dropped. 
 
• fin7: Imagine that you have $100 in a savings account and the annual interest rate on your 
savings account was 1 percent per year, and annual inflation was 2 percent per year. After one 
year, how much purchasing power would you have on the initial $100?  
Actual:   $98.98 
Initial bin labels:  [$95, $96, $97, $98, $99*, $100, $101, $102, $103, $104] 
Newer bin labels:  [$98, $99*, $100, $101, $102, $103, $104, $105, $106, $107] 
 
• fin8: Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the interest rate that you earn on 
these savings is 10 percent a year. How much would you have in the account after two years?  
Actual:   $242.00 
Initial bin labels:  [$200, $220, $231, $240, $242*, $266, $293, $322, $330, $341] 
Newer bin labels:  Not applicable, this question was dropped. 
 
• fin9: David just found a job with a take-home pay of $2,000 per month. He must pay $900 for 
rent and $150 for groceries each month. He also spends $250 per month on transportation. If he 
budgets $100 each month for clothing, $200 for restaurants, and $250 for everything else, how 
long will it take him to accumulate savings of $600?  
Actual:   4 months 
Initial bin labels:  [1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 4 months*, 5 months, 6 months, 7 
months, 8 months, 9 months, 10 months] 
Newer bin labels:  [4 months*, 5 months, 6 months, 7 months, 8 months, 9 months, 10 
months, 11 months, 12 months, 13 months] 
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• fin10: If your credit card is stolen and the thief runs up a total debt of $1,000, but you notify the 
issuer of the card as soon as you discover it is missing, what is the maximum amount that you 
can be forced to pay according to Federal law?  
Actual:   $50 (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [$0, $25, $50*, $100, $250, $500, $1000, $2500, $5000, $10000] 
Newer bin labels:  [$0, $10, $20, $30, $40, $50*, $100, $250, $500, $1000]  
 
• fin11: If your ATM or debit card is stolen and the thief runs up a total debt of $1,000, and you 
notify the bank 5 days later, what is the maximum amount that you can be forced to pay 
according to Federal law?  
Actual:   $500 (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [$0, $25, $50, $100, $250, $500*, $1000, $2500, $5000, $10000] 
Newer bin labels:  [$0, $50, $500*, $750, $1000, $2500, $5000, $7500, $1000, $2500] 
 
• fin12: On average, if you went to college and earned a four-year degree, how much more money 
could you expect to earn than if you only had a high school diploma? (For example, 1X would be 
no increase, and 2X would be twice as much)  
Actual:   7X (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [The Same, 1.1X, 1.3X, 1.5X, 1.7X, 1.9X, 2X, 4X, 7X*, 10X] 
Newer bin labels:  Not applicable, this question was dropped. 
 
• fin13: You lend $100 to a friend one evening and he gives you $105 back the next day. How 
much interest has he paid on the loan?  
Actual:   5% 
Initial bin labels:  [0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%*, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%] 
Newer bin labels:  [-4%, -3%, -2%, -1%, 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%*] 
 
• fin14: Suppose you put $100 into a savings account with a guaranteed interest rate of 2% per 
year. You don’t make any further payments into this account and you don’t withdraw any 
money. How much would be in the account at the end of the first year, once the interest 
payment is made?  
Actual:   $102 
Initial bin labels:  [$98, $99, $100, $101, $102*, $103, $104, $105, $106, $107] 
Newer bin labels:  [$95, $96, $97, $98, $99, $100, $101, $102*, $103, $104] 
 
• fin15: Based on 2006 statistics, if a man lived to be 20 in the United States, how many more 
years would he expect to live? Note that this is not asking for the age he would die at, but rather 
how many more years he would expect to live?  
Actual:   56.1 years (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60*, 70, 80, 90] 
Newer bin labels:  [15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55*, 60] 
 
• fin16: Based on 2006 statistics, if a woman lived to be 20 in the United States, how many more 
years would she expect to live? Note that this is not asking for the age she would die at, but 
rather how many more years she would expect to live?  
Actual:   61 years (US-specific) 
Initial bin labels:  [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60*, 70, 80, 90] 
Newer bin labels:  [15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60*] 
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The order of presentation of questions was held constant across all subjects. Because several of the 
questions related to each other, and we were concerned that altering their order for different subjects 
would cause a potential confound when comparing results over subjects. The sections below provide 
background on each question and is ordered by category.  Every question was not asked in every session 
due to the time allotted for different session, some questions were dropped from analysis for reasons 
explained below. 
Interest and Inflation 
Several of the questions in our battery tested subject’s knowledge about the concepts of interest 
and inflation. These questions covered calculations for the nominal rates of simple interest (fin13, fin14) 
and compound interest (fin1, fin6, fin8), and the real rate of interest adjusting for inflation (fin7). 
Questions fin13 and fin14 are adapted from an OECD International Network on Financial 
Education pilot study undertaken in 14 countries. That data were collected in 2010 and 2011 and 
administered to a nationally representative sample of adults over 18 in each country. The study was 
undertaken to identify needs and gaps in financial education and develop national policies to raise 
literacy levels. Our fin13 question adapts the following question of theirs “You lend X to a friend one 
evening and he gives you X back the next day. How much interest has he paid on the loan?” The value 
of X was tailored to the local currency and price levels. Responses to their question were open ended, 
and if the participant answered correctly the data were coded as a 1, otherwise a 0. Atkinson and Messy 
(2012) report that 95% of the subjects from Hungary answer the “interest paid on a loan” question 
correctly, while only 60% from the British Virgin Islands give the correct answer. Our fin14 question is 
asked with exactly the same wording as their question. Responses to their question were open ended and 
recorded in the same manner as described above. For this “calculation of interest plus principal” 
question, Atkinson and Messy (2012) report Ireland as the country with the highest percentage of 
respondents giving the correct answer at 76%, while Albania and Peru tied for the lowest with only 40% 
of the respondents able to give the correct answer.  
The questions fin1 and fin7 are natural extensions of questions asked by Lusardi and Mitchell 
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(2007, 2008) and used in the Health & Retirement Survey (HRS) of 2004 in the United States.9 This survey 
is naturally representative of Americans over the age of 50. Our fin1 question adapts the following 
question of theirs: “Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per 
year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to 
grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102?” Our fin7 question adapts this question of theirs: 
“Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1 percent per year and inflation was 2 
percent per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than 
today with the money in this account?” The main difference for both questions is that we ask for beliefs 
about the true answer over a wide range and allow for reports over that range. Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2011; Table 2.1) report that only 67.1% and 75.2% of their sample gave the correct response to each 
question, respectively. These fractions drop significantly (their Figures 2.1a and 2.1b) as one considers 
Black and Hispanic respondents. When the same questions were posed to a nationally representative 
sample of young Americans, aged between 22 and 28 in Wave 11 of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth conducted in 2007-2008, 79.3% and 54.0% gave the correct responses to the interest rate and 
inflation questions, respectively (Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto (2010, Table 1, p. 365)).10  
 Questions fin6 and fin8 were dropped after the first phase of data collection in our study, since 
both questions require the same compound interest calculation needed to answer fin1. These three 
questions, fin1, fin6, and fin8, only differed by the initial dollar amount, the annual interest rate, and the 
time horizon. Because these questions require the same calculation, and time in the experimental lab was 
at a premium, we decided to ask only fin1 throughout the remainder of the project. By way of 
background, fin6 is the natural adaptation of a question that was first used in the Module for Financial 
Literacy from the RAND: American Life Panel MS5: Retirement Decisions and Saving for Retirement survey. 
                                                 
9 A third question they asked was: Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single company stock usually provides 
a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” This question was posed in order to understand if individuals know about diversification 
and risk. The 3 questions from the HRS are often referred to as “The Big 3” in the financial literacy literature. In a later 
Dutch national survey van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) increased the set of questions posed to individuals. Apart from 5 
questions aimed at characterizing “basic” financial literacy (p. 452), they added 11 questions to characterize “advanced” 
financial literacy (p. 454). Similar extensions were undertaken by Bateman et al. (2012) in surveys in Australia. 
10 Bateman et al. (2012) ask these questions of adult retirement savers in Australia, and find that 78.4% correctly answer the 
inflation question and 71.8% correctly answer the interest rate question. 
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Question fin8 was the adaptation of the question used by the Chilean Social Protection Survey, as reported in 
(Mitchell, Hastings, and Chyn 2011).   
Rules, Regulations, and Procedural 
 Our study took place in the United States, so several questions in our battery tested subject’s 
knowledge about rules, regulations, and procedures unique to that country. Study participants were 
asked about their knowledge of Social Security benefits (fin2, fin3, fin4), Medicare (fin5), credit and debit 
cards (fin10, fin11), and expected returns to education (fin12). 
 The United States Social Security Administration (SSA) is an independent agency of the U.S. 
Federal government that administers Social Security, a social insurance program consisting of retirement, 
disability, and survivors’ benefits. To qualify for these benefits in the typical manner, most workers pay 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes on their earnings; the claimant’s benefits are based on 
the wage earner’s contributions. According to a 2017 report11 by the SSA, social security benefits 
account for 33% of aggregate total income of couples and nonmarried persons aged 65 or older in 2015. 
The other sources of aggregate income included 34% for current earnings, 9% for asset income, 8% for 
government employee pensions, 12% from private pensions, and 4% other. What is noteworthy is that, 
on average and for those taking social security, one-third of retirement income is funded from those 
payments.  
The age at which full (normal) social security can be claimed has varied from 65 to 67, and is 
currently 67 years old for those born in 1960 and later. However, the earliest age at which social security 
can be claimed has remained at 62 years old. Additionally, the percentage reduction in Social Security 
benefits if taken at the earliest possible age (62) has varied from a 20 percent to a 30 percent reduction, 
and is currently at a 30 percent reduction for those born in 1960 and later.12  
                                                 
11 Available at www.ssa.gov under SSA Publication No. 13-11785. 
12 Benefits by year of birth can be found at https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/agereduction.html. 
38 
 
Our questions fin2, fin3, and fin4 explore subject’s knowledge of social security. However, only 
question fin2 was kept throughout the study and included in the analysis. Questions fin3 and fin4 had a 
potential confound by not explicitly stating for what age range the question was being posed. A simple 
qualifier at the beginning of each of these question, such as: “For persons born in 1960 and later, …”, 
would have eliminated this confound, but as some participants expressed confusion it was decided to 
exclude questions fin3 and fin4 from analysis.  
Medicare is a national health insurance program administered by the U.S. Federal government 
that is available to U.S. citizens over the age of 65, regardless of income or medical history. It is funded 
through multiple sources including a federal income tax, general revenue, and premiums. According to 
the 2017 Annual Report to the Medicare Board of Trustees, Medicare covered 47.8 million people aged 65 and 
older. Our fin5 question asks subjects if they know at which age they can normally enroll in Medicare.  
 Our fin10 and fin11 questions ask if subjects know how much exposure and personal liability is 
should their personal credit or debit card is stolen, respectively. Our fin10 question is adapted from 
Mandell (2008) as reported in the Jump$tart survey: “If your credit card is stolen and the thief runs up a 
total of $1,000, but you notify the issuer of the card as soon as you discover it is missing, what is the 
maximum amount that you can be forced to pay according to Federal law?” Answers were in multiple 
choice format and given as a) $500, b) $1000, c) Nothing, and d) $50. The correct response is $50, and 
on average only 13% of students in the 2008 study answered this correctly. Hilgert, Hogarth, and 
Beverly (2003) asked a true or false version of this question in a quiz administered as part of the Survey of 
Consumers: “If your credit card is stolen and someone uses it before you report it missing, you are only 
responsible for $50, no matter how much they charge on it.” The percentage of respondents answering 
correctly was 50%. Our fin11 question was constructed similarly, but takes advantage that U.S. Federal 
Law is slightly different with respect to the maximum amount for which one can be held personally 
liable when using an ATM or debit card.  
 Our fin12 question ask if subjects understand the average return for obtaining a 4-year college 
degree compared to obtaining only a high school diploma.  It is also adapted from Mandell (2008) as 
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reported in the Jump$tart survey: “If you went to college and earned a four-year degree, how much more 
money could you expect to earn than if you only had a high school diploma?” However, the fin12 
question was dropped from the study after piloting it in a few sessions, primarily for timing purposes.   
Budgeting  
 Our question fin9 presents participants with information about a basic budget and then asks 
them to calculate how long it will take to accumulate a targeted amount of savings. The question was 
also adapted from Mandell (2008) as reported in the Jump$tart survey: “David just found a job with a 
take-home pay of $2,000 per month.  He must pay $900 for rent and $150 for groceries each month.  He 
also spends $250 per month on transportation. If he budgets $100 each month for clothing, $200 for 
restaurants and $250 for everything else, how long will it take him to accumulate savings of $600.”  
Answers were in multiple choice format and given as a) 3 months, b) 4 months, c) 1 month, and d) 2 
months. The correct response is 4 months. For the 2008 survey, 60.2% of high school students and 
77.8% of college students answered correctly.    
Longevity Risk  
 The final two questions, fin15 and fin16, ask about a basic informational input to retirement 
planning: expected remaining lifetime, conditional on reaching the age of 20. Smith, Taylor, and Sloan 
(2001, p. 1126) call this “the most important subjective risk assessment a person can make,” although 
they were referring to own-mortality. We separate out the question for men and women, to ascertain if 
the differential expected mortality between the two is recognized by individuals. These questions do not 
condition on the health, income, or any other relevant characteristics of the individual that would affect 
expected mortality. One could extend these questions to elicit more precise beliefs about someone more 
closely resembling the subject by conditioning on their age, gender, ethnicity, etc.  
 The most widely used subjective beliefs about longevity come from the Health and Retirement 
Survey, which has asked a simple question for respondents under the age of 65 since 1992: “With 0 
representing absolutely no chance, and 100 absolute certainty, what is the chance that you will live to be 
75 years of age or older?”. A comparable question asks the chance that they would live to be 85, and for 
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respondents over 65 a variant asked the chances of them living 11-15 years more. In the 2006 wave of the 
Health and Retirement Survey a sub-sample was asked questions that elicited their beliefs about the 
population life tables: “Out of a group of (men/women) your age, how many do you think will survive 
to the age of X?” The value of X was 75 for those under 65, and 11-15 years older for those over 65. 
These questions are closer to those we asked, although we only conditioned on the single age 20. 
 Of course, the questions in the Health and Retirement Survey are not incentivized, and do not elicit 
information on the confidence of the subjective belief. Smith, Taylor, and Sloan (2001) show that 
responses to this question are reasonably good predictors of future, actual mortality, even if they do not 
perfectly reflect new health information when updated. Perozek (2008) makes an even stronger case for 
the predictive value of these subjective belief questions, arguing that responses to these questions 
actually outperform population life tables. In contrast, Elder (2013) stresses that only with the 2006 wave 
can one evaluate the actual predictions, as early respondents reach the target ages of 75 or 85. And in 
that respect he presents a sharply contrary view, arguing that the evidence supports a “flatness bias,” a 
“tendency for individuals to understate the likelihood of living to relatively young ages while overstating 
the likelihood of living to ages beyond 80.” He attributes this bias to a failure to recognize that mortality 
risk increases with age. 
Recap 
 To recap, we began with 16 financial literacy questions spanning topics of interest and inflation, 
rules, regulations, and procedures, budgeting, and longevity risk. These questions were identified from 
reviewing the current literature and adapted to the method of subjective belief elicitation used here. 
While we began with 16 questions, only 11 questions were used in the final analysis. Of the 5 questions 
that were dropped, questions fin3, fin4, and fin12 were dropped due to time restrictions in the lab and 
questions fin6 and fin8 were dropped due to possible ambiguity in the wording of the question. The 
remaining 11 questions are used in the analysis throughout this chapter and in chapters 3 and 4.   
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2.2.2 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used throughout this research was first introduced in Section 1.3. 
This section will further develop that framework and show the complementary nature of why it is 
needed to jointly elicit risk preferences as well as the subjective beliefs of subjects. Following Harrison 
and Ulm (2016) each individual subject’s risk preferences is used to recover latent beliefs form the 
scoring rules employed. 
Atemporal Risk Attitudes 
 Consider the evaluation of a risky prospect consisting of a poor outcome x that will occur with 
known probability p, and a good outcome y that will occur with probability (1-p). Assume that this risky 
outcome will be resolved at a point in time, typically the present. Choices over risky prospects of this 
kind can be viewed as arising from the maximization of expected utility (EU) defined by: 
EU = p × U(x) + (1-p) × U(y), (1) 
where U is a utility function. 
 The psychological process underlying EUT theory is that the decision-maker has attitudes 
towards the variability of outcomes. The notion of “variability” includes variance, skewness and kurtosis. 
Someone might be averse to mean-preserving variance (Uʺ<0), skewness (U‴>0), and even kurtosis 
(Uʹ‴<0). However, even if someone is averse to variance, it is possible that they are attracted to 
skewness.13 
 If one relaxes the assumption that individuals and households employ Expected Utility Theory 
(EUT) to evaluate atemporal risk, then there are several ways to model their choices. One popular 
alternative is Rank Dependent Utility (RDU), due to Quiggin (1982), which posits that individuals weight 
the decumulative probabilities of outcomes using some Probability Weighting Function (PWF) reflecting 
                                                 
13 The simplest mathematical forms for utility functions rule out such complexities, but they remain a part of EUT. 
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“optimism” or “pessimism” towards better outcomes. With non-satiation, U(y) > U(x), so we can 
instead of (1) consider the decision to engage in a risky act as guided by the evaluation 
RDU = (1-w(1-p)) × U(x) + w(1-p) × U(y), (2) 
where w(p) is some probability weighting function.14 For instance, if w(p) = pγ and γ>1, then it can be 
shown that the decision-maker has a positive risk premium even if the utility function is linear, since the 
decision-maker is “pessimistic” about the better outcome occurring.15 It is immediate from (2) that 
optimism or pessimism about the probability can drive behavior, in addition to any effect from 
convexity or concavity of the utility function used to evaluate final outcomes. In short, to know if 
individuals or households are risk averse, we need to know both their utility function and their PWF. 
 Just from these two alternatives we can see that the identification of the risk preferences involves 
several psychological processes: aversion to variability of outcomes, probability or pessimism towards 
probabilities, and desires to beat the odds. 
Subjective Beliefs 
 Our interest in eliciting subjective beliefs is so that we can characterize how literate individuals 
are in certain domains. Characterizing and measuring the literacy of an individual requires then that we 
have some way of assessing how knowledgeable the person is about certain topics. There are some topics 
about which one can have “crisp” knowledge, in the sense of Boolean truth values. However, there are 
many domains of knowledge that one naturally expects varying levels of precision. We characterize 
literacy in terms of the subjective beliefs that someone has over possible responses to some question. By 
eliciting the subjective belief distribution, rather than just the answers to true/false or multiple choice 
                                                 
14 We have written (2) in the slightly awkward form in which w() is directly applied to 1-p to generate the decision weight 
w(1-p) from the probability of the higher-ranked outcome y, and then the lower-ranked outcome is the residual decision 
weight. When there are only two outcomes we could have written (2) as w(p) U(x) + w(1-p) U(y) since the decision weights 
sum to 1. The approach in (2) generalizes to cases in which there are 3 or more outcomes: the decision weight for the highest-
ranked outcome is just the weighted probability of that outcome, the decision weight for the second-highest outcome is the 
weighted probability of at least that outcome (i.e., it is the weighted cumulative probability of at least the second-highest 
outcome), and so on. The decision weight for the lowest-ranked outcome is the residual decision weight. 
15 This is true when ranking the options from best to worst.  
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questions (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2011 and 2014), we can directly measure the confidence that an 
individual has about their knowledge of some fact. 
 Following Savage (1971, 1972), we define subjective beliefs by the choices that individuals make 
when facing bets whose outcomes depend on those beliefs. The measurement of the literacy that 
someone has in a specific domain entails the elicitation of their subjective beliefs. For that task we 
conduct an experiment using proper scoring rules, which are simply structured bets offered to the 
individual by an observer (the experimenter). All of the elicited beliefs were incentivized and incentive-
compatible, so that the subjects were making real choices with real economic consequences.16 
 We elicit subjective beliefs about the answers to 11 specific questions asked of each subject. In 
each case there is a correct answer, and responses were elicited over a continuous range of possible 
answers presented in terms of 10 intervals or “bins.” A computer interface was used to present the belief 
elicitation tasks to subjects and record their choices, allowing them to allocate tokens in accordance with 
their subjective beliefs. Figure 2.1 presents the interface. The interface implements the Quadratic Scoring 
Rule (QSR) discussed below. Subjects could move the sliders at the bottom of the screen to re-allocate 
the 100 tokens as they wished, ending up with some distribution.  
 
                                                 
16 Harrison (2014a) presents evidence that one cannot rely on hypothetically elicited subjective belief distributions to generally 
provide the same responses as appropriately incentivized methods.  
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Figure 2.1 - Illustration of Subjective Belief Interface, Potential Token Allocation for fin9 
 
The instructions explained that they could earn up to $50 dollars, as shown in Figure 2.2, but only by 
allocating all 100 tokens to one interval and that interval contains the true answer: if the true answer was 
just outside the selected interval, they would in that case receive the payout indicated on the top of the 
slider bar for the bin containing the true answer.17   
                                                 
17 The software is also capable of an alternative display that shows points instead of cash payouts. These displays would be 
used if applying the “binary lottery procedure” to induce risk neutrality, following Harrison, Martínez-Correa, and Swarthout 
(2014). However, our experiments also elicited a measure of risk for each individual, and corrected for those risk attitudes as 
explained later.    
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Figure 2.2 - Illustration of Subjective Belief Interface, All Tokens Allocated to Correct Interval 
for fin9 
 
 Subjects were rewarded for one of these belief elicitation tasks, with the task selected at random 
by the subject’s rolling of a die. The question they picked was called back up on the display, then the 
correct answer was revealed, and a participant’s earnings recorded. For example, if the respondent had 
reported the beliefs in Figure 2.1, they would have been paid $25.50 if the correct answer was 2 months. 
As it happens, the correct answer here is 4 months, so the subject would have actually received $40.50. 
The decision maker in our experiment reports their subjective beliefs with a discrete version of a 
QSR for continuous distributions, developed by Matheson and Winkler (1976).18 Partition the domain 
into K intervals, and denote as r k the report of the density in interval k = 1, …, K. Assume for the 
                                                 
18 This formal exposition closely follows Di Girolamo et al. (2015) 
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moment that the decision maker is risk neutral, and that the full report consists of a series of reports for 
each interval, { r1, r2, …, r k , …, r K } such that r k ≥ 0 ∀k and ∑ i = 1…K (r i ) = 1. 
 If k is the interval in which the true value lies, then the payoff score is from Matheson and 
Winkler (1976, p. 1088, equation (6)): 
 S = (2 × r k) - ∑ i = 1…K (r i )2  
The reward in the score is a doubling of the report allocated to the true interval, and a penalty that 
depends on how these reports are distributed across the K intervals. The subject is rewarded for 
accuracy, but if that accuracy misses the true interval the punishment is severe. The punishment includes 
all possible reports. 
 Consider some examples, assuming K = 4. What if the subject has very tight subjective beliefs 
and puts all of the tokens in the correct interval? Then the score is 
 S = (2 × 1) - (12 + 02 + 02 + 02 ) = 2 - 1 = 1, 
and this is positive. But if the subject has a tight subjective belief that is wrong, the score is 
 S = (2 × 0) - (12 + 02 + 02 + 02 ) = 0 - 1 = -1, 
and the score is negative. So we see that this score would have to include some additional “endowment” 
to ensure that the earnings are positive.19 Assuming that the subject has a very diffuse subjective belief 
and allocates 25% of the tokens to each interval, the score is less than 1: 
 S = (2 × ¼) - (¼2 + ¼2 + ¼2 + ¼2 ) = ½ - ¼ = ¼ < 1. 
The tradeoff from the last case is that one can always ensure a score of ¼, but there is an incentive to 
provide less diffuse reports, and that incentive is the possibility of a score of 1. 
                                                 
19 This is a point of practical behavioral significance, but is not important for the immediate theoretical point. 
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 To ensure complete generality, and avoid any decision maker facing losses, allow some 
endowment, α, and scaling of the score, β. We then get the generalized scoring rule 
 α + β [ (2 × r k) - ∑ i =1…K (r i ) 2 ] 
where we initially assumed α=0 and β=1. We can assume different values of α and β to transform the 
payoffs to any alternative range of levels we may want. 
 In our experiment K = 10, and we do not know whether the subject is risk neutral. Indeed, the 
weight of evidence from past experiments clearly suggests that subjects will be modestly risk averse over 
the prizes they face. It is well-known that risk aversion can significantly affect inferences from 
applications of the QSR when eliciting subjective probabilities over binary events (Winkler and Murphy 
1970; Kadane and Winkler 1988), and there are various methods for addressing these concerns. Harrison 
et al. (2017) characterize the implications of the general case of a risk averse agent when facing the QSR 
and reporting subjective distributions over continuous events, and find, remarkably, that these concerns do 
not apply with anything like the same force. For empirically plausible levels of risk aversion, one can 
reliably elicit the most important features of the latent subjective belief distribution without undertaking 
calibration for risk attitudes. 
 Specifically, they draw the following conclusions: 
1. An individual reports having a positive probability for an event only if he has positive subjective 
probability for the event. We can infer from Figure 2.1, for instance, that this subject truly attaches 
zero weight to the possibility of a savings horizon 5 months or longer, no matter what his risk 
attitudes. 
2. If an individual has the same subjective probability for two events, then the reported probabilities 
for the two events will also be the same if the individual is risk averse or risk neutral.  
3. The converse is true for risk averse subjects, as well as for risk lovers. That is, if we observe two 
events receiving the same reported probability, we know that the true probabilities are also equal, 
although not necessarily the same as the reported probabilities. 
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4. If the individual has a symmetric subjective distribution, then the reported mean will be exactly the 
same as the true subjective mean, whether or not the subjective distribution is unimodal. Hence if we 
simply assume symmetry of the true distribution, a relatively weak assumption in some settings, we 
can elicit the mean belief directly from the average of the reported distribution. 
5. The more risk averse an agent is, the more the reported distribution will resemble a uniform 
distribution defined on the support of their true distribution. In effect, risk aversion causes the 
individual to report a “flattened” version of their true distribution, but never to report beliefs to 
which they assign zero subjective probability. 
6. It is possible to derive the effect of increased risk aversion on the difference between the reported 
distribution and true distribution. Harrison et al. (2017) show numerically that a priori plausible levels 
of risk aversion in laboratory settings implies no significant deviation between reported and true 
subjective beliefs in this setting. 
Provided that our subjects exhibit the modest levels of risk aversion that are typically found in lab 
settings with similar stakes, these results provide the basis for using the reported distributions as if they 
are the true, subjective belief distributions. 
 One of the maintained assumptions in our main data analysis, then, is that the responses of 
subjects to the belief elicitation questions can be taken at face value as revealing the true subjective 
beliefs of the individual (to a reasonable approximation). One alternative assumption is that subjects 
exhibit RDU preferences over risk, in which case we are unable to take these responses at face value in 
all respects. To evaluate that alternative assumption our experimental design included binary lottery 
choice questions for each subject, with lotteries defined over objective probabilities. So the alternative, 
but significantly weaker, assumption is that evidence for RDU preferences over objective probabilities is 
evidence for RDU (or non-SEU) preferences over subjective probabilities. If we accept this assumption 
for some individuals, we can filter them out and see if it changes our inferences based on the average 
elicited subjective beliefs (Harrison 2014a).  
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 Our approach to eliciting subjective belief distributions allows a rigorous characterization of the 
concept20 of “overconfidence,” widely used in the behavioral economics literature, since it provides 
information on the confidence that the individual holds certain beliefs. Moore and Healy (2008) and 
Merkle and Weber (2011) review the vast literature, and explain why one needs information on the 
distribution of beliefs to measure overconfidence relative to the “rational Bayesian updating” 
explanation offered by Benoît and Dubra (2011). 
Recovering a Participant’s True Beliefs 
 Once a participant has reported their beliefs to the scoring rule, one faces the question of 
recovering the latent subjective belief distribution underlying those reports. There are four approaches 
that will be adopted here to recover the latent subjective beliefs and all are at the level of the individual. 
They differ in terms of the importance of identifying theoretical assumptions, from the most restrictive 
to the least restrictive.  
 The first approach is to simply assume that every subject behaves consistently with SEU theory. 
In this case, we know from the results in Harrison, Martínez Correa, Swarthout and Ulm (2017) that 
subjects that exhibit the typical risk attitudes found in the laboratory will generate reports that are 
extremely close to their true, latent subjective belief distribution. This is a remarkable result, particularly 
in contrast to the results obtained for the elicitation of a subjective probability over a binary event. In the 
elicitation of a subjective probability even modest amounts of risk aversion generate significant 
distortions in the elicited probability compared to the observed report. The intuition is that risk aversion 
causes the subject to report a belief that is closer to a 50% belief, because at a 50% report the subject is 
equalizing the payoff for the two states of nature that are possible. By reporting closer to 50% then the 
subject actually believes, the subject is reducing the variability of payouts from the scoring rule 
depending on which of the binary events actually occurs. In the extreme, the most risk-averse subject 
will literally report 50% and remove all variability in payouts. The net result of this distortion from risk 
                                                 
20 To be precise, the notion of “overplacement,” or the “better-than-average” effect in which more than 50% of a group of 
individuals think themselves to be better than the average of that group in something. 
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attitudes, in the case of elicitation of a subjective probability of a binary event, is to cause reports to be 
left biased or right biased relative to true beliefs. However, when eliciting subjective belief distributions 
over a continuous event, which is what is being done here, the effect of risk aversion under SEU is to 
cause the reports to be “flattened” relative to true beliefs. In other words, the subject is reducing the 
variability of payoffs across the states of nature that he thinks will occur, and if there are four or five 
discrete states of nature that he thinks will occur, he will reduce the variability over those four or five 
states by equalizing the number of tokens allocated to each state. So instead of the distortion causing a 
left biased or right biased adjustment relative to true beliefs, it causes a flattening adjustment relative to 
true beliefs. This results in reports being much closer to true beliefs, at least for the standard levels of 
risk aversion found in the laboratory. 
 This is a valuable theoretical result, but rests on the assumption that the individual is indeed 
behaving consistently with SEU. In effect, that strong theoretical assumption is “buying” a great deal of 
identification: if we can make that assumption, then effectively the observed reports can be assumed to 
be the true, latent subjective beliefs. What does one do if one relaxes that assumption that the subject 
behaves consistently with SEU? The remaining three approaches consider various ways of relaxing that 
assumption. 
 One way to relax that assumption is to undertake a separate experimental task in which one 
determines if the subject is behaving consistently with respect to EUT or some alternative model of 
decision-making under risk. We should distinguish between SEU and EUT because the typical task that 
is used for this purpose is one in which there is objective risk, generated by physical dice, rather than 
subjective risk. We then make the assumption that if the subject is behaving consistently with respect to 
EUT, then it is reasonable to assume that they behave consistently with respect to subjective beliefs and 
hence behave consistently with SEU. Assume that the alternative specification to EUT is the popular 
Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) specification. In this case our approach boils down to deciding if the 
individual subject is better characterized, from their choices over risky lotteries, as an EUT subject or as 
a RDU subject. The simplest way to make that determination is to estimate the structural model of risk 
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preferences for the individual, again based on their responses to the choices over risky lotteries. We 
discuss the econometric specification of this step in section 2.5. Because EUT is nested within RDU, we 
would estimate the more general model for each individual and then test the hypothesis that the 
estimates are consistent with EUT. That hypothesis boils down to the assumption that the subject does 
not engage in any “probability weighting.” That hypothesis can be formally tested once we have 
econometric estimates of the RDU model for the individual. We can then adopt some conventional 
critical level at which we determine if the null hypothesis that the subject behaves consistently with EUT 
is rejected. If we use a 5% critical level, then if the p-value for the hypothesis test provides a value that is 
5% or below, then we classify the subject as being consistent with RDU. On the other hand, if the p-
value for the hypothesis test provides a value that is greater than 5%, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, and we conclude that the subject behaves consistently with EUT. Once we have classified 
each subject in this manner, we can simply repeat the analysis from the first approach but deleting the 
subjects who are not deemed to be behaving consistently with SEU. In general terms, based on evidence 
for samples drawn from the same population in Harrison and Ng (2016) and Harrison and Ulm (2016), 
we expect that approximately 50% of the subjects will be characterized as being consistent with EUT in 
this manner.  
 The third approach is a variant on the second approach just presented, but where we ascertain a 
probability that the subject is an SEU subject. The second approach simplifies this by assuming that we 
have classified the subject as 100% consistent with SEU, or 0% consistent with SEU, based on the 
critical value of the hypothesis test (assumed to be 5% above). A more flexible approach is to recognize 
that the hypothesis test provides information on the strength of the assumption that the subject is an 
SEU subject, and that by transforming that information on the strength of the null hypothesis into an 
“all or nothing” classification, we are in fact throwing valuable information way. If there is some way 
from the statistical hypothesis test to ascertain the probability that a given subject is an SEU subject, 
then this approach would simply reweight the responses used in the first approach. It would reflect the 
probability that the subject is behaving consistently with those reports actually being a close 
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approximation of the true latent subjective probability belief distribution. It is an extremely easy matter 
to reweight observations in any statistical analysis, and one sacrifices virtually nothing by using this 
approach in terms of the range of econometric specifications that can be examined and hypothesis tests 
that can be conducted. But one does gain the use of all observations in the sample, whereas the second 
approach would, under the assumptions noted about the fraction of subjects that we find in this 
population to be consistent with SEU, lead us to drop about 50% of the sample. 
 The final approach is to undertake more sophisticated corrections to the reported subjective 
belief distributions in order to “recover” the true latent subjective belief distribution, even when one 
assumes that the subject behaves consistently with RDU. In this instance we use the theoretical results, 
and numerical methods, of Harrison and Ulm (2016). They show that if the subject does behave 
consistently with RDU, then you will also experience a left bias or right bias in the elicited subjective 
probability belief distribution. One still obtains the result, for perfectly intuitive reasons, that the subject 
will never report a positive belief over an interval that the subject actually assigns zero subjective 
probability weight to, even if the subject is a probability weighter. What will happen is that the subject 
will “skew” the reports to the left or to the right, depending on the nature of the probability weighting 
that is employed. But the subject will never “shift” the reports to the left or to the right, to include 
intervals that the subject has assigned a zero probability to subjectively. If one knows the parameters of 
the RDU specification for the subject, it is possible to recover the exact latent subjective probability 
distribution from the observed reports.  
It is also possible to recover a distribution over these recovered distributions, reflecting the fact 
that the initial estimate of the RDU model is stochastic. In other words, we may have estimates of the 
parameters of the RDU model for a given subject, but we must recognize that those parameters have 
standard errors, and that imprecision in the estimate of the parameters will generate some imprecision in 
the recovered subjective probability distributions. This additional uncertainty is conventionally handled 
by undertaking a bootstrapping analysis of the recovery of subjective probability distributions. This 
approach is, as one can imagine, somewhat more involved numerically than the first three approaches, 
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but allows one to say that true, latent subjective probability distributions have been employed, rather 
than making strong assumptions explicit in the first three approaches.  
We see these approaches as providing a natural sequence with which to analyze the observed 
data. The first approach allows one to directly treat the observed data as subjective belief distributions 
from which we can ascertain measures of literacy, but at the price of making a very strong theoretical 
assumption. The second and third approaches allow one to relax that assumption to varying degrees, but 
still means that some observations are either thrown out or given relatively low weights compared to 
other observations. The fourth approach allows one to avoid assuming that the subject is behaving 
consistently with SEU, but at the price of requiring more numerical analysis of the raw results in order to 
recover the true latent subjective probability distributions. 
2.3 Experimental Tasks 
The experimental results reported here were collected as part of several unrelated projects. One 
was a project conducted for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta designed to understand differences 
between survey measures of future inflation and incentivized belief distributions of future inflation. 
Another was a project designed to evaluate expected welfare gains to individuals from purchases of 
insurance, documented in Harrison and Ng (2016).  
Of relevance for the results reported here, each subject completed a battery of binary choices 
over risky lotteries, a battery of token allocations for beliefs, and a standard socio-demographic survey. 
The order in which these were administered varied from session to session. Section 2.2 addresses the 
theoretical framework of the risky lotteries and the subjective belief tasks, and using characteristics of 
individuals derived from the standard socio-demographic survey allows the modeling of some of the 
observed heterogeneity in the sample. 
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2.4 Experiments and Demographics 
The experiments in the United States, reported in chapters 2, 3 and 4, were conducted at Georgia 
State University’s (GSU) Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN)21 over the period from November 
2013 to March 2016 and were often run in combination with other research projects. The lab can 
accommodate up to 40 subjects in a session. In total 31 sessions using the financial literacy questions 
were administered to current GSU students that registered interest on the recruiter over that time frame; 
note session 24 isn’t applicable. Once a student participated in any of the 31 sessions, they were excluded 
from participating in subsequent sessions for this project. A copy of the email invitation via an online 
recruiter is in Appendix B.  
Table 2.2 displays the number of sessions by treatments and the bin labeling scheme used. Over 
the 31 sessions, 20 sessions used “Initial” interval labels and 11 used “New” interval labels. This is a 
naming convention that was adopted to test if there is an anchoring effect or mid-point biases around 
the initial bin labels compared to new bin labels when shifting the interval labels around the bins, thus 
shifting the bin location containing the true answer, Appendix A provides more detail on these 
robustness checks. The second column labeled “Individual” is defined as a participant only having access 
to their own cognition with which to respond to the financial literacy questions being asked. The 
participants in these control sessions were allowed to use a piece of blank paper and a pencil if they 
wanted to do calculations by hand, but no other outside aides were allowed (e.g. calculator, phone, or 
internet). There were 16 Individual sessions using the initial bin label and 3 using the new labels, thus 19 
sessions total. The third column shows the number of sessions that were allowed timed access to the 
Internet just prior to answering the financial literacy questions. There are 5 Internet sessions in total; 2 
sessions using the initial labels and 3 sessions using the new bin labels. The Internet sessions are 
discussed fully in Chapter 3. The fourth column shows the number of sessions assigned to the Group 
                                                 
21 Every Fall semester graduate students and staff affiliated with ExCEN canvas classrooms across Georgia State University 
to inform students about the opportunity to participate in paid research at the Center. Students interested in the opportunity 
are instructed to go to ExCEN’s website - http://excen.gsu.edu/center/ - and register for the online recruiter. After a 
student is registered they are then eligible to be invited to participate in research projects that take place in ExCEN. Only 
current students are eligible to participate.  
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treatment. In the Group treatment students were randomly assigned to exogenously formed groups 
comprised of two individuals and required to make a joint decision when answering the literacy 
questions. There are 7 total Group sessions; 2 sessions using the initial labels and 5 sessions using new 
labels. Beliefs as part of Groups will be the focus of Chapter 4.  
Table 2.2 - Session Count by Treatment and Bin Labels 
  
 The proceedings of a session were as follows: a) students were signed into the experiment using 
their GSU identification card and randomly assigned to one of the 40 seats in the lab; b) students were 
presented with an introductory text that outlined their time in the lab; c) they would complete a 
demographic survey, participate in stylized economic experiments; d) paid a flat participation fee and any 
additional earnings generated from their decisions in the experiments. The complete protocol and 
instruction sets is documented in Appendix C. Table 2.3 provides an expanded view by session, overall 
participation, treatment assigned, and the number of responses for each question asked in a given 
session.  
Label Individual Internet Group Session Count
Initial 16 2 2 20
New 3 3 5 11
Total 19 5 7 31
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Table 2.3 - Session by Total Participation, Bin Label, Treatment, and by FinQ 
Session Participants Bin Label Individual Internet Groups fin1 fin2 fin3 fin4 fin5 fin6 fin7 fin8 fin9 fin10 fin11 fin12 fin13 fin14 fin15 fin16
S01 40 Initial Yes 14 13 14 13 14 13 40 13 13 14 13 13 14 13 13 13
S02 40 Initial Yes 13 14 13 13 13 14 40 13 14 13 14 14 13 13 13 13
S03 40 Initial Yes 13 13 13 14 13 13 40 14 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 14
S04 40 Initial Yes 14 13 14 13 14 13 40 13 13 14 13 13 14 13 13 13
S05 40 Initial Yes 14 13 14 13 14 13 40 13 13 14 13 13 14 13 13 13
S06 40 Initial Yes 13 13 13 14 13 13 40 14 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 14
S07 40 Initial Yes 13 13 13 14 13 13 40 14 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 14
S08 36 Initial Yes 13 11 13 12 13 11 36 12 11 13 11 11 13 12 12 12
S09 3 Initial Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S10 4 Initial Yes 2 1 2 1 2 1 4 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
S11 3 Initial Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S12 36 Initial Yes 36 36 36 36 36 36
S13 40 Initial Yes 40 40 40 40 40 40
S14 37 Initial Yes 37 37 37 37 37 37
S15 36 Initial Yes 18 18 18 18 36 18 18 18 18 18 18
S16 34 Initial Yes 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
S17 33 New Yes 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
S18 33 Initial Yes 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
S19 33 New Yes 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
S20 32 New Yes 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
S21 16 New Yes 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
S22 22 New Yes 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
S23 22 New Yes 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
S24 N/A
S25 39 New Yes 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
S26 28 New Yes 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
S27 34 New Yes 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
S28 34 New Yes 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
S29 39 New Yes 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
S30 32 Initial Yes 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
S31 34 Initial Yes 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
S32 36 Initial Yes 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Total 976 19 5 7 666 684 165 127 666 183 976 127 684 666 684 183 666 628 628 628
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For purposes of this chapter we first start by comparing the responses to the 11 belief questions 
presented to individuals under both labeling schemes, initial and new, to test whether the label shift had an 
anchoring effect. For Chapters 3 and 4 we can consider pooling responses across all labels using all 
Individuals as a control group to compare results with Internet and the Group treatments, respectively, if 
the effect of the labeling scheme is not statistically significant. Table 2.4 shows the total number of 
participants in the Individual sessions that responded for each financial literacy question by bin label. For 
fin9, for example, we see that a total of 322 participants responded to that question, 106 were presented the 
question that used the new labels and 216 with the initial labels. 
Table 2.4 - Number of Participants by Question by Bin Label, Individuals 
 
 The demographic covariates for the GSU sample are generally self-explanatory, and their averages 
are displayed in Figure 2.3. Variable “High GPA” denotes subjects reporting a cumulative GPA between 
3.75 and 4, which translates into “mostly A’s.” We have more women than men, relatively large shares of 
Asians and Blacks, and a large fraction of Christians.
Question Total
Initial New
fin1 198 106 304
fin2 216 106 322
fin3 165 165
fin4 127 127
fin5 198 106 304
fin6 183 183
fin7 508 106 614
fin8 127 127
fin9 216 106 322
fin10 198 106 304
fin11 216 106 322
fin12 183 183
fin13 198 106 304
fin14 160 106 266
fin15 160 106 266
fin16 160 106 266
Total 3213 1166 4379
Bin Labels
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Figure 2.3 - Average of GSU Sample Demographics 
 
The experiments in Denmark, reported in chapter 5, involved subjects recruited for a field 
experiment. The recruitment procedures, logistics, and demographics are explained in chapter 5.   
2.5 Econometric Specification 
 The most natural econometric specification for the beliefs data is Interval Regression. This 
econometric model is essentially the same as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, except that it allows 
that data may be in intervals. That is, we may know the strength of someone’s belief about how many years 
a man will live, conditional on being 20, is between 40 and 49, but not know more precisely than that. We 
might also observe the strength of their belief is 40 years or more, but not know more than that. When the 
upper and lower bound of the interval are the same, the data collapse to “point data” that is what one 
normally applies OLS to. 
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 One limitation of Interval Regression, as typically implemented, is that it assumes that the latent 
distribution being estimated is Gaussian. When beliefs are recorded in terms of probabilities, as we do in 
some cases, this can be unattractive: the Gaussian distribution implies that the estimated values in this 
instance could be less than 0 or greater than 1, which is inconsistent with them being a probability that is 
bounded between 0 and 1. One way to address this issue is to consider an extension of Interval Regression 
to allow for a latent distribution that is bounded between 0 and 1, and the most flexible of those is the Beta 
distribution. It is possible to extend the logic of Interval Regression to allow for a Beta distribution, as 
documented in a lecture by Harrison (2013), reproduced here with permission as Appendix D. These notes 
also show how one can extend the specification to include a flexible non-Gaussian distribution that is not 
bounded between 0 and 1, the Gamma distribution. 
 For most purposes it is acceptable to use the typical Interval Regression specification, which is easy 
to understand and interpret. As needed, estimates will be provided with the Beta or Gamma Interval 
Regression model and noted as such. 
 We estimate EUT and RDU models for each individual, following procedures explained in Harrison 
and Rutström (2008) and formal econometric models specified in Harrison and Ng (2016), Harrison and 
Ross (2018) and Harrison and Ulm (2016). We consider the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function U(x) = x(1−r)/(1−r) where x is the lottery prize and r≠1 is a parameter to be estimated. For r=1 
assume U(x)=ln(x) if needed. Thus r is the coefficient of CRRA for an EUT individual: r=0 corresponds to 
risk neutrality, r<0 to risk loving, and r>0 to risk aversion. For the RDU models we consider this CRRA 
utility function and one of three possible probability weighting functions. The first is the simple “power” 
probability weighting function proposed by Quiggin (1982), with curvature parameter γ: ω(p) = pγ. 22 The 
second probability weighting function is the “inverse-S” function popularized by Tversky and Kahneman 
                                                 
22 So γ≠1 is consistent with a deviation from the conventional EUT representation. Convexity of the probability weighting 
function is said to reflect “pessimism” and generates, if one assumes for simplicity a linear utility function, a risk premium since 
ω(p) < p  ∀p and hence the “RDU EV” weighted by ω(p) instead of p has to be less than the EV weighted by p. 
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(1992): ω(p) = pγ / ( pγ + (1-p)γ )1/γ. 23 The third probability weighting function is a general functional form 
proposed by Prelec (1998) that exhibits considerable flexibility. This function is ω(p) = exp{-η(-ln p)φ}, and 
is defined for 0<p≤1, η>0 and φ>0.24  For our purposes, it does not matter which of these probability 
weighting functions characterize behavior: the only issue is at what statistical confidence level we can (or 
cannot) reject the EUT hypothesis that ω(p) = p. 
 If the sole metric for deciding a subject were better characterized by EUT or RDU was the log-
likelihood of the estimated model, then there would be no subjects classified as EUT since RDU nests 
EUT. But if we use metrics of a 10%, 5% or 1% significance level on these test of the EUT hypothesis that 
ω(p) = p, then we can classify subjects as being RDU subjects if there is statistically significant evidence that 
they behave as if weighting probability. The null hypothesis is that subjects are better characterized by EUT, 
and they will be assumed to be better characterized by RDU only if they show statistically significant to 
reject that null hypothesis. As a general matter the population from which our samples are drawn end up 
being classified as roughly 50% EUT, and the rest as one or other of the RDU models, with the most 
popular RDU model being the one with the Prelec probability weighting function (see Harrison and Ng 
(2016) and Harrison and Ulm (2016)). 
Further, the recovery of latent subjective beliefs is undertaken at the level of each individual subject, 
and as such requires estimates of a model of risk preferences for each individual.25 In general this is not an 
issue, since one of the four specifications considered normally solves with a priori sensible parameter values 
for the vast majority of subjects. When estimating such models for a large number of subjects, however, it is 
                                                 
23 This function exhibits inverse-S probability weighting (optimism for small p, and pessimism for large p) for γ<1, and S-shaped 
probability weighting (pessimism for small p, and optimism for large p) for γ>1. 
24 When φ=1 this function collapses to the Power function ω(p) = pη. Many apply the Prelec (1998; Proposition 1, part (B)) 
function with constraint 0 < φ < 1, which requires that the probability weighting function exhibit subproportionality. Contrary to 
received wisdom, many individuals exhibit estimated probability weighting functions that violate subproportionality, so we use the 
more general specification from Prelec (1998; Proposition 1, part (C)), only requiring φ > 0, and let the evidence for an individual 
determine if the estimates φ lies in the unit interval. 
25 To restate, interval regressions are utilized for the evaluation of the final results throughout the thesis. However, the calibration 
and recovery of latent subjective beliefs is done utilizing techniques developed by Harrison and Ng (2016) and Harrison and Ulm 
(2016), which are the most current techniques available at this time.  
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always possible that some subjects have no such solved model. In that case we adopt an approach with an 
informally Bayesian flavor. We estimate a pooled RDU model using the Prelec probability weighting 
function, and use it to predict parameter estimates for each individual. This is the most flexible of the four 
specifications, of course. This model includes a vector of demographic characteristics for each of the 
parameters of the model of risk preferences, so the predictions reflect the actual values of those 
characteristics for each subject. Hence the predictions for each subject can be, and are, very different, and 
can include EUT as a special case if that is the case. We are also able to predict a covariance matrix for the 
subject, so we can then undertake bootstrap evaluations of the recovered beliefs for that subject. These 
predicted risk preferences are only used when there is no model for an individual, using the choices of only 
that individual, that converges with sensible parameter values; the default is to use the estimates based only 
on the observed choices of that subject. In this GSU sample we use these predicted risk preferences for 84 
subjects out of 955, or 8.8%. 
2.5.1 How to Interpret the Interval Regression Output of Stata  
It is worthwhile to carefully go through the regression output generated from Stata’s intreg 
command using one of the financial literacy questions to articulate and interpret the output that will form 
the basis for the remainder of our analysis. Here we illustrate an example using the recovered latent 
subjective beliefs for the pool of control participants26 for fin9, “the budgeting question,” with wording as 
follows:  
David just found a job with a take-home pay of $2,000 per month. He must pay $900 for rent and $150 for 
groceries each month. He also spends $250 per month on transportation. If he budgets $100 each month for clothing, 
$200 for restaurants, and $250 for everything else, how long will it take him to accumulate savings of $600? 
                                                 
26 Recall that our control participants are individuals without access to the internet or a group and using the initial labeling 
scheme.  
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The bin intervals are exact values which were labeled as: “1 month”, “2 months”, “3 months”, “4 months”, 
“5 months”, “6 months”, “7 months”, “8 months”, “9 months”, and “10 months” for bins 1 through 10, 
respectively. For this question and response interval, the true answer is “4 months”, which lies in bin 4.  
The block below contains the code used and the subsequent estimation in Stata’s intreg for a 
constant-only model using fin9. It is worthwhile being explicit about how one interprets output of this kind, 
to avoid excessive abstraction in explaining the way the data are evaluated. Immediately following the model 
is a demonstration on how to recover sigma. Note the highlighted areas end with superscripted indicators 
that will be used below to further elaborate on what the estimation output is telling us. 
 
1 . * demonstrate translation from "lnsigma" to "sigma" 
2 . intreg v_lo v_hia [fweight = choiceI]b if qid=="fin9" & Controls==1, cluster(id)c 
Fitting constant-only modeld: 
 
Iteration 0: log pseudolikelihood = -35199.053 
Iteration 1: log pseudolikelihood = -35197.572 
Iteration 2: log pseudolikelihood = -35197.572 
Fitting full modele: 
 
Iteration 0: log pseudolikelihood = -35197.572 
Iteration 1: log pseudolikelihood = -35197.572 
Interval regression Number of obsg = 20,865 
Uncensored = 0 
Left-censored = 0 
Right-censored = 370 
Interval-cens. = 20,495 
Wald chi2(0)h = . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -35197.572f Prob > chi2i = . 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 216 clusters in id) 
 
  
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
 
z 
 
P>|z| 
 
[95% Conf. 
 
Interval] 
_consj 4.15382 .0811236 51.20 0.000 3.994821 4.312819 
/lnsigmak .2422078 .1051359 2.30 0.021 .0361452 .4482704 
sigmal 1.274059 .1339494   1.036806 1.565602 
 
3 . nlcom (sigma: 
exp([lnsigma]_cons))m  
sigma: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigman 1.274059 .1339494 9.51 0.000 1.011523 1.536595 
 
*updated 6/3/2018 using recovered beliefs  
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Figure 2.4 - Stata Output for intreg Command, Constant-only Model Using fin9. 
a) vi_lo vi_hi – The latent dependent variable in an interval regression are two numbers telling us the lower 
bound of an interval and the upper bound of an interval, v_lo and v_hi, respectively. Thus values 0.23 
and 0.45 would imply an observation known to lie in the interval (0.23, 0.45). It is possible that intervals 
overlap, so that another interval might be (0.3, 0.5). There is no requirement that the intervals be the 
same length. Although specific to the syntax in Stata, -∞ is implied by a dot as the lower value, and +∞ 
is implied by a dot as the upper value. If we have an observation that is exact, as is the case for fin9, the 
upper and lower intervals are the same, and we can mix “exact” and “interval” data freely. In the case of 
the beliefs data we have non-overlapping intervals by design, and often have intervals including -∞ or 
+∞. 
i. Note that we stressed the term latent: using the language of most statistical packages, 
there are two variables giving us the lower and upper bounds of each interval, but we are 
estimating a model of a single latent variable. 
ii. Just prior to the table output we are told the types of observations inferred for use in the 
model. In this case, out of the 216 subjects we have no uncensored observations, no left-
censored observations, 370 right-censored observations, and 20,495 interval 
observations. The word “censored” just means that the lower value is -∞ (left-censored) 
or the upper value is +∞ (right-censored). 
b) [fweight = choiceI] – The way the interval regression responses are recorded rests critically on what I 
call “frequency weights.” These are weights on each observation to indicate how many times it should 
be counted: for example, in a survey of the population it is possible that we know that there are 100 men 
and 100 women in the population, but the survey has 10 men and 5 women. In this case we might place 
a weight of 10 on each man in the survey and a weight of 20 on each woman in the survey, so that when 
the survey observations are weighted they match the population. In this instance, we use the 100 tokens 
that each subject has in order to apportion weights to each interval. Recall the belief elicitation task gives 
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each subject 100 tokens to apportion across each of the 10 intervals, thus these frequency weights sum 
to 100 for each subject and each belief question. 
c) cluster(id) – Given that we have multiple observations from each subject, in fact 100 observations 
corresponding to each of the 100 tokens that the subject allocates, it is important to recognize when we 
estimate the model over many individuals that the responses of a given individual will be correlated. 
This is implemented by the use of “clustering,” which is a popular method of allowing for this type of 
correlation. There are many other ways to allow for this type of correlation, such as “fixed effects” or 
“random effects” panel estimation. 
d) Fitting constant-only model – This is the iteration history for fitting the constant only model. This 
model does not include any predictors and is simply estimating the mean predicted value of the outcome 
variable.  Because the observed values for the outcome variable are intervals, not exact values, the mean 
predicted value is not simply the mean of the observed values.  Instead, the predicted mean is arrived at 
iteratively by maximizing the log likelihood of the data given a mean predicted value.  
e) Fitting full model – This is the iteration history for fitting the model including the specified predictors. 
f) Log psuedolikelihood – This is the log likelihood of the fitted model. It is used in the Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square test of whether all predictors’ regression coefficients in the model are simultaneously zero.  
g) Number of obs – This is the number of observations in the dataset for which all of the predictor 
variables and at least one of the outcome interval variables is non-missing. In interval regression, one of 
the interval bounds may be missing. If the upper bound of an interval is missing, then the interval is 
treated as [lower bound, infinity). If the lower bound of an interval is missing, then the interval is treated 
as (negative infinity, upper bound]. If both the lower bound and upper bound are missing, then the 
observation is not included in the model. Also, see note under a) ii above. 
h) LR chi2(0) – This is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square test that at least one of the predictors’ 
regression coefficient is not equal to zero. The number in the parentheses indicates the degrees of 
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freedom of the Chi-Square distribution used to test the LR Chi-Square statistic and is defined by the 
number of predictors in the model (0).27 
i) Prob > chi2 – This is the probability of getting a LR test statistic as extreme as, or more so, than the 
observed statistic under the null hypothesis; the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero. The parameter of the chi-square distribution used to test the null 
hypothesis is defined by the degrees of freedom in the prior line, chi2(0).  
j) Coef. – These are the regression coefficients.  They are interpreted in the same manner as OLS 
regression coefficients: for a one-unit increase in the predictor variable, the expected value of the 
outcome variable changes by the regression coefficient, given the other predictor variables in the model 
are held constant. The first estimate to come from the interval regression model when we have no 
covariates, such as the gender of the subject, shows us the average value of the estimated distribution of 
beliefs over all subjects. This is estimated as the mean of the latent distribution of beliefs, and is shown 
here as 4.154. We observe that the 95% confidence interval of this estimate of the mean of the pooled 
distribution of subjective beliefs is between 3.995 and 4.313. We can use this estimate of the mean to 
test the hypothesis that the average belief is the same as the true belief, which in this case is 4 months. 
We could undertake this hypothesis test explicitly, or simply observe that the true value lies between the 
95% confidence intervals, although close to the lower bound. 
k) /lnsigma – The second estimate to come from the interval regression model shows us the standard 
deviation of the belief distribution. In this case Stata estimates a transformation of the standard 
deviation, which is the logarithm of the standard deviation. It does this for numerical reasons.  
l) sigma – Undertakes a nonlinear transformation of the estimate of /lnsigma to recover the estimate of 
the standard deviation itself. When there is no covariate in the model, as in this case, Stata displays this 
                                                 
27 It is often the case that the estimated interval regression model will not show a value for the Wald statistic, and this is indicated 
in the case of Stata by a dot. All this means is that the numerical algorithm that was being used to find the maximum likelihood 
estimates was unable to complete an infinitesimal perturbation of the likelihood at the maximum likelihood values. This is often 
due to numerical issues that are unrelated to whether the estimation method has indeed found the maximum likelihood values. If 
the Wald statistic is missing, then the p-value associated with it will also be missing. 
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transformation. So we observe that the estimated standard deviation of the distribution is 1.274, with a 
95% confidence interval between 1.037 and 1.566. This estimate of the standard deviation, 1.274, is 
mathematically e0.2422078, which is to say that the estimate of the logarithm of the standard deviation, 
0.2422078, is mathematically ln(1.274059).  
m) nlcom – This mathematical expression demonstrates the translation to convert the logarithm of the 
standard deviation (from k above) into the recovered standard deviation.  
n) sigma (recovered) – We then see that the estimate of the standard deviation is 1.274059, which is 
identical to the estimate automatically provided by Stata. There is a slight difference in the 95% 
confidence intervals that are calculated, but these are usually second-order differences. One reason for 
the difference is that the nonlinear combination that is explicitly calculated here is in fact an 
approximation, using what is known in statistics as the “Delta method” (Oehlert 1992). This method 
provides a way of approximating the correct standard errors or nonlinear transformations of estimated 
parameters, effectively taking a Taylor series approximation of the true nonlinear transformation. Here 
we show this transformation explicitly in this instance, even though Stata has provided the transformed 
estimate of the standard deviation of the distribution, because we will be using this explicit 
transformation extensively to recover detailed coefficients when we have covariates. We will illustrate 
this momentarily. 
The next block of code below is like the one above, however, introduces one covariate to the intreg 
estimation; in this case, whether the participant was a female. This is known as the total effect of being female 
and we will go on to calculate (recover) the marginal effect of the covariate and its standard error, now that 
Stata doesn’t automatically provide these. Let us now interpret those results, those of the recovered sigmas, 
and the standard error of the covariate’s incremental effect. Since we are building on the results above, I 
again highlight the areas of interest which end with superscripted indicators to aid in the discussion that 
follows.   
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1 . * now do when Stata does not provide this, when there are covariates 
2 . intreg v_lo v_hi femaleo [fweight = choiceI] if qid=="fin9" & Controls==1, cluster(id 
> ) het(female)p 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0: log pseudolikelihood = -227411.08 
Iteration 1: log pseudolikelihood = -36784.947 
Iteration 2: log pseudolikelihood = -35151.394 
Iteration 3: log pseudolikelihood = -35116.73 
Iteration 4: log pseudolikelihood = -35116.592 
Iteration 5: log pseudolikelihood = -35116.592 
Interval regression Number of obs = 20,865 
Wald chi2(1) = 1.21 
Log pseudolikelihood = -35116.592 Prob > chi2 = 0.2710 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 216 clusters in id) 
 
  
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
 
z 
 
P>|z| 
 
[95% Conf. 
 
Interval] 
model  
female 
_cons 
 
-.1785286 
4.262164 
 
.1621955 
.1216165 
 
-1.10 
35.05 
 
0.271 
0.000 
 
-.496426 
4.0238 
 
.1393688 
4.500528 
lnsigma 
female 
_cons 
 
.0883017 
.1846372 
 
.2348058 
.2034445 
 
0.38 
0.91 
 
0.707 
0.364 
 
-.3719092 
-.2141067 
 
.5485127 
.5833811 
 
4 . * total effect 
5 . nlcom (sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons)) (sigma_female: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma 
> ]female)) 
sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_female: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]female) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons 1.202782 .2446994 4.92 0.000 .72318 1.682384 
sigma_female 1.31382 .1540261 8.53 0.000 1.011934 1.615706 
 
7 . * marginal effect of covariate 
8 . nlcom (sigma_female: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]female) - exp([lnsigma]_cons)) 
sigma_female: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]female) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_female .111038 .2891398 0.38 0.701 -.4556655 .6777416 
 
*updated 6/3/2018 using recovered beliefs 
 
Uncensored = 0 
Left-censored = 0 
Right-censored = 370 
Interval-cens. = 20,495 
 
q 
r 
s 
 
Figure 2.5 - Stata Output for intreg Command, One Covariate Model Using fin9. 
o) Female – In this specification we have included one covariate, a binary indicator that the subject was a 
female. We include this covariate on the estimate of the mean of the distribution, as well as on the 
estimate of the standard deviation of the distribution.   
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p) het(female) – “het(.)”, asks Stata to estimate a model with what is called multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity. This means that Stata allows the estimate of the standard deviation of the normal 
distribution to vary in a linear fashion with the covariate.  
q) The effect on the mean is given by the coefficients, and the effect on the standard deviation is given by 
the variable in the option “het(.)” We focus initially on the interpretation of the estimates for the mean 
of the distribution, and come below to the interpretation of the estimates for the standard deviation of 
the distribution. Since the binary variable female is equal to one if the subject is a female, and equal to 
zero if the subject is a male, we can infer that the constant term in this estimated model refers to the 
average of the distribution of beliefs for males: in this case, the average is 4.262 for males. The model 
tells us that the average for females is 0.179 smaller than the average for males, so the average for females 
is 4.262164 - 0.1785286 = 4.0836354. We observe that the 95% confidence interval for males between 
4.024 and 4.500, and we can see that the 95% confidence interval for females, taking care to evaluate 
with respect to the constant, is between 3.527 (= 4.024 - 0.496) and 4.640 (= 4.500 + 0.139). Further, 
Stata’s output provides us the Confidence Interval (CI) for an individual coefficient taking into account 
that there are other predictors in the model. For a given predictor with a level of 95% confidence, we 
say that we are 95% confident that the “true” coefficient lies between the lower and upper limit of the 
interval. 
r) We turn now to the effect of the covariate on the estimated standard deviation of the distribution, and 
interpretation of the constant term and the female term. Note that we are now doing two calculations 
with the “Delta method,” to infer the estimate of the standard deviation for men, 1.203, and the 
estimate of the standard deviation for women, 1.314. In each case we also have the correct estimates of 
the standard error and the 95% confidence intervals. In this case the estimate of the standard deviation 
for men is exactly the same mathematical expression as the previous specification that had no covariates, 
although with different numerical values: e0.1846372 = 1.203. But to calculate the standard deviation for 
females we need to recognize that the mathematical expression becomes e(0.1846 + 0.0883) = e0.2729 = 1.314. 
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Notice that the mathematical expression is essentially the same, but the exponent is the linear 
combination of the coefficient for men (0.1846) and the coefficient for the incremental effect of being 
female (+0.0883), which is the lnsigma displayed in intreg estimation results. 
s) We could use the same logic to calculate the incremental effect of being female on the estimated 
standard deviation of the distribution. This is given by the total effect of being female on the estimated 
standard deviation of the distribution, which is the same thing as the standard deviation of the 
distribution for females, minus the standard deviation of the distribution for males. In effect, this is the 
difference between the two standard deviations calculated in (r) above: 0.111 = 1.319 - 1.203. But we 
cannot calculate the standard error of this incremental effect in the same way that we can calculate the 
mean effect itself. We must recognize that the incremental effect of being female is not just a nonlinear 
transformation of the coefficients directly estimated by Stata, but the difference between these two 
nonlinear transformations. And this requires us to again apply the Delta method, resulting in an 
estimated standard error of the incremental effect of being female of 0.2891. 
It is useful to pause here for a moment to compare the two estimates of the standard deviation for 
females. One is called the “total effect” of being female on the estimated standard deviation, and is 1.314, 
shown in (r) above. The total effect is different from the “marginal effect” of being female relative to the 
estimated standard deviation for males, which is 0.111, shown in (s) above. The terminology “total effect” is 
a bit awkward in this context, since we can more conveniently refer to the standard deviation of the belief 
distribution for women, but it is extremely important to differentiate that from the marginal, or incremental, 
effect of being a woman relative to the total effect of being a man. In this simple setting in which there is 
just one covariate, these distinctions might seem to be excessive, but as we start to include several covariates 
they will become increasingly important to correctly interpret results. 
Our final block of code below will go through an example when all covariates are introduced into the 
model estimation.   
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1 . * now for all covariates 
2 . intreg v_lo v_hi $demogt [fweight = choiceI] if qid=="fin9" & Controls==1, cluster(id 
> ) het($demog)u 
Fitting full model: 
 
Iteration 0: log pseudolikelihood = -255739.64 
Iteration 1: log pseudolikelihood = -36696.927 
Iteration 2: log pseudolikelihood = -33512.381 
Iteration 3: log pseudolikelihood = -33431.722 
Iteration 4: log pseudolikelihood = -33431.128 
Iteration 5: log pseudolikelihood = -33431.128 
Interval regression Number of obs = 20,865 
Wald chi2(7) = 4.44 
Log pseudolikelihood = -33431.128 Prob > chi2 = 0.7285 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 216 clusters in id) 
 
 
 
3 . foreach v of global demog { 
 nlcom (sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons)) (sigma_`v'_t: exp([lnsigma]_cons 
 > + [lnsigma]`v')) (sigma_`v'_m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]`v') –  
 > exp([lnsigma]_cons))  
} 
sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_fema~t: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]female) 
sigma_fema~m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]female) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons .9915922 .293948 3.37 0.001 .4154647 1.56772 
sigma_female_t 1.182399 .3469704 3.41 0.001 .5023498 1.862449 
sigma_female_m .1908071 .2426216 0.79 0.432 -.2847225 .6663367 
 
 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE  
  
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
 
z 
 
P>|z| 
 
[95% Conf. 
 
Interval] 
model 
female 
asian 
black 
christian 
gpaHI 
junior 
senior 
_cons 
 
-.1947403 
-.1100327 
-.1186321 
.3144775 
.1177914 
.0104117 
.0793734 
4.070898 
 
.1580315 
.1631922 
.1705087 
.186012 
.130793 
.1455112 
.21057 
.159489 
 
-1.23 
-0.67 
-0.70 
1.69 
0.90 
0.07 
0.38 
25.52 
 
0.218 
0.500 
0.487 
0.091 
0.368 
0.943 
0.706 
0.000 
 
-.5044763 
-.4298836 
-.4528229 
-.0500994 
-.1385582 
-.274785 
-.3333363 
3.758305 
 
.1149957 
.2098182 
.2155587 
.6790544 
.3741409 
.2956083 
.492083 
4.383491 
lnsigma 
female 
asian 
black 
christian 
gpaHI 
junior 
senior 
_cons 
 
.175989 
.1050275 
.299265 
.2115997 
-.2116856 
-.4085053 
-.266104 
-.0084433 
 
.2186728 
.2926372 
.2491636 
.2361546 
.1973843 
.2109104 
.2493592 
.2964404 
 
0.80 
0.36 
1.20 
0.90 
-1.07 
-1.94 
-1.07 
-0.03 
 
0.421 
0.720 
0.230 
0.370 
0.284 
0.053 
0.286 
0.977 
 
-.2526019 
-.4685309 
-.1890867 
-.2512547 
-.5985518 
-.821882 
-.7548391 
-.5894559 
 
.6045799 
.678586 
.7876168 
.6744542 
.1751805 
.0048714 
.2226311 
.5725692 
Uncensored = 0 
Left-censored = 0 
Right-censored = 370 
Interval-cens. = 20,495 
 
v 
 
w 
x 
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sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_asia~t: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]asian) 
sigma_asia~m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]asian) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons .9915922 .293948 3.37 0.001 .4154647 1.56772 
sigma_asian_t 1.101402 .2508395 4.39 0.000 .6097659 1.593039 
sigma_asian_m .1098101 .3003861 0.37 0.715 -.4789359 .6985561 
 
sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_blac~t: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]black) 
sigma_blac~m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]black) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons .9915922 .293948 3.37 0.001 .4154647 1.56772 
sigma_black_t 1.337526 .3692232 3.62 0.000 .6138618 2.06119 
sigma_black_m .3459338 .2957258 1.17 0.242 -.233678 .9255457 
 
sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_chri~t: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]christian) 
sigma_chri~m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]christian) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons .9915922 .293948 3.37 0.001 .4154647 1.56772 
sigma_christian_t 1.225264 .3762609 3.26 0.001 .4878063 1.962722 
sigma_christian_m .2336719 .2727544 0.86 0.392 -.3009168 .7682606 
 
sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_gpaH~t: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]gpaHI) 
sigma_gpaH~m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]gpaHI) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons .9915922 .293948 3.37 0.001 .4154647 1.56772 
sigma_gpaHI_t .8024153 .2643792 3.04 0.002 .2842416 1.320589 
sigma_gpaHI_m -.1891769 .1760838 -1.07 0.283 -.5342948 .1559409 
 
sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_juni~t: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]junior) 
sigma_juni~m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]junior) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons .9915922 .293948 3.37 0.001 .4154647 1.56772 
sigma_junior_t .6590548 .2211891 2.98 0.003 .2255321 1.092577 
sigma_junior_m -.3325375 .1826507 -1.82 0.069 -.6905262 .0254513 
 
sigma_cons: exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
sigma_seni~t: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]senior) 
sigma_seni~m: exp([lnsigma]_cons + [lnsigma]senior) - exp([lnsigma]_cons) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
sigma_cons .9915922 .293948 3.37 0.001 .4154647 1.56772 
sigma_senior_t .7599161 .253219 3.00 0.003 .2636159 1.256216 
sigma_senior_m -.2316762 .2179309 -1.06 0.288 -.6588128 .1954605 
 
*updated 6/3/2018 using recovered beliefs 
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Figure 2.6 - Stata Output for intreg Command, Full Covariate Model Using fin9. 
t) $demog – In this specification we have included the full complement of covariates, which were defined 
in Section 2.4. All covariates were included for the estimate of the mean of the distribution, as well as 
for the estimate of the standard deviation of the distribution.   
u) het($demog) – again “het(.)” asks Stata to estimate a model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity. In 
the full demographic model, this means that Stata allows the estimate of the logarithm of the standard 
deviation of the normal distribution to vary in a linear fashion with each covariate.  
v) The effect on the mean is given by the coefficients, and the effect on the logarithm of the standard 
deviation is given by the variable in the option “het(.)”. For the covariates of the mean, we can interpret 
the estimate in the same manner as estimates of OLS regression coefficients: for a one unit increase in 
the predictor variable, the expected value of the outcome variable changes by the regression coefficient, 
given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. By setting all binary covariates in the 
model equal to zero one can evaluate the model constant, which is the omitted variable that the other 
covariates are compared to. For this model the constant term is interpreted as White males in either 
their freshman or sophomore year of college (underclassmen) 28, with a mean report of 4.071 and a 95% 
CI of 3.758 to 4.383. Let us again focus on the covariate “female” to narrate this example now that the 
model is accounting for a richer set of demographics. By setting the binary variable female equal to one 
the model tells us that the average for females is 0.195 smaller than the average for White male 
underclassmen, so the average for females is 4.070898 - 0.1947403 = 3.8761577. We can calculate the 
95% CI for females, again taking care to evaluate with respect to the constant, and it is between 3.254 (= 
3.758 - 0.504) and 4.498 (= 4.383 + 0.115). The remainder of the covariates can be evaluated in the 
                                                 
28 Underclassman is a term used colloquially in the United States to refer to a freshman or sophomore student in a high school or 
university setting. The Oxford English Dictionary defines upperclassman, as a special use noun in the United States, as a junior or 
senior student in high school or college. The distinction was made to be able to identify those that generally haven’t started course 
work in their major area of study. 
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same manner. It should be noted here that the estimates provided in this section (v) will also be 
interpreted later as bias.   
w) Is Stata code that loops over all the covariates of the logarithm of the standard deviation (“lnsigma”) in 
the model to recover the estimate of the standard deviation for the constant, and the total effect and 
marginal effect for each covariate.  
x) This section of results should be interpreted comparably to sections (r) and (s) earlier. Here the 
“sigma_cons” term is the estimate of the standard deviation for White male underclassmen, 0.992. The 
“sigma_female_t” is the overall effect of being female on the estimated standard deviation of the 
distribution, 1.182: this estimate accounts for the total effect of being female after taking into account all 
of the covariate values of females in the sample. Here we can read off the p-value on this statistic as 
0.001, thus only looking the total effect of being a female on the standard deviation of the underlying 
belief distribution is statistically significant at the 0.1 percentage point significance level. On the other 
hand, “sigma_female_m” is the incremental effect of being female on the estimated standard deviation 
of the distribution, 0.191, and accounts for the marginal effect of being female when controlling for the 
other covariates in the model. The p-value on this statistic is 0.432, thus the marginal effect of being a 
female on the standard deviation of the underlying belief distribution is not statistically significant at any 
traditional significance levels. The estimates provided in this section (x) will also be interpreted later as 
confidence.  
2.5.2 Characterizing Responses Using Bias and Confidence 
Section 1.2.1 introduced concepts that allow us to build a framework for characterizing responses 
using the terms bias and degree of confidence in reference to some known true answer. Section 2.5.1 then 
presented the output generated from Stata using interval regression and detailed how to interpret those 
estimates with respect to bias and confidence. Figure 2.7 shows these concepts in practice by illustrating 
four participants’ raw token allocations for the “budget” question fin9 in four panels that represent varying 
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degrees of confidence and bias from the true answer. Recall that the true answer is 4 months, and this is 
displayed by the dashed red line in each panel. The two panels on the top of Figure 2.7 exhibit a high degree 
of confidence, and the two panels on the bottom exhibit a low degree of confidence. The two panels on the 
left exhibit no bias from the true answer, whereas the two panels on the right exhibit bias.  
Figure 2.7 - Examples of Bias and Confidence shown with fin9 
 
No Bias, High Confidence 
The top-left panel of Figure 2.7 is the token allocation given by Subject #15. This subject exhibits 
no bias from the true answer and a high degree of confidence by allocating all 100 tokens to the bin that 
contained the true answer. This is the ideal scenario for a decision maker to be in and the one that generates 
the maximum earnings under the quadratic scoring rule for this question, which was $50. Figure 2.8 displays 
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the earning outcomes for this participant. This participant has the capability to plan a budget and, given the 
income and expenditures presented in the question, knows it will take exactly 4 months to accumulate 
savings of $600. This is important when planning to save meaningful sums of money and knowing how long 
it will take to reach a targeted amount.  
Figure 2.8 - Potential Earning Outcome with No Bias and High Confidence, fin9 
 
Bias, High Confidence 
The top-right panel of Figure 2.7 is the token allocation given by Subject #176. This subject exhibits 
bias away from the true answer and, unfortunately, a high degree of confidence by allocating all 100 tokens 
to a bin that did not contain the true answer. Here the participant was certain the true answer was 2 months 
to accumulate a savings of $600, when in fact it would take 4 months. This is one of the worst scenarios for 
76 
 
a decision maker to be in and generates no earnings for this question. Figure 2.9 displays the earning 
outcomes for this participant. This participant does not seem capable at planning a budget and if given the 
task to do so they would systematically underestimate the time it takes to accumulate savings.  
Figure 2.9 - Potential Earning Outcome with Bias and High Confidence, fin9 
 
No Bias, Low Confidence 
The lower-left panel of Figure 2.7 is the token allocation given by Subject #18. This subject exhibits 
no bias from the true answer and a low degree of confidence by allocating tokens across 5 different 
response bins, allocating 45 tokens to the bin that contained the true answer. Here the participant had a 
rough sense that the true answer was 4 months, whereby allocating the largest percentage of their overall 
tokens to that bin. However, they were less confident than Subject #15 and allocated their remaining 19, 16, 
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11, and 9 tokens across the response bins of 2, 3, 5, and 6 months, respectively. This scenario does not 
generate the maximum earnings for this question, but did afford the participant a potential payout over all 
bins, with actual earnings of $40.39. Figure 2.10 displays the earning outcomes for this participant. Recall, 
from Section 2.2.2, that the intuition as to why there are positive earnings over all bins including those with 
zero token allocation has to do with the incentivizing nature of the QSR that allows it to reward reports that 
are precise as possible. This participant is reasonably capable at planning a budget and reports diffused 
beliefs from 2 months to 6 months in order to accumulate savings of $600. It is significant that the subject is 
at least aware that they do not know the exact, correct answer.    
Figure 2.10 - Potential Earning Outcome with No Bias and Low Confidence, fin9 
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Bias, Low Confidence 
Lastly, the lower-right panel of Figure 2.7 is the token allocation given by Subject #98. This subject 
exhibits a bias from the true answer and a low degree of confidence by allocating tokens across 4 different 
response bins, and no tokens to the bin that contained the true answer. Here the participant didn’t believe 
that the true answer was 4 months, and instead allocated 24, 47, 26, and 3 tokens across the response bins of 
7, 8, 9, and 10 months, respectively. This scenario does not generate the maximum earnings for this 
question, but did afford the participant a potential payout over all bins, with actual earnings of $16.33. 
Figure 2.10 displays the earning outcomes for this participant. This participant systematically overestimated 
the time it takes to accumulate savings of $600. Again, the fact that the subject is aware of their lack of 
precise knowledge in this instance may help mitigate the consequences of their bias.  
Figure 2.11 - Potential Earning Outcome with Bias and Low Confidence, fin9 
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2.5.3 Constructing Measures of Literacy 
For each subject in Figure 2.7 there are also 2 different literacy measures displayed, L and W. The 
measure L is defined as the percentage of raw token allocation that is placed into the true bin, which is equal 
to the number of tokens allocated to the bin with the true answer divided by 100. Subject #15 allocated all 
their tokens to the correct bin, thus L = 1.0 (= 100/100). Subject #18 allocated 45 tokens to the correct bin, 
thus L = 0.45 (= 45/100). This constructed L is data that we can use directly when undertaking estimation 
(i.e., it can be used as a covariate since it is data and not an estimate).  
On the other hand, the W shown in Figure 2.7 is defined as the expected earnings for the bin 
containing the true answer divided by the maximum earning amount. It is motivated by the “efficiency” 
measure widely used for over 50 years in experimental economics. Recall the maximum earnings a 
participant could earn in this task is $50, which is the denominator for all subjects. Using Subject #18 as an 
example, we’ll calculate the numerator and their measure of W.  The numerator for this subject is equal to 
the actual payoff, $40.39, multiplied by the percentage of raw token allocation that is placed into the true 
bin, 0.45, which is the expected earnings of $18.18. Thus Subject #18’s measure of W = 0.36 (= 
$18.18/$50). This measure gets at expected earnings, knowing what the true answer is, hence the focus on 
the true bin only. However, it has the weakness that the expectation is taken with respect to the share of 
tokens, which is only the subjective probability of the subject if the subject is risk neutral (or all bins with 
tokens have exactly the same number of tokens). 
There are two other versions of efficiency measures that could be calculated given the data. Note 
that the denominator used in all efficiency measures use the maximum earnings a participant could earn in 
this task, $50. The first variation of efficiency measure, W1, is the percentage of actual earnings realized by 
the participant. Using subject #18 we see their actual payoff at $40.39, thus W1 = 0.81 (= $40.36/$50). 
Efficiency measure W2 is reported as W, and explained above. The other variation of efficiency measure, 
W3, is another way to go beyond W1 to get at expectation, and reflects the subject’s uncertainty over all 
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bins, not just the true bin as given in W2 (reported as W above). To calculate the W3 measure for subject 
#18, we sum every payoff amount over all 10 bins and multiply it by the respective percentage of tokens 
allocated to each bins. This total is $32.11 and is the expected earnings over all bins, which would then be 
divided by $50. Thus W3 = 0.64 (= $32.11/$50) in this instance.   
2.6 Results 
The evaluation of results in this chapter focuses on individuals and utilizes the correction techniques 
of Harrison and Ulm (2016) in order to correct every participant’s raw token allocations of reported 
subjective belief distributions to “recover” the true latent subjective belief distribution for all financial 
questions asked; the technique is described in Section 2.2.2. Each subject is typed at the individual level by 
their responses to the incentivized risk aversion task. At the 5% significance level, the overall frequency of 
each decision making model employed in recovering the true latent subject belief distribution is as follows: 
40% of our subjects were typed as EUT, 5% were RDU using an inverse-S probability weighting function, 
1.1% were RDU using a power probability weighting function, and the remainder 53.9% were RDU using a 
Prelec probability weighting specification.   
The initial evaluation of results will look at pooled beliefs across all individuals using both initial and 
new labels to test the effect of shifting the labels. We then report on pooled beliefs across individuals using 
the new labels.  Finally, we will look at beliefs when controlling for observable demographic characteristics, 
in order to evaluate hypotheses about how literacy could vary across demographics using the new labels.   
2.6.1 Effect of Different Labeling Schemes 
The first evaluation of results focuses on the pooled beliefs of individuals across both initial and new 
labels in order to test whether the shift in labels had a statistically significant effect on the average token 
reports of participants. Table 2.3 lists the sessions which individuals participated in using the initial labeling 
scheme as sessions 1 through 15 and session 18, and those using the new labeling scheme as sessions 19, 28, 
and 29. Table 2.5 presents interval regression estimates and evaluates results for two models: a constant 
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model only and another model, M1, that introduces the covariate new_label, controlling for a change in the 
mean estimate due to the new label dummy, for all financial questions asked under both labeling schemes. 
The first column of Table 2.5 lists the financial question. The second column lists the number of individuals 
that responded by each question. The next column lists the model type, either the constant only model or 
the model M1. The next three columns are the parameter name with mean and standard deviation of the 
estimates. The next two columns are results from a hypothesis test, H0, that the coefficient on the model 
constant is equal to the true answer for each financial question. This is interpreted as a test of bias away 
from the true answer. The final two columns are testing the hypothesis, H1, that the covariate new_label has 
a statistically significant marginal effect at the 5% significance level. In other words, it is testing if the label 
shifts between initial and new labeling schemes had an effect on responses. 
It is helpful to undertake a detailed example of the analysis for question fin1 using Table 2.5. We see 
that a total 304 individuals responded to this question, which included both initial and new labels. The 
coefficient on the constant in the constant only model is $108.70 with a standard deviation of $4.33, and we 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the model constant is equal to the true answer at the 5% 
significance level. Recall that the true answer is $110.41. Stated another way, the subjects’ average response 
was biased significantly biased from the true answer. Now consider the results for the one covariate model, 
M1. For question fin1 we see that the coefficient and standard deviation, respectively, for the model 
constant is $107.64 and $4.40 and for the covariate new_label is $3.10 and $3.38. The average response for 
participants presented with the new label scheme can be calculated by adding the estimated mean of the 
constant to the mean of the new_label, here $110.74 (= $107.64 + $3.10).  We then perform a hypothesis 
test that the average response when controlling for the new labeling scheme is equal to the true answer, and 
here we cannot reject the hypothesis at the 5% significance level. Finally, for question fin1, we see that the p-
value on the parameter estimate new_label is statistically significant at a level <0.000. From this result we 
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infer that the different labeling scheme caused a statistically significant difference in average responses, such 
that biased responses became unbiased responses.  
Reviewing Table 2.5, we can quickly see that for model M1 that a test of the null hypothesis of no 
bias could not be rejected at a significance level of 5% only for fin1. Thus responses to questions fin1 under 
the new labeling scheme were not biased from the true answer. All other questions failed that test and the 
average responses are statistically biased away from the true answer. Further, testing the marginal effect of 
the different labeling schemes shows that only two questions, fin13 and fin14, could not be rejected at a 
significance level of 5%.  
This section broadly covers the need to analyze the different labeling schemes separately.  
Throughout the remainder of Chapter 2 and across Chapters 3 and 4 the results will be presented solely 
using the new labeling scheme. A detailed exposition on the labeling schemes used can be found in 
Appendix A.  
2.6.2 Pooled Beliefs of Individuals with New Labels 
 The first evaluation of results focuses on pooled beliefs of individuals across new labels. Table 2.6 
and Figure 2.12 illustrate the results for the question on a savings account with 2% interest, one of the core 
questions asked in the financial literacy field. The average belief is $110.74, with a 95% confidence interval 
between $110.27 and $111.20. The correct answer is $110.41, so these beliefs are generally unbiased. The 
literacy index L shows that only 53% of the tokens were correctly allocated to the bin containing the true 
answer. And the literacy index W shows that 50% of the possible earnings was attained, from perfect literacy 
(all 100 tokens allocated to the correct bin). For a subject pool of college undergraduates, these outcomes 
are a bit disappointing, but broadly consistent with findings from the National Financial Capability Study in the 
United States: Data from the 2015 State-by-State Survey (2015) that asks the same question, although in a multiple 
choice format. That study’s choice architecture listed the following as options: a) More than $102; b) Exactly 
$102; c) Less than $102; d) Don’t know; and e) Prefer not to say. The correct answer lies in option a) More 
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than $102, and 75% of their national sample and 71% of the Georgia sample answered correctly. It makes 
sense that we see a larger number of participants answering a multiple choice correctly over 5 outcomes 
instead of 10 outcomes.  
 However, we quickly see that literacy levels are even lower for other types of questions. Table 2.7 
and Figure 2.13 show the results for the question about the earliest age at which Social Security benefits 
begin, which is actually 62. The average response is biased, with a 95% CI that does not span the true value, 
the imprecision of beliefs as shown by the wide dispersion of average beliefs across intervals lowers literacy 
by either measure. Table 2.8 and Figure 2.14 ask a comparable question about the age at which Medicare 
eligibility begins, which is 65. There is evidence of bias here as well, with the average response being 57.3 
and the 95% CI being below the true answer.  In addition, there is are more diffuse beliefs being reported 
here than to the Social Security question, resulting in even lower literacy indices. 
 Returning to more narrow economic literacy, Table 2.9 and Figure 2.15 shows results for the real 
interest rate question, also a staple of the general financial literacy literature. The modal token allocation for 
the individuals is in the correct bin. However, there is statistically significant evidence bias in quantitative 
terms, the average is $101 and the correct answer is $99.98, and the imprecision around this average 
response is large, resulting in low literacy indices of L = 0.28 and W = 0.29. These are lower with respect to 
the indices for the interest rate question that is also widely used in the financial literacy literature. 
 Table 2.10 and Figure 2.16 show results for the savings horizon question, an important dimension of 
literacy for retirement decisions. The mode of the token allocation is in the bin that contains the correct 
answer. Again, there is statistical evidence of bias, with the average response being 5 months and the 95% 
CI including 4.54 to 5.36 months, when the true answer is 4.0 months. The imprecision of beliefs is 
relatively low, leading to a literacy index L of 0.77 and a literacy index W of 0.74. These results suggest that 
individuals are only slightly biased, however, and appear to do well in constructing and calculating a budget 
in order to find the time it takes to accumulate a certain amount of savings, here $600 in 4 months.  
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 Table 2.11 and Table 2.12, and Figure 2.17 and Figure 2.18, consider paired questions on stolen 
credit cards and debit cards, respectively. The modal response in both cases was $0, or, more precisely, the 
bin representing the lowest interval between $0 and $5 (the mid-point to the $10 bin) for the stolen credit 
card and the interval between $0 and $25 (the midpoint to the $50 bin) for the stolen debit card, 
respectively. As it happens, the true answer is quite low for a credit card, at $50, and quite high for a debit 
card, at $500. Although the non-zero responses are “in the right direction” in the sense that they are more 
significant for the debit card question, they are striking evidence of imprecision. The responses for both 
questions are significantly biased and we see very low literacy indices. 
 Table 2.13 and Table 2.14, and Figure 2.19 and Figure 2.20, show results for two interest rate 
questions. These topics elicit some of the highest literacy rates, with some subjects knowing the correct 
answer with virtual certainty. Table 2.13, for question fin13, shows evidence of bias, with the average 
response of 4.45% and the 95% CI not including the true answer of 5%. Table 2.14, for fin14, shows 
evidence of slight bias, with the average response $101.74 and the 95% CI not including the true answer of 
$102. For both questions the modal response is the correct answer. 
 Table 2.15 and Table 2.16, and Figure 2.21 and Figure 2.22, close out with two basic question on 
longevity risk for men and women. Both are fundamental components of literacy with respect to retirement 
planning. In both cases there is statistically significant bias, with the averages being below the true values, 
and neither had a 95% confidence interval containing the correct answer. For the question about men the 
bias is 9.5 years, and for the question about women the bias is 11.7 years from the true answer. The 
imprecision is greater for the question about men, 9.7 years versus 9.53 years.  
2.6.3 Demographics 
The next evaluation of results looks at beliefs across all individuals when we control for observable 
demographic characteristics, in order to evaluate hypotheses about how literacy is associated with different 
demographics. In effect these results allow an insight into the pooled results, to see if there are any 
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systematic demographic correlates of literacy, or if literacy tends to be the same across the sample. Results 
are still interpreted against the “omitted variable” of the average response for White male underclassmen. 
Table 2.17 and Table 2.18 relate to fin1, the savings account question with 2% interest. The results 
listed in Table 2.17 are similar to the results listed in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, but with one covariate “true” 
that is equal to the true answer to the question and then a series of demographics defined earlier. There is 
no constant term in the first part of the estimation. If the responses for the omitted variable are unbiased 
the coefficient on the parameter true in the first part of the estimation should equal 1, since there is no 
constant.29 If there is bias we would see the parameter “true” grow larger or smaller than 1 and we can 
interpret this as a percent adjustment of the true answer. For example, the “true” parameter estimate listed 
of 1.01 for fin1 should be interpreted as a percent adjustment of the true answer to obtain the average 
response for White male underclassmen. Here the true parameter of 1.01 would be evaluated as 101.28% of 
the true answer of $110.41, thus $111.83, which is the average response reported for the omitted category. 
We see that the coefficient on the true parameter is 1.01 in Table 2.17 with a 95% confidence interval 
between 1.00 and 1.02.  The p-value = 0.013 in the text above the table is reporting on a model test that the 
coefficient on the true parameter is equal to 1; here we reject the hypothesis that the true parameter is equal 
to 1 and is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.30 Back inside the table text, we see the 
coefficient on the covariate for those with high grade point averages is statistically significant with an 
average of -1.52 and a confidence interval between -2.40 and -0.64. To evaluate the average response for 
those with high grades, we deduct $1.52 from $111.83 (calculated previously), which is $110.31 and only 
$0.10 less than the correct answer.  
Recall from Table 2.6 that we found what might appear to be a slightly different result: statistically 
significant evidence of unbiasedness. Different results can occur and the reason, of course, is that the 
                                                 
29 In Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, by contrast, the coefficient on the constant would have been equal to the true value if there was no 
bias. 
30 The p-value in the table is, as customary, testing the hypothesis that the model coefficient is equal to zero.  
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estimation in Table 2.6 implicitly assumed that all individuals held the same beliefs, whereas Table 2.17 
allows for sampling variability in terms of the observed demographics under the new labeling scheme. These 
estimations are therefore “answering different inferential questions,” and may thus lead to different answers. 
 The main objective of Table 2.18, however, is to study the effects of demographics in terms of bias 
and confidence. The latter is listed in the bottom panel of the table as the additional imprecision of beliefs. 
The top panel shows the bias from the correct answer for each demographic characteristic taken by itself. 
We observe that females, Asians, Blacks, Christians, and those with senior class standing hold statistically 
and quantitatively biased beliefs relative to the correct answer of $110.41 at the 5% significance level. 
Conversely, participants that reported a high grade point average and those with junior class standing held 
unbiased beliefs. Illustrating an example using the covariate “gpaHI”, those students with a high grade point 
average, we see their estimated bias from the correct answer at -$0.10 and a p-value = 0.39, therefore we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that those with high grade point averages reported values statistically different 
than the correct answer. Note this is the same -$0.10 amount that we calculated earlier in the example from 
Table 2.17. We could do these calculations by hand using the values supplied in Table 2.17, however, Table 
2.18 allows a more natural interpretation of these effects.  
 Of course, that is just part of the literacy evaluation. Even if there is no bias, or to be precise no 
evidence of statistically significant bias, there could be “costly” imprecision in beliefs. The word costly is in 
quotation marks, because imprecision is directly costly in terms of the foregone potential earnings from the 
scoring rule, but it is possible that there is a beneficial imprecision when the individual senses that they 
might have a biased belief. Recall the earlier discussion of the pooled beliefs about the longevity risk of 
women. Hence the second panel of Table 2.18 shows the additional imprecision of beliefs by each 
demographic, compared to the average imprecision of the pooled sample. In this case the estimates reflect 
the standard deviation of beliefs, not the log of the standard deviation (referred to as “LnSigma” in Table 
2.6 and Table 2.17). We infer significantly lower levels of imprecision for females, those with a high grade 
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point average, and those with junior or senior class standing. However, only juniors and those with high 
grade point averages exhibited no evidence of statistically significant bias, thus the extra precision of their 
beliefs is enhancing their literacy measures.  
 Table 2.19 shows significant bias for the social security start question and the 95% CI for the true 
parameter ranging between 1.04 and 1.09. The top panel of Table 2.20 shows that all demographics reported 
a statistically significant bias from the correct answer. Evidence of statistically significant bias ranged from 
an average low of 2.67 years for Asians to an average high of 4.67 for females. The bottom panel of Table 
2.20 shows that upperclassmen are the only demographics that had more precise beliefs compared to the 
average level of imprecision. Since both classes of upperclassmen, juniors and seniors, exhibited bias from 
the correct answer, this additional precision does not increase levels of literacy. Thus we have an instance 
where “everybody gets it wrong,” as distinct from there being identifiable demographic groups that exhibit 
worse literacy than others. 
 Table 2.21 and Table 2.22 consider the Medicare eligibility question, where we see very low levels of 
literacy from the pooled responses. Table 2.21 informs us that White underclassmen underestimated the 
correct answer with the 95% CI of the true parameter ranging between 0.88 and 0.97. Table 2.22 allow us to 
say that the bias in literacy for this question is shared by all demographics across the board (top panel), and 
no demographic group exhibits significantly different precision than the average (bottom panel) at the 5% 
significance level. Again, we see “everybody gets it wrong” when considering the age at which a citizen of 
the US is normally eligible for Medicare. 
Table 2.23 shows that there is significant bias away from the true answer for the question about the 
real interest rate across the pooled response with a p-value = 0.041. The top panel of Table 2.24 shows that 
students with a high grade point average and students in their junior year of study do better on this question, 
in the sense that they do not have a statistically significant bias from the correct answer, $98.98, at a 5% 
significance level. The bottom panel of Table 2.24 shows that no demographic exhibits different levels of 
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precision compared to the average at the 5% significance level. However, at the 10% significance level, we 
see evidence of decreased imprecision for those with junior class standing; thus enhancing literacy measures 
for this group.   
Table 2.25 shows the first example of an insignificant bias away from the true answer for the savings 
horizon question across pooled response. Stated another way, White underclassmen are unbiased with 
respect to the correct answer. However, Black and Christians exhibit statistically significant differences at 
the 5% significance level. The top panel of Table 2.26 shows that all demographics except Christians do not 
have a bias from the correct answer at a 5% significance level. In the bottom panel of Table 2.26 we see that 
all of those demographics listed have statistically significantly different levels of imprecision relative to the 
average level of imprecision. The corrections for each demographic are in fact diminishing the average 
imprecision, and getting closer towards exhibiting zero additional imprecision. Given that females, Asians, 
Blacks, those with a high grade point average, and students in their junior or senior year of study were 
unbiased from the correct answer, the effect the extra precision of their beliefs is enhancing their literacy 
measures. 
Table 2.27 and Table 2.28 refer to the question about the stolen credit card. Table 2.27 reports a p-
value = 0.730 in the text above the table, is reporting on a model test that the coefficient on the true 
parameter is equal to 1. Here we cannot reject the hypothesis that the true parameter is equal to 1 and is 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. However, we see from the text inside the table that the 
mean estimate for the true parameter is 1.78 with a p-value = 0.43, which implies that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there is significant difference from an estimate equal to zero. This finding could be further 
evidence of diffuse beliefs being reported across all bin levels, but with the average belief being near the 
correct answer. Table 2.28 confirms a bias from the correct answer for only Christians. In each case of 
unbiased responses relative to the correct answer, literacy measures did not benefit from increased precision. 
Table 2.29 and Table 2.30 consider a similar question relating to the stolen debit card. The interpretation of 
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results is similar as for the stolen credit card. The variation can be found in Table 2.30 that shows that all 
demographics are unbiased from the correct answer (top panel) and that all demographics, apart from 
Christians, hold more precise beliefs relative to the average (bottom panel).   
Table 2.31 shows another example of an insignificant bias away from the true answer for the 
nominal interest rate question across the pooled response. Participants with junior class standing exhibit 
statistically significant differences at the 5% significance level. As there is insignificant bias away from the 
true answer over the pooled response, this finding suggests that students that are juniors have a different 
underlying belief distribution then the average White underclassmen. This finding could lead to different 
levels of literacy between the two demographics. The top panel of Table 2.32 show that Asians, Blacks, 
those with a high grade point average, and students in their junior or senior years of study are not biased 
relative to the correct answer at 5% significance level. The bottom panel of the table lends further support 
to enhanced literacy levels through the reduction of imprecision relative to the average imprecision for 
students in their junior year at the 5% significance level.  
Table 2.33 shows the last example of an insignificant bias away from the true answer for the interest 
rate question across the pooled response. Table 2.34 reports that only Christians exhibit a statistically 
significant bias relative to the correct answer for this question (top panel), and females, Blacks, those with 
high grade point averages, and upperclassmen exhibit significantly different precision than the average 
(bottom panel) at the 5% significance level. Thus we have an instance where “most everybody gets it right,” 
with Christians exhibiting slightly worse literacy than the others. 
Table 2.35 and Table 2.36 consider the question about the remaining life for men conditional on 
reaching 20 years old. Table 2.35 shows lower levels of literacy from the pooled responses and statistically 
significant differences for females at the 5% significance level. Table 2.36 confirms the bias from the correct 
answer at the 5% significance level for everyone except students with high grade point averages and those in 
their junior year. In the bottom panel of the table we see that of the two unbiased demographics, only those 
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with a high grade point average exhibited less imprecision in relation to the average imprecision. Since those 
with high grade point averages are statistically unbiased from the correct answer, this increase in precision 
implies a higher literacy measure for that demographic.   
Table 2.37 and Table 2.38 round out the analysis and consider the question about the remaining life 
for women conditional on reaching 20 years old. The results are strikingly similarly to the results for the 
previous question asking the same longevity question about men. Table 2.37 shows lower levels of literacy 
from the pooled responses and a statistically significant difference for females and those with higher grade 
point averages at the 5% significance level. Table 2.38 shows that those with a high grade point average are 
the only demographic that do not exhibit bias relative to the correct answer, and that is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. These results vanish at the 10% level.  
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter began with a presentation of questions identified in the current literature that are being 
used to measure financial literacy. A total of 16 questions are initially identified, which were also uniquely 
suited to be asked in a subjective belief elicitation setting. These questions span various topics such as 
interest and inflation, financial rules, regulations, and procedures, budgeting, and longevity risk. Of the 
overall 16 questions identified, a subset of 11 questions were used in the final analysis.  
The chapter then covered the statistical foundations necessary to present a quantitative framework 
for measuring financial literacy using subjective belief elicitation. This research utilizes scoring rules and 
methods operationalized by Harrison and Phillips (2014), Harrison and Ulm (2016) and Harrison et al. 
(2017). The elicitation method was selected for several reasons. First it allows us to incentivize responses 
using a scoring rule that pays subjects for performing better. With knowledge of the risk preferences of 
subjects, these responses are also incentive-compatible, in the sense that the experiments can recover true 
latent beliefs from observed token allocations under the scoring rule. The elicitation format also permits us 
to infer a rich characterization of an individual’s entire subjective belief distribution. Using that information, 
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we develop a construct to characterize responses using concepts of confidence and bias. The elicitation 
format also enables a definition of several measure of literacy, such as the percent of raw tokens that were 
allocated to the correct answer or other efficiency measures that analyze an individual’s overall earnings.  
After the theoretical framework of subjective belief elicitation is developed the experimental tasks 
that the subjects experienced were defined. Each subject completed a battery of binary choices over risky 
lotteries, a battery of token allocations for beliefs, and a standard socio-demographic survey. Each task 
addresses a component required by the theoretical framework.  
The next topic covered was the econometric specification of the model.  There was some discussion 
of the various methods available, and interval regression was discussed in detail. A thorough discussion 
explains how to correctly interpret the output of these regressions, along with other constructed measures 
of literacy, bias, and confidence.  
Finally, we put the theory, planning, experimentation, and econometric specification into practice 
and examine results for a subset of individual participants under different labeling schemes and controlling 
for heterogeneity of observable demographics. The techniques covered in this chapter form the foundation 
for the analyses of treatments in subsequent chapters. The results presented here for individuals serve also 
as a “control” group when testing literacy under different scaffolds in later chapters. Table 2.39 displays a 
summary view of the financial literacy questions and the associated pooled L and W indices across the 
results previously displayed in this chapter’s tables shown as standalones. It further classifies the questions 
into 3 categories: numeracy, procedural, and longevity risk, to allow a more nuanced evaluation of which 
scaffolds perform better under what circumstances in the next two chapters. 
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Table 2.5: Evaluating the Effect of New Labels 
 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
Question Answer N Model Parameter mean sd p- value p- value
fin1 $110.41 304 Constant _cons 108.70 4.33 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 107.64 4.40
M1 new_label 3.10 3.38 NO 0.171 YES <0.001
fin2 age 62 322 Constant _cons 63.13 4.18 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 61.84 3.84
M1 new_label 3.92 3.58 YES <0.001 YES <0.001
fin5 age 65 304 Constant _cons 59.92 5.03 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 61.34 4.27
M1 new_label -3.99 5.30 YES <0.001 YES <0.001
fin7 $98.98 614 Constant _cons 99.76 2.22 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 99.50 2.13
M1 new_label 1.48 2.24 YES <0.001 YES <0.001
fin9 4 months 322 Constant _cons 4.42 1.69 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 4.15 1.27
M1 new_label 0.80 2.25 YES <0.001 YES 0.000
fin10 $50.00 304 Constant _cons 238.56 515.70 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 270.96 601.32
M1 new_label -99.96 283.08 YES <0.001 YES 0.018
fin11 $500.00 322 Constant _cons 625.70 1105.79 YES 0.021
M1 _cons 457.09 803.44
M1 new_label 484.71 1495.55 YES 0.001 YES 0.001
fin13 5% 304 Constant _cons 4.56 1.17 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 4.62 1.13
M1 new_label -0.16 1.24 YES <0.001 NO 0.167
fin14 $102.00 266 Constant _cons 101.80 1.35 YES 0.002
M1 _cons 101.84 1.40
M1 new_label -0.11 1.25 YES 0.003 NO 0.395
fin15 57.1 years 266 Constant _cons 49.19 12.53 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 50.26 14.05
M1 new_label -2.68 9.70 YES <0.001 YES 0.030
fin16 61.7 years 266 Constant _cons 52.59 12.35 YES <0.001
M1 _cons 54.10 13.77
M1 new_label -3.77 9.53 YES <0.001 YES 0.002
* Note H1: refers to the p -value for the parameter estimate new_label
* Note H0: refers to the hypothesis that the coefficient on the model constant is equal to the true answer for Model = Constant, and is 
evaluated as (_cons + new_label) for Model = M1
H1: new_label is stat. 
sig. diff. at 0.05 level
H0: (mean=true) stat. 
sig. diff. at 0.05 level
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Table 2.6: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Average: $110.7      Standard deviation: $3.4 
Correct answer: $110.41      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.53 and W = 0.50 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 110.74 <0.001 110.27 111.20 
LnSigma 
constant 1.22 <0.001 1.09 1.34 
Sigma 
sigma 3.38   2.97 3.84 
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Table 2.7: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Average: 65.8 years      Standard deviation: 3.6 years 
Correct answer: 62      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.26 and W = 0.21 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 65.75 <0.001 65.24 66.26 
LnSigma 
constant 1.27 <0.001 1.16 1.39 
Sigma 
sigma 3.58   3.19 4.01 
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Table 2.8: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Average: 57.3 years      Standard deviation: 5.3 years 
Correct answer: 65      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.16 and W = 0.16 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 57.35 <0.001 56.46 58.23 
LnSigma 
constant 1.67 <0.001 1.61 1.73 
Sigma 
sigma 5.30   4.98 5.63 
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Table 2.9: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Average: $101.0      Standard deviation: $2.2 
Correct answer: $98.98      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.28 and W = 0.29 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 100.98 <0.001 100.62 101.35 
LnSigma 
constant 0.81 <0.001 0.73 0.88 
Sigma 
sigma 2.24   2.08 2.41 
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Table 2.10: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Average: 5.0 months      Standard deviation: 2.2 months 
Correct answer: 4 months (4m)      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.77 and W = 0.74 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 4.95 <0.001 4.54 5.36 
LnSigma 
constant 0.81 <0.001 0.57 1.05 
Sigma 
sigma 2.25   1.76 2.86 
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Table 2.11: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Average: $171.0      Standard deviation: $283.1 
Correct answer: $50      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.06 and W = 0.06 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 171.00 <0.001 120.00 222.00 
LnSigma 
constant 5.65 <0.001 5.47 5.82 
Sigma 
sigma 283.08   237.52 337.37 
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Table 2.12: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Average: $941.8      Standard deviation: $1495.6 
Correct answer: $500      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.16 and W = 0.12 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 941.80 <0.001 679.38 1204.22 
LnSigma 
constant 7.31 <0.001 6.97 7.66 
Sigma 
sigma 1495.55   1059.22 2111.63 
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Table 2.13: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Average: 4.5%      Standard deviation: 1.2% 
Correct answer: 5%      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.80 and W = 0.76 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 4.45 <0.001 4.26 4.65 
LnSigma 
constant 0.21 0.03 0.02 0.40 
Sigma 
sigma 1.24   1.02 1.50 
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Table 2.14: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Average: $101.7      Standard deviation: $1.3 
Correct answer: $102.00      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.74 and W = 0.68 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 101.74 <0.001 101.56 101.91 
LnSigma 
constant 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.41 
Sigma 
sigma 1.25   1.04 1.51 
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Table 2.15: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Average: 47.6 years      Standard deviation: 9.7 years 
Correct answer: 57.1      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.22 and W = 0.18 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 47.58 <0.001 45.94 49.22 
LnSigma 
constant 2.27 <0.001 2.15 2.40 
Sigma 
sigma 9.70   8.56 10.98 
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Table 2.16: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Average: 50.3 years      Standard deviation: 9.5 years 
Correct answer: 61.7      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
Literacy indices L = 0.27 and W = 0.22 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 50.34 <0.001 48.79 51.88 
LnSigma 
constant 2.25 <0.001 2.12 2.39 
Sigma 
sigma 9.53   8.29 10.95 
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Source: C:\Us ers\ms chn\Dropbox\M ark - PhD Diss ertation\ thesis GSU data - may 2018 update 1\thesis GSU data - may 2018 update 1 - RECOVERED\tabl es\Thesis Chapter 2.docx  
 
 
 
Table 2.17: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $110.41      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.013 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 1.01 <0.001 1.00 1.02 
female -0.09 0.83 -0.90 0.72 
asian 0.60 0.23 -0.37 1.57 
black -0.12 0.77 -0.93 0.69 
christian -0.08 0.85 -0.88 0.73 
gpaHI -1.52 <0.001 -2.40 -0.64 
junior -0.85 0.09 -1.85 0.15 
senior -0.34 0.45 -1.20 0.53 
LnSigma 
female -0.06 0.72 -0.37 0.25 
asian 0.30 0.16 -0.12 0.71 
black 0.50 <0.001 0.12 0.87 
christian 0.20 0.18 -0.09 0.48 
gpaHI -0.16 0.26 -0.44 0.12 
junior -0.40 0.06 -0.82 0.01 
senior -0.18 0.38 -0.58 0.22 
constant 0.82 <0.001 0.41 1.22 
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Table 2.18: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $110.41 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 3.38 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female 1.33 0.02 0.23 2.42 
asian 2.02 <0.001 0.76 3.27 
black 1.30 0.05 0.05 2.55 
christian 1.34 <0.001 0.45 2.23 
gpaHI -0.10 0.39 -1.40 1.19 
junior 0.57 0.26 -0.63 1.77 
senior 1.08 0.04 0.09 2.08 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -1.24 0.02 -2.26 -0.22 
asian -0.33 0.34 -1.52 0.86 
black 0.34 0.35 -1.02 1.70 
christian -0.62 0.15 -1.51 0.26 
gpaHI -1.45 <0.001 -2.37 -0.53 
junior -1.86 <0.001 -2.61 -1.11 
senior -1.49 <0.001 -2.37 -0.61 
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Table 2.19: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 62      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is < 0.001 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 1.07 <0.001 1.04 1.09 
female 0.59 0.26 -0.43 1.61 
asian -1.41 0.05 -2.83 0.02 
black -1.05 0.08 -2.22 0.12 
christian 0.25 0.64 -0.79 1.29 
gpaHI 0.47 0.35 -0.51 1.45 
junior -0.04 0.95 -1.24 1.17 
senior -0.69 0.20 -1.76 0.38 
LnSigma 
female -0.08 0.50 -0.30 0.15 
asian -0.27 0.22 -0.70 0.16 
black 0.11 0.48 -0.18 0.40 
christian -0.03 0.83 -0.28 0.23 
gpaHI 0.27 0.01 0.06 0.49 
junior -0.40 <0.001 -0.63 -0.16 
senior -0.30 <0.001 -0.51 -0.09 
constant 1.26 <0.001 0.89 1.63 
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Table 2.20: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 62 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 3.58 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female 4.67 <0.001 3.25 6.08 
asian 2.67 <0.001 1.04 4.30 
black 3.03 <0.001 1.60 4.46 
christian 4.33 <0.001 2.98 5.68 
gpaHI 4.55 <0.001 2.77 6.32 
junior 4.04 <0.001 2.70 5.38 
senior 3.38 <0.001 1.91 4.86 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -0.31 0.36 -1.56 0.94 
asian -0.89 0.13 -2.06 0.28 
black 0.35 0.34 -0.84 1.53 
christian -0.14 0.39 -1.32 1.03 
gpaHI 1.06 0.19 -0.66 2.77 
junior -1.21 0.01 -2.09 -0.32 
senior -0.95 0.05 -1.86 -0.05 
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Table 2.21: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 65      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is < 0.001 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 0.92 <0.001 0.88 0.97 
female 0.95 0.36 -1.09 2.99 
asian -1.06 0.55 -4.53 2.42 
black -2.19 0.16 -5.21 0.83 
christian -1.42 0.20 -3.58 0.74 
gpaHI -1.05 0.27 -2.91 0.81 
junior -1.23 0.40 -4.08 1.62 
senior 0.75 0.58 -1.91 3.41 
LnSigma 
female -0.02 0.83 -0.19 0.15 
asian 0.04 0.77 -0.26 0.35 
black 0.12 0.38 -0.15 0.39 
christian 0.01 0.94 -0.17 0.19 
gpaHI -0.05 0.53 -0.19 0.10 
junior 0.10 0.59 -0.25 0.44 
senior 0.16 0.14 -0.05 0.37 
constant 1.52 <0.001 1.21 1.83 
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Table 2.22: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 65 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 5.30 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female -4.05 0.03 -7.50 -0.59 
asian -6.05 <0.001 -8.99 -3.11 
black -7.19 <0.001 -9.74 -4.63 
christian -6.42 <0.001 -9.15 -3.68 
gpaHI -6.05 <0.001 -9.47 -2.63 
junior -6.23 <0.001 -9.74 -2.71 
senior -4.25 0.01 -7.44 -1.05 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -0.81 0.18 -2.05 0.44 
asian -0.51 0.28 -1.68 0.66 
black -0.13 0.39 -1.64 1.37 
christian -0.69 0.22 -1.92 0.54 
gpaHI -0.93 0.17 -2.33 0.48 
junior -0.26 0.38 -2.01 1.49 
senior 0.07 0.40 -1.36 1.49 
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Table 2.23: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $98.98      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.041 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 1.02 <0.001 1.00 1.03 
female 0.72 0.03 0.08 1.36 
asian 0.30 0.67 -1.06 1.65 
black -0.06 0.93 -1.31 1.19 
christian 0.75 0.05 0.01 1.49 
gpaHI -0.68 0.05 -1.36 -0.01 
junior -0.92 0.02 -1.69 -0.16 
senior -0.11 0.82 -1.08 0.86 
LnSigma 
female 0.00 0.97 -0.18 0.19 
asian -0.06 0.73 -0.40 0.28 
black 0.01 0.97 -0.26 0.27 
christian -0.04 0.73 -0.29 0.20 
gpaHI -0.23 <0.001 -0.40 -0.06 
junior -0.42 0.02 -0.79 -0.06 
senior -0.05 0.71 -0.29 0.20 
constant 0.95 <0.001 0.57 1.34 
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Table 2.24: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $98.98 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 2.24 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female 2.28 <0.001 0.74 3.83 
asian 1.86 <0.001 0.72 3.00 
black 1.50 <0.001 0.58 2.42 
christian 2.31 <0.001 0.97 3.66 
gpaHI 0.88 0.20 -0.57 2.33 
junior 0.64 0.28 -0.85 2.12 
senior 1.45 0.04 0.14 2.76 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female 0.36 0.29 -0.51 1.24 
asian 0.20 0.35 -0.60 1.00 
black 0.37 0.27 -0.44 1.17 
christian 0.24 0.33 -0.54 1.03 
gpaHI -0.17 0.37 -1.02 0.67 
junior -0.54 0.08 -1.14 0.05 
senior 0.23 0.31 -0.43 0.89 
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Table 2.25: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 4 months (4m)      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.123 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 0.95 <0.001 0.89 1.01 
female 0.05 0.70 -0.21 0.31 
asian 0.26 0.15 -0.10 0.62 
black 0.52 0.01 0.11 0.92 
christian 0.55 <0.001 0.23 0.88 
gpaHI -0.04 0.80 -0.35 0.27 
junior 0.49 0.28 -0.39 1.37 
senior 0.29 0.19 -0.15 0.73 
LnSigma 
female -0.09 0.71 -0.59 0.41 
asian 0.82 0.01 0.17 1.47 
black 1.39 <0.001 0.95 1.83 
christian 1.04 <0.001 0.52 1.55 
gpaHI -0.16 0.45 -0.58 0.26 
junior 1.25 <0.001 0.58 1.92 
senior 0.62 <0.001 0.20 1.03 
constant -1.63 <0.001 -2.36 -0.89 
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Table 2.26: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 4 months (4m) 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 2.25 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female -0.15 0.24 -0.45 0.15 
asian 0.06 0.38 -0.28 0.40 
black 0.31 0.15 -0.13 0.76 
christian 0.35 0.03 0.06 0.65 
gpaHI -0.24 0.14 -0.57 0.09 
junior 0.29 0.33 -0.65 1.23 
senior 0.09 0.37 -0.40 0.58 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -2.07 <0.001 -2.19 -1.95 
asian -1.80 <0.001 -2.14 -1.46 
black -1.46 <0.001 -2.00 -0.91 
christian -1.69 <0.001 -1.98 -1.40 
gpaHI -2.08 <0.001 -2.20 -1.96 
junior -1.56 <0.001 -2.21 -0.91 
senior -1.88 <0.001 -2.18 -1.59 
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Table 2.27: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $50      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.730 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 1.78 0.43 -2.66 6.22 
female 10.46 0.86 -104.51 125.43 
asian 9.61 0.93 -205.73 224.96 
black 55.01 0.37 -66.01 176.04 
christian 82.67 0.30 -74.29 239.63 
gpaHI 11.55 0.83 -94.16 117.26 
junior -71.17 0.46 -261.27 118.93 
senior -50.31 0.63 -252.65 152.03 
LnSigma 
female 0.14 0.57 -0.33 0.61 
asian 0.11 0.88 -1.31 1.52 
black 0.33 0.45 -0.54 1.21 
christian 0.24 0.53 -0.51 0.98 
gpaHI -0.00 1.00 -0.42 0.42 
junior -0.14 0.73 -0.95 0.66 
senior -0.03 0.94 -0.88 0.82 
constant 5.14 <0.001 3.69 6.58 
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Table 2.28: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $50 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 283.08 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female 49.49 0.38 -246.37 345.35 
asian 48.64 0.29 -72.11 169.39 
black 94.04 0.23 -82.22 270.30 
christian 121.69 0.03 18.34 225.04 
gpaHI 50.58 0.37 -185.47 286.62 
junior -32.14 0.35 -149.10 84.81 
senior -11.28 0.39 -149.16 126.59 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -88.13 0.35 -427.18 250.92 
asian -94.16 0.12 -214.01 25.69 
black -45.69 0.36 -238.40 147.02 
christian -68.02 0.30 -248.35 112.31 
gpaHI -113.26 0.24 -337.39 110.87 
junior -135.51 0.08 -285.77 14.74 
senior -118.13 0.13 -270.94 34.69 
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Table 2.29: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $500      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.837 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 0.91 0.04 0.04 1.78 
female -217.12 0.20 -550.17 115.92 
asian -2.83 0.99 -535.82 530.16 
black 320.13 0.20 -173.31 813.56 
christian 380.83 0.01 80.97 680.69 
gpaHI -7.75 0.96 -292.49 276.98 
junior -17.94 0.91 -343.12 307.24 
senior 459.74 0.04 10.52 908.96 
LnSigma 
female -0.30 0.24 -0.80 0.20 
asian -0.41 0.35 -1.27 0.45 
black 0.17 0.67 -0.61 0.95 
christian 0.70 0.02 0.14 1.27 
gpaHI 0.17 0.37 -0.21 0.55 
junior 0.04 0.90 -0.58 0.66 
senior 0.94 <0.001 0.46 1.43 
constant 6.34 <0.001 5.53 7.15 
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Table 2.30: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $500 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1495.55 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female -262.98 0.24 -778.73 252.76 
asian -48.68 0.39 -422.08 324.71 
black 274.27 0.09 -41.44 589.98 
christian 334.97 0.07 -19.02 688.96 
gpaHI -53.61 0.39 -671.26 564.04 
junior -63.79 0.38 -463.76 336.18 
senior 413.88 0.16 -195.72 1023.48 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -1075.55 <0.001 -1526.49 -624.60 
asian -1120.63 <0.001 -1296.03 -945.22 
black -823.68 <0.001 -1148.38 -498.98 
christian -349.52 0.24 -1020.08 321.05 
gpaHI -821.32 0.01 -1444.50 -198.14 
junior -906.41 <0.001 -1475.53 -337.30 
senior -42.25 0.40 -1230.72 1146.23 
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Table 2.31: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 5%      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.169 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 0.92 <0.001 0.80 1.04 
female -0.24 0.15 -0.57 0.09 
asian -0.17 0.51 -0.67 0.33 
black -0.02 0.93 -0.35 0.32 
christian -0.26 0.06 -0.54 0.02 
gpaHI 0.17 0.18 -0.08 0.42 
junior 0.38 0.04 0.01 0.76 
senior 0.31 0.15 -0.12 0.74 
LnSigma 
female 0.14 0.58 -0.36 0.65 
asian 0.32 0.38 -0.40 1.05 
black -0.00 0.99 -0.48 0.48 
christian 0.46 0.12 -0.12 1.04 
gpaHI -0.40 0.05 -0.81 0.00 
junior -0.75 <0.001 -1.20 -0.30 
senior -0.22 0.44 -0.79 0.34 
constant 0.02 0.97 -0.80 0.83 
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Table 2.32: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 5% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1.24 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female -0.66 0.03 -1.21 -0.10 
asian -0.59 0.09 -1.25 0.08 
black -0.43 0.06 -0.87 0.01 
christian -0.68 0.01 -1.18 -0.18 
gpaHI -0.25 0.28 -0.81 0.32 
junior -0.03 0.39 -0.47 0.41 
senior -0.11 0.35 -0.51 0.30 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -0.06 0.40 -1.00 0.87 
asian 0.17 0.38 -0.99 1.33 
black -0.22 0.34 -0.97 0.53 
christian 0.38 0.27 -0.47 1.23 
gpaHI -0.56 0.07 -1.15 0.03 
junior -0.75 <0.001 -1.15 -0.35 
senior -0.42 0.16 -1.04 0.19 
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Table 2.33: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $102.00      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.678 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 1.00 <0.001 1.00 1.00 
female -0.02 0.84 -0.22 0.17 
asian -0.38 0.11 -0.85 0.09 
black -0.07 0.47 -0.25 0.12 
christian -0.27 0.02 -0.48 -0.05 
gpaHI 0.08 0.37 -0.09 0.24 
junior 0.06 0.56 -0.15 0.28 
senior 0.14 0.24 -0.09 0.38 
LnSigma 
female 0.29 0.14 -0.09 0.67 
asian 0.78 0.02 0.10 1.45 
black 0.06 0.78 -0.39 0.52 
christian 0.81 <0.001 0.36 1.26 
gpaHI -0.18 0.35 -0.56 0.20 
junior -0.50 0.08 -1.06 0.05 
senior -0.25 0.28 -0.70 0.20 
constant -0.60 0.04 -1.18 -0.02 
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Table 2.34: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $102.00 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1.25 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female -0.06 0.33 -0.26 0.14 
asian -0.42 0.09 -0.90 0.06 
black -0.11 0.22 -0.31 0.09 
christian -0.31 0.05 -0.60 -0.02 
gpaHI 0.04 0.38 -0.18 0.25 
junior 0.02 0.39 -0.19 0.24 
senior 0.10 0.31 -0.19 0.39 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -0.52 0.04 -1.01 -0.03 
asian -0.06 0.39 -0.86 0.74 
black -0.67 <0.001 -0.98 -0.36 
christian -0.02 0.40 -0.55 0.51 
gpaHI -0.80 <0.001 -1.07 -0.52 
junior -0.92 <0.001 -1.18 -0.66 
senior -0.83 <0.001 -1.07 -0.59 
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Table 2.35: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 57.1      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is 0.016 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 0.93 <0.001 0.87 0.99 
female -3.95 0.01 -7.06 -0.84 
asian -2.91 0.26 -7.94 2.12 
black -3.32 0.09 -7.11 0.48 
christian -1.25 0.45 -4.49 2.00 
gpaHI 2.43 0.12 -0.62 5.47 
junior 1.00 0.62 -3.00 5.01 
senior -1.94 0.30 -5.61 1.74 
LnSigma 
female 0.27 0.02 0.05 0.48 
asian 0.28 0.29 -0.24 0.80 
black 0.22 0.21 -0.12 0.56 
christian 0.16 0.29 -0.13 0.45 
gpaHI -0.33 <0.001 -0.55 -0.11 
junior 0.09 0.68 -0.32 0.49 
senior 0.23 0.09 -0.04 0.51 
constant 1.80 <0.001 1.42 2.19 
 
123 
 
 
 
Table 2.36: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 57.1 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 9.70 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female -8.19 <0.001 -13.06 -3.32 
asian -7.15 <0.001 -11.36 -2.94 
black -7.56 <0.001 -11.16 -3.95 
christian -5.49 <0.001 -8.93 -2.04 
gpaHI -1.81 0.28 -6.04 2.41 
junior -3.24 0.15 -7.79 1.31 
senior -6.18 0.02 -10.98 -1.37 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -1.78 0.22 -4.93 1.38 
asian -1.68 0.25 -5.14 1.79 
black -2.17 0.08 -4.53 0.20 
christian -2.60 0.05 -5.06 -0.15 
gpaHI -5.34 <0.001 -7.16 -3.53 
junior -3.08 0.08 -6.45 0.29 
senior -2.03 0.20 -5.44 1.39 
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Table 2.37: Interval Regression Estimates, With Controls for Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 61.7      N=106 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that true is 1 is < 0.001 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
true 0.87 <0.001 0.81 0.94 
female -3.74 0.01 -6.64 -0.83 
asian -4.76 0.16 -11.43 1.91 
black -1.75 0.33 -5.25 1.75 
christian -0.84 0.58 -3.77 2.10 
gpaHI 3.29 0.03 0.33 6.25 
junior 0.67 0.70 -2.73 4.07 
senior -0.96 0.59 -4.49 2.57 
LnSigma 
female 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.49 
asian 0.55 0.06 -0.03 1.13 
black 0.16 0.33 -0.16 0.48 
christian 0.15 0.30 -0.13 0.44 
gpaHI -0.31 0.02 -0.56 -0.05 
junior -0.01 0.96 -0.37 0.35 
senior 0.24 0.10 -0.05 0.52 
constant 1.78 <0.001 1.45 2.10 
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Table 2.38: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 61.7 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 9.53 
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
female -11.55 <0.001 -16.33 -6.78 
asian -12.58 <0.001 -18.37 -6.78 
black -9.57 <0.001 -13.32 -5.81 
christian -8.65 <0.001 -11.78 -5.53 
gpaHI -4.53 0.07 -9.27 0.21 
junior -7.15 <0.001 -11.08 -3.21 
senior -8.78 <0.001 -13.40 -4.16 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
female -1.86 0.17 -4.61 0.89 
asian 0.68 0.39 -4.38 5.74 
black -2.59 0.02 -4.68 -0.51 
christian -2.65 0.02 -4.81 -0.48 
gpaHI -5.18 <0.001 -7.06 -3.31 
junior -3.67 <0.001 -5.80 -1.54 
senior -2.04 0.19 -5.31 1.23 
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Table 2.39: Pooled Measures of L and W  Indices for Individual "Control" Subjects 
   
Question Type Correct Answer L W
fin1  - Savings Account 2% Numeracy $110.41 0.53 0.50
fin2  - Social Security Start Age Procedural 62 0.26 0.21
fin5  - Medicare Eligibility Procedural 65 0.16 0.16
fin7  - Real Interest Rate Numeracy $98.98 0.28 0.29
fin9  - Savings Horizon Numeracy 4 months 0.77 0.74
fin10 - Stolen Credit Card Procedural $50 0.06 0.06
fin11 - Stolen Debit Card Procedural $500 0.16 0.12
fin13 - Nominal Interest Numeracy 5% 0.80 0.76
fin14 - Interest Rate Numeracy $102 0.74 0.68
fin15 - Remaining Life for Men Longevity Risk 57.1 years 0.22 0.18
fin16 - Remaining Life for Women Longevity Risk 61.7 years 0.27 0.22
*Pooled literacy measures of L  and W  are initally reported for each question in their respective 
section. 
Individual
Literacy Measures
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Appendix A: Label and other Biases and their Effects on Measurements of Literacy 
One can argue that if a participant doesn’t know an answer for certain that there could be a 
tendency for them to favor the first bin, the middle bin, or the last bin as a heuristic for selecting where to 
place their 100 tokens. What is the effect of shifting the labels so that the interval that contains the true 
answer moves from bin 1 to bin 5, or bin 7 to bin 3, for example? This is just a shifting of the 10 bins we 
have subjects allocate tokens over and re-labeling them. We’re calling this the Label treatment to test the 
effect of the new labels.  
Table A1 below shows the bin labels from the Control group using the initial label scheme and 
Table A2 the bin labels from the Label treatment using the new labeling scheme. In each of the tables we 
place an asterisk next to the value and highlight the bin that contains the true answer. Comparing the labels 
of fin1 across the two tables we see that the bin that contained the true answer in the control was bin 10 and 
then shifted to bin 5 in the label treatment, a shift of 5 bins. Table A3 shows the absolute shift that occurred 
for all the financial questions.  
Table A 1 - Interval Labels for Control Group with Initial Labeling Scheme 
  
QuestionID Correct Answer Bin1 Bin2 Bin3 Bin4 Bin5 Bin6 Bin7 Bin8 Bin9 Bin10
fin1 $110.41 92 94 96 98 100 102 104 106 108 110*
fin2 62 54 56 58 60 62* 64 66 68 70 72
fin5 65 55 57 59 61 63 65* 67 69 71 73
fin7 $98.98 95 96 97 98 99* 100 101 102 103 104
fin9 4 months 1 2 3 4* 5 6 7 8 9 10
fin10 $50.00 0 25 50* 100 250 500 1000 2500 5000 10000
fin11 $500.00 0 25 50 100 250 500* 1000 2500 5000 10000
fin13 5% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%* 6% 7% 8% 9%
fin14 $102.00 98 99 100 101 102* 103 104 105 106 107
fin15 57.1 years 0 10 20 30 40 50 60* 70 80 90
fin16 61.7 years 0 10 20 30 40 50 60* 70 80 90
Note: * denotes the bin containing the true answer.
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Table A 2 - Interval Labels for Treatment Group with New Labeling Scheme 
  
Table A 3 - Absolute Bin Shift between Control and Treatment Groups 
  
There could also be a widening or narrowing of the bin response interval labels and we would have 
to think through what effect that would have on literacy. One can show that as the response intervals widen 
for the bins, they would naturally contain more responses within a bin’s response space. The wider the 
response interval labels, the more we allow a participant with lower literacy to get “close to” the bin that 
contains the true answer without knowing it outright. Conversely, the more narrow or tight we make the bin 
response interval labels, the more literate we require the subject to be to select the bin that contains the true 
answer. This is akin to asking someone to throw a dart and hit the dartboard (widening) versus asking them 
QuestionID Correct Answer Bin1 Bin2 Bin3 Bin4 Bin5 Bin6 Bin7 Bin8 Bin9 Bin10
fin1 $110.41 102 104 106 108 110* 112 114 116 118 120
fin2 62 62* 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
fin5 65 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65* 67
fin7 $98.98 98 99* 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107
fin9 4 months 4* 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
fin10 $50.00 0 10 20 30 40 50* 100 250 500 1000
fin11 $500.00 0 50 500* 750 1000 2500 5000 7500 1000 2500
fin13 5% -4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%*
fin14 $102.00 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102* 103 104
fin15 57.1 years 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55* 60
fin16 61.7 years 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60*
Note: * denotes the bin containing the true answer.
QuestionID Mean Shift of True Answer Bin
Control vs Treatment
fin1 5
fin2 4
fin5 3
fin7 3
fin9 3
fin10 3
fin11 3
fin13 4
fin14 3
fin15 2
fin16 3
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to hit the bullseye on the dartboard (narrowing). This is just a re-labeling of the 10 bins we have subjects 
allocate tokens over and allow some variation in the bin width.  
While this is a separate bias related to precision of belief and could have had its own treatment, I 
unfortunately did not put this into the design of the experiment prior to running. The following questions 
have had their bin widths adjusted conjoint with the Label treatment: fin10, fin11, fin15, fin16. Table A4 
below shows the difference within a bin’s response space from the control less the Label treatment. Let’s 
illustrate an example using fin1. From Table A1 above we see that the control labels for bin 1 and bin 2 are 
92 and 94, a difference of 2. Likewise, from Table A2 the Label treatment labels for bin 1 and bin 2 are 102 
and 104, also a difference of 2. Thus, looking at the difference of the label widths between the control and 
Label treatment is 2 minus 2, or 0, which is the number shown in Table A4 for “Bin 1&2” for fin1 below.   
Table A 4 - Differences in Label Widths Between Control and Treatment Groups 
  
For fin10 we can see that the range of bin response intervals varied from 15 dollars to 4500 dollars 
and for fin11 the bin response intervals varied from -25 to 3500 dollars over bins 1 through 10 for the 
control compared to the Label treatment response, respectively. While these are not zero, I feel the amounts 
are small and will introduce only a slight confound in the analysis for these questions, however, are not 
overly concerning.   
QuestionID Bin 1&2 Bin 2&3 Bin 3&4 Bin 4&5 Bin 5&6 Bin 6&7 Bin 7&8 Bin 8&9 Bin 9&10
fin1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fin2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fin5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fin7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fin9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fin10 15 15 40 140 240 450 1350 2250 4500
fin11 -25 -425 -200 -100 -1250 -2000 -1000 9000 3500
fin13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fin14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
fin15 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
fin16 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
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Appendix B: Recruitment Protocol  
The email invitation text sent to potential participants was as follows:  
You have been invited to the following experiment: 
 
Date: XXX 
Time: XXX 
Location: Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, room 447 
 
 
This experiment is on a first register, first to participate basis. All recruits who take part in the 
experiment are guaranteed a $5.00 fee; those who show up on time, but cannot participate will get a 
$5.00 show up fee and priority in later experiments.  
 
Please login to the Experiment Recruiter at http://excen.gsu.edu/recruiter/ 
to confirm or decline your participation in this experiment. Replying to this message will NOT 
confirm or decline participation in the experiment. 
 
While you may login to the Recruiter and Accept or Decline this invitation at your earliest 
convenience, subjects will be confirmed on a first come, first served basis. 
 
You must bring your Student ID Card in order to participate in the experiment. 
 
Thank you. 
 
Full participation was usually confirmed within 24 hours of sending out the recruitment emails.  
 
Appendix C: Experimental Instructions 
1. General Introduction 
Welcome to the experiment today. We are going to ask you to make two types of decisions, and to 
answer some survey questions in-between. Any earnings you accumulate will be in addition to the show-up 
fee you have received just for being here. 
 
We will read through the instructions for the first task in a moment. After you have completed those 
decisions an experimenter will come around to your booth and select one decision for payment and make a 
record of your earnings. You will then be asked to answer some survey questions. When everybody has 
caught up, we will read through the instructions for the second task. When you have completed those 
decisions an experimenter will again come around to your booth, select one decision for payment, and make 
a record of your total earnings. We will then ask one of you at a time to come up to be paid. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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2. Demographic Questions 
Q1. What is your AGE? 
1. 16 (1) 
2. 17 (2) 
3. 18 (3) 
4. 19 (4) 
5. 20 (5) 
6. 21 (6) 
7. 22 (7) 
8. 23 (8) 
9. 24 (9) 
10. 25 (10) 
11. 26 (11) 
12. 27 (12) 
13. 28 (13) 
14. 29 (14) 
15. 30 (15) 
16. 31 (16) 
17. 32 (17) 
18. 33 (18) 
19. 34 (19) 
20. 35 (20) 
21. 36 (21) 
22. 37 (22) 
23. 38 (23) 
24. 39 (24) 
25. 40 (25) 
26. 41 (26) 
27. 42 (27) 
28. 43 (28) 
29. 44 (29) 
30. 45 (30) 
31. 46 (31) 
32. 47 (32) 
33. 48 (33) 
34. 49 (34) 
35. 50 (35) 
36. 51 (36) 
37. 52 (37) 
38. 53 (38) 
39. 54 (39) 
40. 55 (40) 
41. 56 (41) 
42. 57 (42) 
43. 58 (43) 
44. 59 (44) 
45. 60 (45) 
46. 61 (46) 
47. 62 (47) 
48. 63 (48) 
49. 64 (49) 
50. 65 (50) 
51. 66 (51) 
52. 67 (52) 
53. 68 (53) 
54. 69 (54) 
55. 70 (55) 
56. 71 (56) 
57. 72 (57) 
58. 73 (58) 
59. 74 (59) 
60. 75 (60) 
61. 76 (61) 
62. 77 (62) 
63. 78 (63) 
64. 79 (64) 
65. 80 (65) 
66. 81 (66) 
67. 82 (67) 
68. 83 (68) 
69. 84 (69) 
70. 85 (70) 
71. 86 (71) 
72. 87 (72) 
73. 88 (73) 
74. 89 (74) 
75. 90 (75) 
76. 91 (76) 
77. 92 (77) 
78. 93 (78) 
79. 94 (79) 
80. 95 (80) 
81. 96 (81) 
82. 97 (82) 
83. 98 (83) 
84. 99 (84) 
 
 
Q2. What is your sex? 
85. Male (1) 
86. Female (2) 
87. Other (please specify) (3) ____________________ 
 
Q2_TEXT. What is your sex? 
 [Text Entry for: Other (please specify)] 
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Q3. Which of the following categories best describes you? 
88. White/Caucasian (1) 
89. Black/African-American (2) 
90. African (3) 
91. Asian-American (4) 
92. Asian (5) 
93. Hispanic-American (6) 
94. Hispanic (7) 
95. Mixed Race (8) 
96. Other (please specify) (9) ____________________ 
 
Q4. What is your major? (select all that apply) 
97. Accounting (1) 
98. Economics (2) 
99. Finance (3) 
100. Business Administration, other than 
Accounting, Economics, or Finance (4) 
101. Education (5) 
102. Engineering (6) 
103. Health Professions (7) 
104. Public Affairs or Social Services (8) 
105. Biological Sciences (9) 
106. Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical 
Sciences (10) 
107. Social Sciences or History (11) 
108. Humanities (12) 
109. Psychology (13) 
110. Other Fields (please elaborate) (14) 
111. Other Fields (please elaborate) (14_text) 
112. Does not apply (15) 
 
 
Q5. What is your class standing? 
113. Freshman (1) 
114. Sophomore (2) 
115. Junior (3) 
116. Senior (4) 
117. Masters (5) 
118. Doctoral (6) 
119. Does not apply (7) 
 
Q6. What is the highest level of education you expect to complete? 
120. Bachelor’s Degree (1) 
121. Master’s Degree (2) 
122. Doctoral Degree (3) 
123. First Professional Degree (4) 
124. High School Diploma or GED (5) 
125. Less than High School (6) 
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Q7. What was the highest level of education that your father (or male guardian) completed? 
126. Less than High School (1) 
127. GED or High School Equivalency (2) 
128. High School (3) 
129. Vocational or Trade School (4) 
130. College or University (5) 
131. Don’t Know (6) 
 
Q8. What was the highest level of education that your mother (or female guardian) completed? 
132. Less than High School (1) 
133. GED or High School Equivalency (2) 
134. High School (3) 
135. Vocational or Trade School (4) 
136. College or University (5) 
137. Don’t Know (6) 
 
Q9. What is your citizenship status in the United States? 
138. U.S. Citizen (1) 
139. Resident Alien (2) 
140. Non-Resident Alien (3) 
141. Other Status (please elaborate) (4) ____________________ 
 
Q9_TEXT. What is your citizenship status in the United States? 
 [Text entry for: Other Status (please elaborate)] 
 
Q10. Are you a foreign student on a Student Visa? 
142. Yes (1) 
143. No (2) 
 
Q11. Are you currently...? 
144. Single and never married? (1) 
145. Married? (2) 
146. Separated, divorced, or widowed? (3) 
 
Q12. On a 4-point scale, what is your current GPA if you are doing a Bachelor’s degree, or what was it 
when you did a Bachelor’s degree? This GPA should refer to all of your coursework, not just the current 
year. (please select one) 
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147. Between 3.75 and 4.0 GPA (mostly A’s) (1) 
148. Between 3.25 and 3.74 GPA (about half A’s and half B’s) (2) 
149. Between 2.75 and 3.24 GPA (mostly B’s) (3) 
150. Between 2.25 and 2.74 GPA (about half B’s and half C’s) (4) 
151. Between 1.75 and 2.24 GPA (mostly C’s) (5) 
152. Between 1.25 and 1.74 GPA (about half C’s and half D’s) (6) 
153. Less than 1.25 GPA (mostly D’s or below) (7) 
154. Have not taken course for which grades are given (8) 
 
Q13. We are interested in knowing what kind of background you have in Economics. From the following 
choices, please select all of the Economics courses that you have taken. (select all that apply) 
    
155. The Global Economy (ECON 2100) (1) 
156. Principles of Macroeconomics (ECON 2105)Finance (2) 
157. Principles of Microeconomics (ECON 2106) (3) 
158. Macroeconomics - CTW (ECON 3900) (4) 
159. Microeconomics (ECON 3910) (5) 
160. Other (please elaborate) (6) 
161. Text entry for: Other (please elaborate) (6_text) 
 
Q14. Where do you live now? That is, where do you stay most often? 
162. Your own place (apartment, house, condo, etc.) (1) 
163. Parent or Guardian’s home (2) 
164. Another’s home (non-parental relative’s or non-related adult’s home) (3) 
165. Group living arrangement (dormitory, barracks, group home, etc.) (4) 
166. Homeless (no regular place to stay) (5) 
167. Other (please elaborate) (6) ____________________ 
 
Q14_TEXT. Where do you live now? That is, where do you stay most often? 
 [Text entry for: Other (please elaborate)] 
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Q15. How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse, and any dependents. Do not 
include your parents or roommates unless you claim them as dependents. (regardless of your living situation, 
always include yourself as “1”) 
168. 1 (1) 
169. 2 (2) 
170. 3 (3) 
171. 4 (4) 
172. 5 (5) 
173. 6 (6) 
174. 7 (7) 
175. 8 (8) 
176. 9 (9) 
177. 10 (10) 
178. 11 (11) 
179. 12 (12) 
180. 13 (13) 
181. 14 (14) 
182. 15 (15) 
183. 16 (16) 
184. 17 (17) 
185. 18 (18) 
186. 19 (19) 
187. 20 (20) 
 
Q16. Please select the category below that best describes the total amount of INCOME earned last year by 
the people in YOUR HOUSEHOLD (as “household” is defined in the previous question). Consider all 
forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments, scholarship support, student loans, 
parental support, social security, alimony, child support, and others. 
188. $15,000 or under (1) 
189. $15,001 - $25,000 (2) 
190. $25,001 - $35,000 (3) 
191. $35,001 - $50,000 (4) 
192. $50,001 - $65,000 (5) 
193. $65,001 - $80,000 (6) 
194. $80,001 - $100,000 (7) 
195. $100,001 - $150,000 (8) 
196. Over $150,000 (9) 
197. Prefer to not answer (10) 
198. Don’t Know (11) 
 
 
Q17. Please select the category below that best describes the total amount of INCOME earned last year by 
YOUR PARENTS. Again, consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend 
payments, scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social security, alimony, child support, and 
others. 
199. $15,000 or under (1) 
200. $15,001 - $25,000 (2) 
201. $25,001 - $35,000 (3) 
202. $35,001 - $50,000 (4) 
203. $50,001 - $65,000 (5) 
204. $65,001 - $80,000 (6) 
205. $80,001 - $100,000 (7) 
206. $100,001 - $150,000 (8) 
207. Over $150,000 (9) 
208. Prefer to not answer (10) 
209. Don’t Know (11) 
 
Q18. Do you work for pay part-time, full-time, or neither? 
210. Part-time (1) 
211. Full-time (2) 
212. Neither (3) 
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Q19. How much money do you typically spend each day using cash and your debit card (in dollars)? 
 [Text entry] 
Q20. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? 
213. Yes (1) 
214. No (2) 
 
Q21. Answered if: Yes was selected on Q20. If you do smoke cigarettes, approximately how many cigarettes 
do you smoke per day? 
 [Text entry] 
 
Q22. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost? 
 [Text entry] 
 
Q23. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how many minutes would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? 
 [Text entry] 
 
Q24. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
 [Text entry] 
 
Q25_1. How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try 
to avoid taking risks? Please select and option on the scale, where 0 means: ‘not at all willing to take risks’ 
and the value 10 means: ‘very willing to take risks’. 
 0 (1) 1 (2) 2 (3) 3 (4) 4 (5) 5 (6) 6 (7) 7 (8) 8 (9) 9 (10) 10 (11)  
Not at 
all 
willing 
to 
take 
risks 
215.  216.  217.  218.  219.  220.  221.  222.  223.  224.  225.  
Very 
willing 
to 
take 
risks 
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Q26. How would you characterize your religious beliefs? Please select the option that best describes your 
beliefs. 
226. Atheism (1) 
227. Buddhism (2) 
228. Christianity - Baptist (3) 
229. Christianity - Catholic (4) 
230. Christianity - Lutheran (5) 
231. Christianity - Methodist (6) 
232. Christianity - Other (7) 
233. Hinduism (8) 
234. Islam (9) 
235. Judaism (10) 
236. Nonreligious or Agnostic (11) 
237. Prefer to not answer (12) 
238. Other (please elaborate) (13) 
 
Q26_TEXT. How would you characterize your religious beliefs? Please select the option that best describes 
your beliefs. 
 [Text entry for: Other (please elaborate)] 
 
3. Instructions for Choices Over Risky Prospects 
 This is a task where you will choose between prospects with varying prizes and chances of winning 
each prize. You will be presented with a series of pairs of prospects where you will choose one of them. 
There are 50 pairs in the series. For each pair of prospects, you should choose the prospect you prefer. You 
will actually get the chance to play one of these prospects, and you will be paid according to the outcome of 
that prospect, so you should think carefully about which prospect you prefer. 
 
 Here is an example of what the computer display of a pair of prospects will look like. 
 
138 
 
 
  
The outcome of the prospects will be determined by the draw of a random number between 1 and 100. 
Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will be able to draw 
the number yourself using two 10-sided dice. 
 
 In the above example the left prospect pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is between 1 and 
40, and pays fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 41 and 100. The blue color in the pie chart 
corresponds to 40% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 1 and 40 
and your prize will be $5. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of the area and illustrates the 
chances that the number drawn will be between 41 and 100 and your prize will be $15. When you select the 
lottery to be played out the computer will confirm what die rolls correspond to the different prizes. 
 
 Now look at the pie chart on the right. It pays five dollars ($5) if the number drawn is between 1 and 
50, ten dollars ($10) if the number is between 51 and 90, and fifteen dollars ($15) if the number is between 
91 and 100. As with the prospect on the left, the pie slices represent the percentage of the possible numbers 
which yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $15 pie slice is 10% of the total pie, and is thus 10 
numbers out of 100. 
 
 Each pair of prospects is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you should 
indicate which prospect you prefer by clicking on one of the buttons beneath the prospects.  
 
 After you have worked through all of the pairs of prospects, raise your hand and an experimenter 
will come over as soon as they are available. You will then roll two 10-sided dice to determine which pair of 
prospects will be played out. You roll the die until a number between 1 and 50 comes up. Since there is a 
chance that any of your 50 choices could be played out for real earnings, you should approach each pair of 
prospects as if it is the one that you will play out. Finally, you will again roll the two ten-sided dice to 
determine the outcome of the prospect you chose. 
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 For instance, suppose you picked the prospect on the left in the above example and it was the pair 
chosen to be played. If the random number from your rolls of the dice was 37, you would win $5; if it was 
93, you would win $15. If you picked the prospect on the right and drew the number 37, you would win $5; 
if it was 93, you would win $15. 
 
 Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things: 
 
• which prospect you selected, the left or the right, for each of these 50 pairs; 
• which prospect pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 50 pairs using the two 10-
sided dice; and 
• the outcome of that prospect when you roll the two 10-sided dice again. 
 
 Which prospects you prefer is a matter of personal choice. The people next to you may be presented 
with different prospects, and may have different preferences, so their responses should not matter to you or 
influence your decisions. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about each 
prospect. 
 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being here, as 
well as any other earnings in other tasks from the session today. 
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4. Instructions for Belief Elicitation 
 This is a task where you will be paid according to how accurate your beliefs are about certain things. 
You will be presented with 15 questions and asked to place some bets on your beliefs about the answers to 
each question. You will actually be rewarded for your answer to one of these questions, so you should think 
carefully about your answer to each question. The question that is chosen for payment will be determined 
after everyone has made all decisions, and that process is explained below. 
 
 Here is an example of what the computer display of a question might look like. 
 
 
 
 
 The display on your computer will be larger and easier to read. You have 10 sliders to adjust, shown 
at the bottom of the screen, and you have 100 tokens to allocate across the sliders. Each slider allows you to 
allocate tokens to reflect your belief about the answer to this question. You must allocate all 100 tokens, and 
in this example we start with 10 tokens allocated to each slider. As you allocate tokens, by adjusting sliders, 
the payoffs displayed on the screen will change. Your earnings are based on the payoffs that are displayed 
after you have allocated all 100 tokens. 
 
 You can earn up to $50 in this task. 
 
 Where you position each slider depends on your beliefs about the correct answer to the question. 
Please note that the bars above each slider correspond to that particular slider. In the above example, the 
tokens you allocate to each bar will naturally reflect your beliefs about the official unemployment rate for 
everyone 16 and over in February 2013. The first bar corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate 
is between 0% and 1.9%. The second bar corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate is between 
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2% and 3.9%, and so on. Each bar shows the amount of money you could earn if the official 
unemployment rate is in the interval shown under the bar. 
 
 To illustrate how you use these sliders, suppose you think there is a fair chance the unemployment 
rate is just under 5%. Then you might allocate the 100 tokens in the following way: 50 tokens to the interval 
4% to 5.9%, 40 tokens to the interval 2% to 3.9%, and 10 tokens to the interval 0% to 1.9%. So you can see 
in the picture below that if indeed the unemployment rate is between 4% and 5.9% you would earn $39.50. 
You would earn less than $39.50 for any other outcome. You would earn $34.50 if the unemployment rate is 
between 2% and 3.9%, $19.50 if it is between 0% and 1.9%, and for any other unemployment rate you 
would earn $14.50.  
 
 
 
 
  You can adjust the allocation as much as you want to best reflect your personal beliefs about the 
unemployment rate. 
 
 Your earnings depend on your reported beliefs and, of course, the true answer. For instance, 
suppose you allocated your tokens as in the figure shown above. The true unemployment rate is actually 
7.7%, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. So if you had reported the beliefs shown above, you would 
have earned $14.50. 
 
 Suppose you had put all of your eggs in one basket, and allocated all 100 tokens to the interval 
corresponding to unemployment rates between 4% and 5.9%. Then you would have faced the earnings 
outcomes shown below. 
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  Note the “good news” and “bad news” here. If the unemployment rate is indeed between 4% and 
5.9%, you earn the maximum payoff, shown here as $50. But the true unemployment rate is 7.7%, so you 
would have earned nothing in this task.  
 
 It is up to you to balance the strength of your personal beliefs with the possibility of them being 
wrong. There are three important points for you to keep in mind when making your decisions: 
 
    • Your belief about the correct answer to each question is a personal judgment that depends 
on the information you have about the topic of the question.   
 
    • Depending on your choices and the correct answer you can earn up to $50. 
 
    • Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to gamble.   
 
The decisions you make are a matter of personal choice. Please work silently, and make your choices by 
thinking carefully about the questions you are presented with. 
 
 For some of the questions we will round the correct answer to the nearest amount shown under 
each bar. For example, the decision screen for the unemployment question might have shown 
unemployment rates of 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, 9%, 11%, 13%, 15%, 17% and 19% or more, as shown below. 
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In this case, the correct answer of 7.7% would have been rounded to 7% rather than rounded to 9%, and 
the payment would have been $32.47. 
 
 When you are satisfied with its decisions, you should click on the Submit button and confirm the 
choices. When everyone is finished we will come to you and roll a 20-sided die until a number between 1 
and 11 comes up to determine which question will be played out. The experimenter will record your 
individual earnings according to the correct answer and the choices you made. 
 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being here, as 
well as any other earnings in the session today. 
 
 Are there any questions? 
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Appendix D: Class Notes on Beta and Gamma Interval Regression 
By Glenn Harrison (with permission) 
 
December 2013  
 
 Much of the behavioral data we consider is not obviously best modeled as a Normal distribution. 
Two alternatives are considered here, building on data that can be better characterized with the Beta 
distribution or the Gamma distribution. 
 
1. Beta Interval Regression 
 The normal distribution is not an attractive statistical assumption for data a priori constrained to lie 
in a known interval, such as elicited probabilities. The same point applies to data a priori constrained to be 
greater or less than some known value, such as age; we refer to such data as left-censored intervals or right-
censored intervals. It is a relatively simple matter to replace the assumption of a normal distribution with a 
beta distribution, providing considerable flexibility as well automatically satisfying the constraint to lie in the 
open unit interval.31 The beta distribution need not be symmetric, allowing left or right skew towards the 
endpoints. Brehm and Gates (1993) discuss direct use of the beta distribution for maximum likelihood (ML) 
regression models, and also point to re-parameterization from King (1998) to facilitate regression analysis in 
terms of “mean effects” and “variance effects.” Paolino (2001, p.336) also offers yet another attractive re-
parameterization for beta regression. 
 
 The most popular re-parameterization of the beta distribution was offered in the statistics literature 
by Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004). The “original” probability density of the beta distribution can be written 
 
f(x, a, b) = {Γ(a+b)/[ Γ(a)Γ(b) ]} xa-1 (1-x)b-1 (D1) 
 
where a, b > 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 for virtually all values of the distributional parameters a and b. Let F(x, a, b) 
denote the cumulative beta distribution. The proposed re-parameterization has parameters μ and φ, with μ = 
a/(a+b) and φ = a+b, so that a = μφ and b = (1-μ)φ. The advantage of this re-parameterization is that we 
can directly specify the mean and variance of the dependent variable x as E(x) = μ and Var(x) = μ(1-
μ)/(1+φ). The latter is a “direct” expression for variance in the sense that for given μ, the variance of x is 
larger as φ is smaller; so, in the usual statistical parlance, φ can be viewed as a precision parameter. The 
obvious constraints on these parameters are that 0< μ<1 and φ>0. Hence, given values of μ and φ we can 
directly evaluate f() and F(). 
 
 The log-likelihood for the beta regression model for a vector of observations y with typical element 
y i can then be directly specified as 
 
L i(μ, φ | y i) = ln f(y i, μφ, (1-μ)φ) (D2) 
 
and maximized by numerical methods.32 Stata software to implement this beta regression model is available, 
and can be obtained by searching within Stata for betafit. 
 
                                                 
31 Known intervals can be accommodated with trivial re-normalizations to the unit interval. 
32 If the dependent variable was not bounded in the unit interval one would add a “link function” following Ferrari and Cribari-
Neto (2004, p.803). 
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 An important extension of the beta regression model allows for the dependent variable to take on 
values 0 and 1, but with a different data-generating process than is assumed for intermediate values strictly 
between 0 and 1. This is akin to a “double-hurdle” model, and specifies logit functions for the two 
endpoints, and the beta model for the open unit interval. It is particularly appropriate for models where one 
expects a “spike” at 0 or 1, such as portfolio allocation data and applications in empirical finance (e.g., Cook, 
Kieschnick, and McCullough (2008)). This is also known as the zero-one inflated beta regression model; 
Stata software to implement this model is also available, and can be obtained by searching within Stata for 
zoib. 
 
 We offer a further extension of the beta regression model, to consider data that is observed in 
interval form. The example of interest, of course, is the response to a belief elicitation task such as 
considered here, where the dependent variable comes in 10 “bins” that might reflect (uncensored or 
censored) intervals. Specifically, and following the notation for the “interval regression” model in Stata, we 
have four classes of responses: 
 
1. for “certain” observations i ∈ C we observe point data y i; 
2. for observations i ∈ L we observe left-censored data where we only know that the value is less than 
or equal to some known y L i; 
3. for observations i ∈ R we observe right-censored data where we only know that the value is greater 
than or equal to some known y R i; and 
4. for observations i ∈ I we observe interval data where we only know that the value is in the closed 
interval [y 1i, y 2i].  
 
The log-likelihood can then be expressed in general form as 
 
L(μ, φ | y) = ∑i∈C ln{Pr(y i)}+∑i∈L ln{Pr(y i≤y L i)}+∑i∈R ln{Pr(y i≥y R i)}+∑i∈I ln{Pr(y 1i≤y i≤y 2i)} (D3) 
 
where Pr() denotes probability. Each of the components can be expressed in terms of the probability 
density and cumulative density of the beta distribution: 
 
5. Pr(y i) is just f(y i, μφ, (1-μ)φ) from (D2); 
6. Pr(y i≤y L i) is F(y L i, μφ, (1-μ)φ); 
7. Pr(y i≥y R i) is 1-F(y R i, μφ, (1-μ)φ); and 
8. Pr(y 1i≤y i≤y 2i) is F(y 2 i, μφ, (1-μ)φ) - F(y 1 i, μφ, (1-μ)φ). 
 
The density in (D2) and corresponding cumulative distributions may be directly evaluated with the intrinsic 
functions betaden and ibeta in Stata. Thus it is a relatively simple matter to specify the likelihood for an 
interval beta regression model, following the documentation in (Harrison and Rutström 2008). 
 
2. Gamma Interval Regression  
 Even when the distribution of the variable being modeled can take on values between ±∞, one 
might want to consider non-normal specifications of the interval regression model. This is attractive when 
there are no covariates that might render the error distribution normal, which occurs when we are simply 
using the interval regression model to estimate the mean and variance of the distribution. It might also be 
attractive when we do not want to check in every case that the error distribution, after allowing for non-
normal covariates, is appropriately distributed. For these reasons we extend the beta interval regression 
model to allow for the gamma distribution. 
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 There are several “gamma distributions” in common use, and one has to be careful to specify which 
one. We use the simple gamma distribution with two shape parameters a and b, and one location-shift 
parameter g, following Stata (version 13): 
 
f(x, a, b, g) = {1/[ Γ(a)ba ]} (x-g)a-1exp(-(x-g)/b) (D4) 
 
where a > 0, b > 0 and -∞ < g < ∞. The mean of this density is ab-g, and the variance is ab2. It is possible to 
come up with re-parameterizations so that one can directly specific the mean as a linear function of 
covariates, but then the variance is difficult to tease apart in the same manner. In this instance we prefer to 
just use the “raw” distribution and generate estimates of mean and standard deviation by non-linear 
combinations of all estimated parameters.33 Using (D4) instead of (D1) in (D3) leads to a log-likelihood for 
the gamma interval regression model; the density function (D4) may be directly evaluated with the intrinsic 
function gammaden in Stata, and the corresponding cumulative distribution function evaluated with the 
function gammap. 
 
 An obvious extension of some value would be to use the Generalized Gamma distribution, as 
illustrated in health economics by Manning, Basu, and Mullahy (2005). This distribution adds an extra shape 
parameter, and collapses in convenient form to the standard gamma (D4), the Weibull distribution, the 
Exponential distribution, and Log-normal distribution. Thus it provides a way to check for the “best” 
distribution across a popular range of alternatives. 
 
3. Stata Implementation 
The program listed below implements the standard interval regression model with normal errors, the 
beta interval regression model, and the gamma interval regression model. It uses data available online, to 
replicate published examples, and also employs user-written routines to verify special cases with pre-existing 
code. These may be accessed online from Stata in the usual manner. A machine-readable version of this 
program is available on request. 
 
* ML interval regression demonstrates interval regression with normal, gamma and beta 
 
* log text file 
log using “ML interval regression.log”, replace 
 
* initializations 
version 13.1 
about 
set more off 
 
* flag for internet access 
global internet “y” 
 
* get the data for tests 
if “$internet” == “y” { 
 
 * get Stata data for the manual example for -intreg- 
 use http://www.stata-press.com/data/r13/womenwage 
 by wagecat: keep if _n==1 
 generate wage1 = wagecat[_n-1] 
 keep wagecat wage1 
 save lagwage, replace 
 use http://www.stata-press.com/data/r13/womenwage 
 merge m:1 wagecat using lagwage 
 erase lagwage.dta 
                                                 
33 This comes at a minor numerical cost: one then has to include each covariate in all three parameters.  
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 generate wage2 = wagecat 
 replace wage2 = . if wagecat == 51 
 sort age, stable 
 save stata_intreg_data1, replace 
 
 * get data to test beta regression 
 use http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/c/citybudget.dta, clear 
 save stata_intreg_data2, replace 
 
} 
 
* read in data for -intreg- test 
use stata_intreg_data1, clear 
 
* replicate the Stata command 
intreg wage1 wage2 age c.age#c.age nev_mar rural school tenure 
 
* define the interval regression commands 
program define MLintreg_normal 
 
 args lnf mu LNsigma 
     
 tempvar sigma vlo vhi type zlo zhi 
 
 quietly { 
 
  * transform sigma 
  generate double `sigma’ = exp(`LNsigma’) 
 
  * read in the data 
  generate double `vlo’ = $ML_y1 
  generate double `vhi’ = $ML_y2 
 
  * determine the type of censored data 
  generate int `type’ = . 
  replace `type’ = 0 if `vlo’ == `vhi’ 
  replace `type’ = 1 if `vlo’ == . & `vhi’ ~= . 
  replace `type’ = 2 if `vlo’ ~= . & `vhi’ == . 
  replace `type’ = 3 if `vlo’ ~= . & `vhi’ ~= . & `vhi’ > `vlo’ 
 
  * get the standardized normals for the intervals 
  generate double `zlo’ = (`vlo’ - `mu’)/`sigma’ 
  generate double `zhi’ = (`vhi’ - `mu’)/`sigma’ 
 
  * get the likelihood contributions 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(normalden(`vlo’,`mu’,`sigma’)) if `type’ == 0 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(normal(`zhi’)) if `type’ == 1 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(1-normal(`zlo’)) if `type’ == 2 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(normal(`zhi’)-normal(`zlo’)) if `type’ == 3 
 
 } 
 
end 
 
* define the interval regression commands 
program define MLintreg_beta 
 
 args lnf muK LNphi 
     
 tempvar mu phi a b vlo vhi type 
 
 quietly { 
 
  * transform parameters 
  generate double `mu’ = 1/(1+exp(`muK’)) 
  generate double `phi’ = exp(`LNphi’) 
  generate double `a’ = `mu’*`phi’ 
  generate double `b’ = (1-`mu’)*`phi’ 
 
  * read in the data 
  generate double `vlo’ = $ML_y1 
  generate double `vhi’ = $ML_y2 
 
  * determine the type of censored data 
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  generate int `type’ = . 
  replace `type’ = 0 if `vlo’ == `vhi’ 
  replace `type’ = 1 if `vlo’ == . & `vhi’ ~= . 
  replace `type’ = 2 if `vlo’ ~= . & `vhi’ == . 
  replace `type’ = 3 if `vlo’ ~= . & `vhi’ ~= . & `vhi’ > `vlo’ 
 
  * get the likelihood contributions 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(betaden(`a’,`b’,`vlo’)) if `type’ == 0 
 
*  code from -betafit- 
*  replace `lnf’ = lngamma(exp(`LNphi’)) - lngamma(invlogit(`muK’)*exp(`LNphi’)) - /// 
                               lngamma((1-invlogit(`muK’))*exp(`LNphi’)) +                     /// 
                               (invlogit(`muK’)*exp(`LNphi’)-1)*ln(`vlo’) +                    /// 
                               ((1-invlogit(`muK’))*exp(`LNphi’)-1)*ln(1-`vlo’) if `type’ == 0 
 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(ibeta(`a’,`b’,`vhi’)) if `type’ == 1 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(1-ibeta(`a’,`b’,`vlo’)) if `type’ == 2 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(ibeta(`a’,`b’,`vhi’)-ibeta(`a’,`b’,`vlo’)) if `type’ == 3 
 
 } 
 
end 
 
* define the interval regression commands 
program define MLintreg_gamma 
 
 args lnf LNa LNb g 
     
 tempvar a b vlo vhi type 
 
 quietly { 
 
  * transform parameters 
  generate double `a’ = exp(`LNa’) 
  generate double `b’ = exp(`LNb’) 
 
  * read in the data 
  generate double `vlo’ = $ML_y1 
  generate double `vhi’ = $ML_y2 
 
  * determine the type of censored data 
  generate int `type’ = . 
  replace `type’ = 0 if `vlo’ == `vhi’ 
  replace `type’ = 1 if `vlo’ == . & `vhi’ ~= . 
  replace `type’ = 2 if `vlo’ ~= . & `vhi’ == . 
  replace `type’ = 3 if `vlo’ ~= . & `vhi’ ~= . & `vhi’ > `vlo’ 
 
  * get the likelihood contributions 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(gammaden(`a’,`b’,`g’,`vlo’)) if `type’ == 0 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(gammap(`a’,(`vhi’-`g’)/`b’)) if `type’ == 1 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(1-gammap(`a’,(`vlo’-`g’)/`b’)) if `type’ == 2 
  replace `lnf’ = ln(gammap(`a’,(`vhi’-`g’)/`b’)-gammap(`a’,(`vlo’-`g’)/`b’))     /// 
                               if `type’ == 3 
 
 } 
 
end 
 
* replicate the Stata command with no covariates 
intreg wage1 wage2  
local mu = [model]_cons 
local lns = [lnsigma]_cons 
 
* see if this replicates Stata with no covariates 
ml model lf MLintreg_normal (mu: wage1 wage2 = ) (LNsigma: ), missing maximize difficult     /// 
                                                              init(`mu’ `lns’, copy) 
ml display 
nlcom (sigma: exp([LNsigma]_cons)) 
 
* see if this replicates Stata with covariates 
ml model lf MLintreg_normal (mu: wage1 wage2 = age c.age#c.age nev_mar rural school tenure ) /// 
                            (LNsigma: ), missing maximize 
ml display 
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* now gamma with no covariates 
ml model lf MLintreg_gamma (LNa: wage1 wage2 = ) (LNb: ) (g: ), missing maximize difficult 
ml display 
nlcom (a: exp([LNa]_cons)) (b: exp([LNa]_cons)) (g: [g]_cons)                                /// 
       mean: (exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)) + [g]_cons)                                   /// 
      (sigma: sqrt(exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)^2)) 
 
* gamma with covariates: need to have covariates in all three parameters with this “raw” 
parameterization 
ml model lf MLintreg_gamma (LNa: wage1 wage2 = age c.age#c.age nev_mar rural school tenure ) /// 
                           (LNb: age c.age#c.age nev_mar rural school tenure )               /// 
                           (g: age c.age#c.age nev_mar rural school tenure),                 /// 
                            missing maximize difficult 
ml display 
nlcom (a: exp([LNa]_cons)) (b: exp([LNa]_cons)) (g: [g]_cons)                                /// 
      (mean: (exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)) + [g]_cons)                                   /// 
      (sigma: sqrt(exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)^2)) 
 
* read in data for beta interval model test 
use stata_intreg_data2, clear 
 
* drop missing LHS since interval regression needs the “missing” option 
drop if governing==. 
 
* replicate with covariates and without 
betafit governing, mu(minorityleft noleft houseval popdens) alternative 
betafit governing, alternative 
local mu = [mu]_cons 
local LNphi = [ln_phi]_cons 
 
* test without covariates and then with covariates 
ml model lf MLintreg_beta (muK: governing governing = ) (LNphi: ), missing maximize         /// 
                                 difficult technique(nr) init(`mu’ `LNphi’, copy) 
ml display 
nlcom (mu: 1/(1+exp([muK]_cons))) (phi: exp([LNphi]_cons)) 
 
ml model lf MLintreg_beta (muK: governing governing = minorityleft noleft houseval popdens ) /// 
                          (LNphi: ), missing maximize difficult technique(nr) continue 
ml display 
nlcom (mu: 1/(1+exp([muK]_cons))) (phi: exp([LNphi]_cons)) 
 
 Since the parameterization of the gamma interval regression model does not directly generate 
estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the latent index, it may be useful to show how one can 
extend the application of the “delta method” to correctly calculate the marginal effects of covariates on the 
mean and standard deviation. In the pseudo-code below the variables x1 and x2 are covariates of some 
previously estimated model, and the first part of the expression for the marginal effect is the total effect of 
the covariate (if that is desired): 
 
* first calculate the mean and standard deviation for the constant 
nlcom (mean: (exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)) + [g]_cons) 
nlcom (sigma: sqrt(exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)^2)) 
 
* now the marginal effects of the covariates on the mean and standard deviation 
foreach v in x1 x2 { 
    nlcom (mean_`v’: ((exp([LNa]_cons+[LNa]`v’)*exp([LNb]_cons+[LNb]`v’))+([g]_cons+[g]`v’))   /// 
                   - ((exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)) + [g]_cons)) 
    nlcom (sigma_`v’: (sqrt(exp([LNa]_cons+[LNa]`v’)*exp([LNb]_cons+[LNb]`v’)^2))              /// 
                   -  (sqrt(exp([LNa]_cons)*exp([LNb]_cons)^2)) ) 
} 
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Chapter 3 - On Measuring Financial Literacy: Applications of Subjective Belief 
Elicitations and Extended Scaffolds 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at “extended” literacy, which is, literacy that is partly achieved and maintained 
through access to scaffolds. Results will be presented for beliefs over questions considered in Chapter 2. 
The key treatment here is that subjects have access to the Internet, and can be compared with the control 
group described in Chapter 2. 
3.2 Literature Review 
There is an obvious sense in which access to the Internet is a scaffold. But this particular treatment 
allows one to consider an aspect of scaffolds that is often neglected: that the value of one scaffold can 
depend on the existence of another scaffold. Consider roads. They are a wonderful scaffold for driving if we 
have cars, traffic lights and lane markings. But take away traffic lights and lane markings and roads can 
become a very poor scaffold.34  Similarly, access to the Internet without the ability to structure the query 
correctly can make the Internet an unreliable scaffold. Internet search engines will always spit out some 
answer, but if the question is poorly posed, that may generate a false sense of confidence. An immediate 
example is the longevity risk question about how many more years a male will live in the United States, 
conditional on reaching the age of 20. If that question is posed to the Internet as “how long will a man live 
in the United States?” then the answer might be reliable if someone then deducts 20 from it. If the direct 
response from the Internet is used, there will be evidence of significant bias, overstating how long men are 
expected to live conditional on reaching the age of 20. Note that this bias arises from using the scaffold 
incorrectly. 
                                                 
34 Proof: me driving in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Of course this is much more of a problem for me than for the Tanzanians. There 
they know how to use alternative scaffolding, a range of signaling conventions, that I do not.  
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3.3 Experimental Design 
The data presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are obtained in the same manner from experiments 
conducted with students at Georgia State University (GSU) in the Experimental Economics Center 
(ExCEN) over the period from November 2013 to March 2016. See Section 2.4 for a full description of the 
data.  
The results presented in Chapter 3 build on Chapter 2 and assess the effect that access to the 
Internet has on an individual’s financial literacy. There were 5 Internet sessions conducted in total: 2 
sessions using the initial labels and 3 sessions using the new labels. Again we focus our analysis on the 3 
Internet sessions using the new labeling scheme to be able to compare the results directly with our control 
treatment of individuals that did not have access to the Internet presented in Chapter 2.  
The sessions involving Internet access were administered in the same manner as the sessions 
without Internet access. The one variation in protocol was that the participants were given a sheet of paper 
that listed the 11 financial questions they could use the Internet to research. Once all the participants had 
the list of questions, an Internet browser was remotely opened on each computer, and they were allowed 
access to the Internet for 15 minutes. After the 15 minutes, the browsers on all the computers closed 
automatically. The participants were instructed that during the 15 minutes of Internet access they should 
research the section’s questions as efficiently as possible, and make notes as needed on the paper provided. 
Immediately after the Internet access ended the participants recorded their responses using the computer 
interface. The pertinent text that was updated in the experimental instructions for participants allowed 
access to the Internet is as follows:  
 Using the methodology described above we will ask you 11 questions today. Immediately 
before each section starting, you will be given that section’s questions on a piece of paper. You can 
write on these papers as needed. After everyone in the experiment has the appropriate question 
sheet in hand we will then open an Internet browser on your computer remotely, and allow access to 
the Internet for 15 minutes. It is a timed 15 minutes, after which the browsers on your computer 
will close automatically. It is during this time that you should research the section’s questions as 
efficiently as possible, and make notes as needed on the paper provided. Immediately after the 
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Internet access ends, you will be asked to respond to the same questions using the computer 
interface.  
  
It is up to you to use your given time on the Internet as efficiently as possible to research the 
questions that will be handed out in advance. You should balance the information you find on the 
Internet with the strength of your personal beliefs and the possibility of them being wrong. There 
are three important points for you to keep in mind when making your decisions: 
 
• Your belief about the correct answer to each question is a personal judgment after being given 
access to the Internet, and that depends on the information you have about the topic of the 
question.   
• Depending on your choices and the correct answer you can earn up to $50. 
• Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to gamble.   
 
The decisions you make are a matter of personal choice. Please work silently, and make your choices 
by thinking carefully about the questions you are presented with.  
 
The complete experimental instruction sets for the Internet treatments are available in Appendix E.  
There are two Internet treatments that differ only by the inclusion of a cautionary statement in the 
instruction set text that states “You are not required to use any information found on the Internet.” The 
caveat was constructed to test the significance of a reminder to participants that they are not obliged to use 
the information found online. Of the three Internet sessions using the new labeling scheme, Session 17 did 
not have the caveat, and Sessions 20 and 25 had the caveat. The total number of participants for Sessions 
17, 20, and 25 are 33, 32, and 39, respectively, thus totaling 104 participants who had access to the Internet.   
3.4 Results 
The results from these experiments are straightforward. In general, we find that access to the 
Internet increases the literacy of individuals and has a large effect by boosting confidence in beliefs, which 
leads to reduction in the standard deviation of responses. Access to the Internet formally improves literacy 
by our measures in eight of the eleven questions and does so in a dramatic way for several: the literacy 
measures of the other three questions stay within a percentage point or two compared to the literacy 
measures without Internet access. It appears that the Internet is being utilized successfully as an 
informational complement, as one might have expected from the metaphor of a cognitive production 
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function: the internet is substituting for other intrinsic inputs. Of course, substitution can be a good thing if 
the expanded production input enhances output at no (major) extra cost, which is the case as we see here 
since there was no cost for the subjects to access the Internet. 
As with previous results we begin the initial analysis going through a detailed example to begin. 
Consider responses to the question about the savings account with 2% interest left to grow over five years 
shown in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1, Table 3.2, and Table 3.3. To anticipate a pattern in evaluating these 
responses, initially we examine the distribution of responses in Figure 3.1, then observe the marginal effect of 
being assigned to an Internet treatment (Table 3.1), then examine the marginal effect of being in an Internet 
treatment that was additionally given a caveat (Table 3.2), and finally examine the total effect of each 
covariate with respect to bias away from the true answer and imprecision of beliefs.  
Beginning with Figure 3.1 we see that the overall average belief for individuals was $110.70 and for 
participants with access to the Internet was $109.80, and a reported p-value = 0.060 on a hypothesis test if 
there is a difference in average responses. Here we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average response of 
individuals and those with access to the Internet are statistically different from one another at the 5% 
significance level.  We further observe from Figure 3.1 that the modal responses for both individuals and 
those with Internet access are in the bin that contains the true answer and that the underlying distributions 
are shaped similarly. Participants with Internet access appear to allocate more tokens on average to the bin 
containing the true answer than individuals. We can read off the average token allocations directly from the 
figure, or see a numeric representation of them using the L literacy index shown at the top of Table 3.3. 
Thus the reported L literacy indices of 0.53 for individuals and 0.68 for subjects given access to the Internet 
correspond to an average token allocation of 53 and 68, respectively, in the middle bin containing the 
correct answer of $110.41 in Figure 3.1.   
Turning to specific statistical findings, we will focus on the effect of the treatment, and not so much 
the demographics. In the top panel of Table 3.1 we see that the overall average belief was $111.51; as usual, 
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the constant refers to the “omitted category,” which is a White male underclassman at GSU. We observe 
that those having Internet access have an average reduction of $0.53 in their belief when compared to the 
omitted category, but that this is not statistically significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.06) at the 5% 
significance level. In the bottom panel of Table 3.1, the interpretation of the coefficients for dispersion is 
immediate, because the dependent variable is in natural log units. Thus the coefficient estimate β implies a β 
× 100 percent change in the standard deviation of beliefs, σ, for a one unit change in that covariate. So the 
statistically insignificant effect (p-value = 0.22) of having access to the Internet is interpreted as a 15% 
reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs compared to the omitted category. The information just below 
the title in Table 3.1 is generally self-explanatory. The p-value for Internet refers to a test of the hypothesis 
that the effect on the average and the standard deviation are jointly zero, and complements the 
corresponding hypothesis tests of the average and the standard deviation in the body of the table. Here the 
overall effect of having access to the Internet is not statistically significant and different from zero (p-value 
< 0.110). Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of reports for each bin, side-by-side for individuals and those 
with Internet, allowing a visual interpretation of differences in reports. 
Table 3.2 is analyzed in the exact same manner as Table 3.1, thereby teasing apart results for whether 
a caveat was announced from those in an Internet treatment. Recall that this caveat was simply telling 
subjects that they didn’t have to answer any question with the information they found online. Here we see 
that the marginal effect of giving subjects access to the Internet without a caveat (internetNC) leads to a 
statistically significant reduction of $0.75 from the average report (p-value = 0.03) and a 38% reduction in 
the standard deviation of beliefs (p-value = 0.05) compared to the omitted category.  There is no statistically 
significant effect for subjects given access to the Internet with a caveat (internetC) compared to the omitted 
category. Finally, the text at the top of the table shows that the overall effect of being in an Internet 
treatment with and without a caveat is statistically significant and different from zero (p-value < 0.015): thus 
there is evidence that the underlying distribution of reports is different for those given a caveat versus no 
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caveat. Of course, these are estimates of the effects of treatments on averages and standard deviations, and 
form the basis for evaluating bias and precision.  
 Table 3.3 provides an evaluation of the bias and imprecision of beliefs that are associated with 
demographics and having access to the Internet (with and without caveat), and is different from the 
estimates underlying Table 3.2. In the top panel of Table 3.3 we estimate the “total effect” of the covariate, 
and then compare the estimated average belief to the correct value. The bottom panel of Table 3.3 
compares the estimated standard deviation for each covariate to the overall pooled standard deviation. Thus 
we measure bias for the average, and relative imprecision for the standard deviation. These are not marginal 
effects: for each covariate of interest it is as if we use the average value of all other covariates for that 
covariate of interest. For students with reported high grade point averages, for instance, the top panel of 
Table 3.3 shows the difference between the average belief of students with high grades is $0.39 less than the 
correct answer of $110.41, and this difference is statistically significantly different from zero (p-value = 
0.04). This is different from Table 3.2, where the coefficient shows the difference compared to the omitted 
category.  
 With this as background, the top panel of Table 3.3 shows that there is statistically significant 
evidence of bias from the correct answer for those with Internet access not given the caveat (p-value = 0.02) 
and no evidence of bias for those with Internet access and given the caveat (p-value = 0.12). The bottom 
panel of Table 3.3 shows us that neither Internet treatment exhibits less imprecision of beliefs compared to 
the average imprecision. For this question we see that “most GSU students get it and those with Internet 
access exhibit slightly higher literacy.” This is also shown by the higher levels of the literacy indexes L and 
W with access to the Internet compared to individuals (Table 3.3).  
Responses to the question about the starting age of Social Security are evaluated in Figure 3.2 and 
Table 3.4, Table 3.5, and Table 3.6. Again it is instructive to first examine the displays in Figure 3.2. The 
correct answer is 62 and located in the first bin in Figure 3.2. The beliefs of individuals assigned to the 
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control treatment exhibit low bias and low confidence represented by a diffuse token allocation with a 
modal response that is, just barely, at the bin containing the correct answer. Individuals in the control 
treatment allocated on average only 26 tokens to the correct bin. By striking contrast, the subjects in the 
Internet treatment exhibit low bias and high confidence, allocating on average 87 tokens to the correct bin. 
We see that the effect of having access to the Internet is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) and leads 
to a 92% average reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs when compared to the omitted category 
(Table 3.4). The effect of having access to the Internet persists even when controlling for the caveat: the 
average reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs strengthens to 139% for those not given the caveat 
compared to the omitted category (Table 3.5). In Table 3.6 we see evidence of bias from the correct answer 
from the Internet treatment with the caveat (p-value < 0.001), but not from the Internet treatment with no 
caveat (p-value < 0.010). It is likely that the participants who heard the cautionary message when given 
access to the Internet reserved a small amount of their tokens and hedged that allocation to the bins 
immediately adjacent to the correct bin as “insurance” for some payout, which would explain the bias 
observed. Overall we see a sharp improvement in literacy with access to the Internet, as measured by the 
two indices (Table 3.6).  
Responses to the question about the age for Medicare eligibility, another important signpost for 
retirement planning, are evaluated in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.7, Table 3.8, and Table 3.9. We see the same 
pattern here as observed for the previous question: diffuse beliefs from the individual subjects that had no 
access to the internet, and a strikingly unimodal response in the bin containing the correct answer from the 
subjects that did have access to the Internet (Figure 3.3). The correct answer is 65, and we see that the effect 
of having access to the Internet is a decrease in bias and increase in confidence when evaluating the two 
panels of Figure 3.3. The results show a 93% average reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs when 
compared to the omitted category (Table 3.7) and a greater than 500% improvement in literacy with access 
to the Internet, as measured by either of our two indices (Table 3.9). 
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Responses to the financial literacy question about the real interest rate are reported in Figure 3.4 and 
Table 3.10, Table 3.11, and Table 3.12. In this case we observe in Figure 3.4 that the underlying distribution 
of beliefs looks similar when comparing participants with and without Internet access. The correct answer, 
$98.98, is the modal response in both cases, and confidence is low in each treatment, as shown by the 
diffuse allocation of beliefs. This is the first response that having access to the Internet (Table 3.10), with or 
without a caveat (Table 3.11), which does not statistically significantly alter beliefs compared to the omitted 
category. In this instance literacy, using our two measures (Table 3.12), remained at similar levels regardless 
of access to the Internet. Subjects exposed to the Internet are biased from the correct answer in a 
statistically significant manner by around +$1.59 (Table 3.12) in total. There is no significant difference in 
confidence with access to the Internet. 
Responses to the savings horizons are reported in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.13, Table 3.14, and Table 
3.15. From Figure 3.5 we observe generally high literacy for individuals with and without Internet access and 
an underlying belief distribution shaped similarly for each treatment. In each case there is a modal response 
in the bin containing the correct response of 4 months. Overall responses from participants having access to 
the Internet are not statistically significantly different than the average response from White male 
underclassmen (Table 3.13). However, there is a statistically significant difference when comparing the no 
caveat Internet treatment with the omitted category (Table 3.14). Literacy is modestly improved, and we 
observe the L index improving by 7 percentage points to a level of 0.84 with access to the Internet (Table 
3.15). 
Responses to the liability for a stolen credit card are reported in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.16, Table 
3.17, and Table 3.18. In the left panel of Figure 3.6 we see low confidence in the distribution of beliefs for 
individuals without access to the Internet and an incorrect modal response of $0, which is biased from the 
correct answer of $50. In the right panel of Figure 3.6 we see a more confident distribution of beliefs for 
participants given access to the Internet, with some weight being placed at $0, but a large spike on the bin 
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that contained the correct answer. The overall effect of having access to the Internet was statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.001) and led to a 73% average reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs when 
compared to the omitted category (Table 3.16). Literacy with access to the Internet shows a sharp 
improvement over no access, increasing dramatically whether measured by either of the two indices (Table 
3.18). 
Responses to the liability for a stolen debit card are reported in Figure 3.7, Table 3.19, Table 3.20, 
and Table 3.21, that convey results very similar to the previous question. We again see less confidence for 
participants without access to the Internet and an incorrect modal response of $0 compared to those with 
Internet access having more confidence and the correct modal response of $500 (Figure 3.7). The overall 
effect of having access to the Internet is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) and led to a 102% average 
reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs when compared to the omitted category (Table 3.19). There is 
no statistical evidence of bias from the correct answer for either Internet treatment and we again see a sharp 
improvement in literacy as measured by either of the two indices (Table 3.21). 
Responses to the question about the nominal interest rate are documented in Figure 3.8,  Table 3.22, 
Table 3.23, and Table 3.24. In this case we observe that the underlying distribution of beliefs looks strikingly 
similar between participants with and without Internet access (Figure 3.8). The correct answer, 5%, is the 
modal response in both cases, and confidence is high and bias appears low in each treatment. As the literacy 
is high to begin with we find that having access to the Internet (Table 3.22), with or without a caveat (Table 
3.23), does not statistically significantly alter beliefs compared to the omitted category. In this instance 
literacy, using the two measures (Table 3.24), remained at similar levels regardless of access to the Internet. 
This is a question that “GSU students get right” regardless of having access to the Internet.  
Responses to the question about the simple interest rate are documented in Figure 3.9, Table 3.25, 
Table 3.26, and Table 3.27, and are similar to the previous question. Again the distribution of beliefs is 
similar for participants with and without access to the Internet, with subjects in each treatment holding a 
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high degree of confidence around the correct answer of $102 as their modal response (Figure 3.9).  This is 
also a question that “GSU students get right,” and literacy remained at similar levels regardless of access to 
the Internet (Table 3.27).  
The final two questions were about beliefs concerning longevity risk for men and women. Figure 
3.10 and Figure 3.11 show that the effect of Internet access, compared to individuals without access, is a 
sharp increase in confidence and an increase in modal responses that are in the bin containing the correct 
answer. The overall effect of access to the Internet is statistically significant for the questions regarding the 
remaining life of men (p-value = 0.007, Table 3.28) and remaining life of women (p-value < 0.001, Table 
3.31) when compared to White male underclassmen. Responses for both questions in either Internet 
treatment were negatively biased from the correct answer, and these effects are statistically significant at a 
1% significance level (Table 3.30 and Table 3.33). However, literacy, as measured by the two indices (Table 
3.30 and Table 3.33), increased around two-fold with access to the Internet for both questions since there 
was greater bias without access to the Internet. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Table 3.34 is an extension of Table 2.39 which displays a summary view of the financial literacy 
questions and the associated pooled L and W indices for each question for both the Individual control 
subjects introduced in Chapter 2 and the subjects that were given access to the Internet as a scaffold in this 
chapter. Table 3.35 is like Table 3.34, but focuses only on the L index and the changes to it when compared 
to the Individual literacy measures. In the fourth column of Table 3.35 are the pooled measures of the L 
index for individuals responding with only their private literacy. In the sixth column of Table 3.35 are the L 
index measures for the Internet. Column seven is the “+/-” difference between the L index for those with 
Internet access compared to individuals without. We see “+/-“ values for the Internet treatment that range 
from -0.02 for fin14, “the interest rate” question, all the way to +0.66 for fin3, “the Medicare eligibility” 
question.   
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In Table 3.35 we observe enhanced literacy directly in eight of our eleven financial questions when 
participants are given access to the Internet. We see that the largest enhancements to literacy from the 
Internet scaffold with procedural and longevity risk questions, thus suggesting the importance of access to, 
and comprehension of, sources of information found online. The three questions (fin7, fin13, and fin14) for 
which we observed either no change, or a very small change in literacy, given access to the Internet are 
numeracy questions dealing with interest. It could be that the participants chose to calculate these directly 
“in their head” instead of searching the Internet for an answer.  
Overall there is clear evidence that access to the Internet served as an effective and constructive 
scaffold with respect to the revealed literacy of individuals.  
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Table 3.1: Effective Literacy of Access 
to the Internet for the Question about 
the Savings Account with 2% Interest  
  
      
      
      
     
  
     
    
     
      
      
       
      
 
      
      
      
      
     
    
      
    
      
       
    
      
      
     
    
     
    
    
   
     
Figure 3.1: Elicited Beliefs about The 
Savings Account with 2% Interest Question, 
Comparing Internet and Individual 
Responses, New Labels 
Figure 3.2: Elicited Beliefs about The Social 
Security Start Question, Comparing Internet 
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Table 3.1: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $110.41      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is 0.110 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet -0.53 0.06 -1.08 0.03 
female -0.31 0.22 -0.80 0.18 
asian -0.12 0.75 -0.88 0.63 
black -0.39 0.15 -0.94 0.15 
christian -0.16 0.51 -0.64 0.31 
gpaHI -0.46 0.11 -1.03 0.11 
junior -0.23 0.42 -0.79 0.33 
senior -0.65 0.05 -1.30 0.00 
constant 111.51 <0.001 110.69 112.33 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.15 0.22 -0.38 0.09 
female -0.07 0.60 -0.33 0.19 
asian 0.75 <0.001 0.34 1.16 
black 0.58 <0.001 0.25 0.91 
christian 0.25 0.09 -0.04 0.54 
gpaHI -0.38 <0.001 -0.61 -0.14 
junior -0.33 0.03 -0.62 -0.04 
senior -0.04 0.79 -0.35 0.27 
constant 0.75 <0.001 0.36 1.15 
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Table 3.2: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $110.41      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.092 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.015 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC -0.75 0.03 -1.42 -0.07 
internetC -0.46 0.11 -1.01 0.10 
female -0.26 0.28 -0.74 0.22 
asian -0.22 0.57 -1.01 0.56 
black -0.43 0.11 -0.96 0.09 
christian -0.14 0.56 -0.62 0.34 
gpaHI -0.37 0.15 -0.88 0.13 
junior -0.12 0.66 -0.66 0.42 
senior -0.69 0.04 -1.33 -0.05 
constant 111.43 <0.001 110.60 112.26 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.38 0.05 -0.75 -0.00 
internetC -0.11 0.39 -0.36 0.14 
female -0.04 0.79 -0.30 0.23 
asian 0.82 <0.001 0.41 1.23 
black 0.57 <0.001 0.25 0.89 
christian 0.26 0.08 -0.03 0.56 
gpaHI -0.41 <0.001 -0.65 -0.16 
junior -0.27 0.08 -0.58 0.04 
senior -0.03 0.84 -0.35 0.28 
constant 0.74 <0.001 0.36 1.11 
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Table 3.3: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $110.41 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 3.18 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.53 (Individuals) and 0.68 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.50 (Individuals) and 0.67 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC -1.07 0.02 -1.90 -0.24 
internetC -0.43 0.12 -0.99 0.12 
female -0.40 0.08 -0.84 0.03 
asian -0.15 0.37 -0.95 0.64 
black -0.23 0.24 -0.69 0.22 
christian -0.19 0.27 -0.62 0.24 
gpaHI -0.39 0.04 -0.74 -0.04 
junior -0.35 0.18 -0.89 0.19 
senior -0.66 0.11 -1.48 0.15 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -0.69 0.13 -1.59 0.20 
internetC -0.13 0.38 -0.87 0.62 
female 0.10 0.37 -0.37 0.58 
asian -0.06 0.39 -0.84 0.72 
black 0.28 0.21 -0.20 0.76 
christian 0.23 0.25 -0.23 0.70 
gpaHI -0.59 0.03 -1.09 -0.10 
junior -0.98 <0.001 -1.49 -0.47 
senior 0.17 0.38 -0.79 1.13 
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Table 3.4: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 62      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet -3.38 <0.001 -3.91 -2.85 
female -0.16 0.38 -0.53 0.20 
asian 0.41 0.17 -0.17 1.00 
black 0.13 0.44 -0.20 0.45 
christian 0.26 0.10 -0.05 0.56 
gpaHI -0.20 0.26 -0.55 0.15 
junior -0.01 0.97 -0.39 0.38 
senior -0.23 0.25 -0.62 0.16 
constant 65.84 <0.001 65.17 66.50 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.92 <0.001 -1.18 -0.66 
female -0.19 0.23 -0.49 0.12 
asian 0.75 <0.001 0.23 1.27 
black 0.34 0.02 0.06 0.62 
christian 0.17 0.19 -0.08 0.42 
gpaHI -0.24 0.07 -0.50 0.02 
junior 0.01 0.98 -0.43 0.45 
senior -0.18 0.27 -0.49 0.14 
constant 1.12 <0.001 0.74 1.50 
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Table 3.5: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 62      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC -3.73 <0.001 -4.27 -3.19 
internetC -3.30 <0.001 -3.85 -2.74 
female -0.05 0.75 -0.36 0.26 
asian 0.45 0.09 -0.08 0.97 
black 0.08 0.60 -0.21 0.36 
christian 0.22 0.08 -0.03 0.47 
gpaHI -0.21 0.17 -0.50 0.09 
junior 0.11 0.54 -0.24 0.45 
senior -0.26 0.10 -0.56 0.05 
constant 65.84 <0.001 65.22 66.46 
LnSigma 
internetNC -1.39 <0.001 -1.86 -0.92 
internetC -0.87 <0.001 -1.15 -0.59 
female -0.09 0.53 -0.36 0.19 
asian 0.86 <0.001 0.34 1.38 
black 0.30 0.03 0.03 0.57 
christian 0.15 0.26 -0.11 0.40 
gpaHI -0.28 0.02 -0.52 -0.04 
junior 0.18 0.38 -0.22 0.57 
senior -0.17 0.25 -0.46 0.12 
constant 1.10 <0.001 0.74 1.46 
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Table 3.6: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 62 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 3.17 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.26 (Individuals) and 0.87 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.21 (Individuals) and 0.84 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC 0.30 0.10 -0.06 0.67 
internetC 0.63 <0.001 0.35 0.92 
female 1.99 <0.001 1.56 2.43 
asian 1.79 <0.001 1.07 2.51 
black 2.22 <0.001 1.76 2.67 
christian 2.24 <0.001 1.79 2.68 
gpaHI 2.02 <0.001 1.51 2.52 
junior 1.58 <0.001 0.95 2.21 
senior 1.75 <0.001 1.17 2.33 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -1.51 0.04 -2.90 -0.12 
internetC -1.43 <0.001 -2.00 -0.85 
female -0.01 0.40 -0.47 0.44 
asian -0.11 0.39 -0.99 0.78 
black 0.12 0.34 -0.32 0.57 
christian 0.08 0.37 -0.34 0.50 
gpaHI 0.11 0.37 -0.41 0.63 
junior -0.46 0.18 -1.16 0.25 
senior -0.48 0.03 -0.90 -0.07 
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Table 3.7: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 65      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet 6.75 <0.001 5.72 7.79 
female 0.25 0.37 -0.30 0.80 
asian -0.71 0.05 -1.44 0.01 
black -0.74 0.02 -1.38 -0.10 
christian -0.17 0.57 -0.75 0.41 
gpaHI 0.11 0.70 -0.45 0.66 
junior -0.52 0.35 -1.62 0.58 
senior 0.09 0.71 -0.39 0.58 
constant 58.00 <0.001 56.70 59.30 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.93 <0.001 -1.22 -0.65 
female 0.04 0.76 -0.23 0.32 
asian 0.67 <0.001 0.22 1.11 
black 0.58 <0.001 0.28 0.87 
christian -0.13 0.44 -0.48 0.21 
gpaHI -0.25 0.10 -0.54 0.05 
junior 0.47 0.07 -0.03 0.98 
senior -0.11 0.36 -0.36 0.13 
constant 1.34 <0.001 0.90 1.78 
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Table 3.8: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 65      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC 6.73 <0.001 5.60 7.85 
internetC 6.76 <0.001 5.71 7.80 
female 0.25 0.38 -0.31 0.81 
asian -0.69 0.05 -1.39 0.01 
black -0.74 0.02 -1.38 -0.10 
christian -0.18 0.56 -0.76 0.41 
gpaHI 0.11 0.72 -0.47 0.68 
junior -0.52 0.36 -1.62 0.58 
senior 0.08 0.75 -0.44 0.61 
constant 58.01 <0.001 56.71 59.32 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.90 <0.001 -1.36 -0.43 
internetC -0.94 <0.001 -1.27 -0.62 
female 0.04 0.78 -0.24 0.32 
asian 0.65 <0.001 0.22 1.09 
black 0.58 <0.001 0.29 0.87 
christian -0.13 0.46 -0.48 0.22 
gpaHI -0.24 0.11 -0.54 0.06 
junior 0.46 0.08 -0.05 0.96 
senior -0.12 0.36 -0.36 0.13 
constant 1.34 <0.001 0.90 1.78 
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Table 3.9: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 65 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 5.38 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.16 (Individuals) and 0.82 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.16 (Individuals) and 0.80 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC -1.47 0.02 -2.68 -0.26 
internetC -0.71 <0.001 -1.18 -0.25 
female -3.78 <0.001 -4.57 -2.99 
asian -3.98 <0.001 -5.43 -2.53 
black -4.61 <0.001 -5.52 -3.71 
christian -4.48 <0.001 -5.34 -3.62 
gpaHI -3.98 <0.001 -4.91 -3.05 
junior -3.93 <0.001 -5.54 -2.32 
senior -3.10 <0.001 -4.30 -1.90 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -1.39 0.14 -3.29 0.50 
internetC -2.98 <0.001 -4.00 -1.96 
female -0.16 0.30 -0.58 0.25 
asian 0.04 0.40 -0.77 0.85 
black 0.24 0.19 -0.15 0.63 
christian 0.08 0.36 -0.28 0.45 
gpaHI -0.04 0.39 -0.51 0.43 
junior 0.39 0.29 -0.56 1.33 
senior -0.60 0.11 -1.34 0.13 
 
173 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.10: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $98.98      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is 0.182 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet -0.22 0.39 -0.73 0.28 
female 0.59 0.01 0.12 1.07 
asian 0.76 0.04 0.04 1.49 
black 0.57 0.08 -0.07 1.21 
christian 0.71 0.01 0.15 1.28 
gpaHI -0.66 <0.001 -1.13 -0.18 
junior -0.17 0.58 -0.76 0.43 
senior -0.43 0.17 -1.04 0.19 
constant 100.05 <0.001 99.23 100.88 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.15 0.07 -0.30 0.01 
female 0.05 0.49 -0.10 0.20 
asian 0.21 0.14 -0.07 0.50 
black 0.13 0.19 -0.07 0.34 
christian 0.15 0.10 -0.03 0.33 
gpaHI -0.17 0.02 -0.31 -0.03 
junior 0.02 0.88 -0.19 0.22 
senior 0.07 0.45 -0.11 0.25 
constant 0.56 <0.001 0.29 0.84 
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Table 3.11: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $98.98      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.536 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.351 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC -0.42 0.27 -1.16 0.32 
internetC -0.14 0.61 -0.68 0.40 
female 0.63 <0.001 0.16 1.10 
asian 0.77 0.03 0.06 1.48 
black 0.57 0.08 -0.07 1.20 
christian 0.68 0.02 0.10 1.26 
gpaHI -0.72 <0.001 -1.23 -0.20 
junior -0.16 0.60 -0.75 0.43 
senior -0.43 0.17 -1.04 0.18 
constant 100.09 <0.001 99.26 100.92 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.20 0.06 -0.41 0.01 
internetC -0.12 0.18 -0.30 0.06 
female 0.06 0.42 -0.09 0.21 
asian 0.22 0.12 -0.06 0.50 
black 0.15 0.14 -0.05 0.34 
christian 0.13 0.16 -0.05 0.32 
gpaHI -0.19 0.02 -0.35 -0.03 
junior 0.00 0.96 -0.20 0.21 
senior 0.07 0.47 -0.11 0.25 
constant 0.57 <0.001 0.30 0.84 
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Table 3.12: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $98.98 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 2.12 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.28 (Individuals) and 0.28 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.29 (Individuals) and 0.28 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC 1.59 <0.001 0.94 2.24 
internetC 1.64 <0.001 1.24 2.04 
female 2.08 <0.001 1.77 2.40 
asian 1.55 <0.001 1.02 2.08 
black 2.10 <0.001 1.78 2.42 
christian 2.14 <0.001 1.83 2.45 
gpaHI 1.55 <0.001 1.23 1.87 
junior 1.61 <0.001 1.11 2.12 
senior 1.47 <0.001 0.92 2.03 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -0.14 0.28 -0.48 0.19 
internetC -0.15 0.11 -0.33 0.04 
female -0.01 0.40 -0.15 0.14 
asian -0.10 0.33 -0.42 0.22 
black 0.05 0.32 -0.09 0.19 
christian 0.04 0.34 -0.10 0.19 
gpaHI -0.17 0.08 -0.36 0.02 
junior -0.16 0.15 -0.39 0.07 
senior 0.04 0.38 -0.26 0.35 
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Table 3.13: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 4 months (4m)      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is 0.341 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet -0.18 0.21 -0.46 0.10 
female -0.10 0.45 -0.37 0.16 
asian 0.31 0.05 -0.00 0.61 
black 0.33 0.04 0.02 0.63 
christian 0.37 <0.001 0.09 0.65 
gpaHI -0.04 0.75 -0.27 0.19 
junior 0.36 0.16 -0.14 0.86 
senior -0.03 0.77 -0.27 0.20 
constant 4.21 <0.001 3.77 4.65 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.31 0.14 -0.73 0.11 
female -0.39 0.06 -0.79 0.01 
asian 0.71 0.05 0.01 1.40 
black 0.76 <0.001 0.23 1.28 
christian 0.63 <0.001 0.17 1.10 
gpaHI -0.02 0.90 -0.40 0.35 
junior 0.66 0.01 0.15 1.17 
senior -0.03 0.89 -0.49 0.43 
constant -0.37 0.34 -1.13 0.39 
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Table 3.14: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 4 months (4m)      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.129 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.042 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC -0.36 0.05 -0.72 0.00 
internetC -0.11 0.45 -0.40 0.18 
female 0.06 0.60 -0.17 0.29 
asian 0.32 0.08 -0.03 0.67 
black 0.13 0.41 -0.19 0.45 
christian 0.25 0.09 -0.04 0.54 
gpaHI -0.17 0.15 -0.40 0.06 
junior 0.32 0.17 -0.14 0.77 
senior -0.16 0.20 -0.40 0.09 
constant 4.35 <0.001 3.87 4.84 
LnSigma 
internetNC -1.07 <0.001 -1.75 -0.38 
internetC -0.21 0.36 -0.65 0.23 
female -0.22 0.27 -0.60 0.17 
asian 0.93 <0.001 0.29 1.56 
black 0.72 <0.001 0.22 1.22 
christian 0.65 <0.001 0.18 1.11 
gpaHI -0.13 0.48 -0.51 0.24 
junior 0.85 <0.001 0.36 1.35 
senior 0.01 0.96 -0.45 0.47 
constant -0.46 0.20 -1.17 0.25 
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Table 3.15: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 4 months (4m) 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1.82 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.77 (Individuals) and 0.84 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.74 (Individuals) and 0.83 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC 0.28 0.02 0.05 0.50 
internetC 0.47 <0.001 0.23 0.72 
female 0.63 <0.001 0.37 0.90 
asian 0.52 0.03 0.07 0.96 
black 0.86 <0.001 0.53 1.18 
christian 0.87 <0.001 0.55 1.19 
gpaHI 0.66 <0.001 0.34 0.97 
junior 0.96 <0.001 0.31 1.62 
senior 0.64 <0.001 0.22 1.06 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -0.91 <0.001 -1.50 -0.32 
internetC -0.51 0.03 -0.94 -0.07 
female -0.11 0.36 -0.58 0.35 
asian -0.18 0.37 -1.12 0.76 
black 0.21 0.27 -0.25 0.68 
christian 0.21 0.27 -0.25 0.68 
gpaHI -0.03 0.40 -0.58 0.52 
junior 0.54 0.18 -0.31 1.39 
senior -0.06 0.39 -0.80 0.69 
 
181 
 
 
 
 
182 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.16: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $50      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet -69.65 0.02 -129.01 -10.29 
female 3.15 0.86 -31.25 37.56 
asian -13.86 0.56 -60.83 33.11 
black 2.74 0.91 -44.02 49.50 
christian 3.28 0.89 -44.84 51.39 
gpaHI 10.37 0.56 -24.60 45.34 
junior -34.75 0.14 -80.92 11.43 
senior -26.89 0.33 -81.30 27.52 
constant 161.18 <0.001 90.54 231.82 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.73 <0.001 -1.11 -0.35 
female 0.11 0.55 -0.26 0.49 
asian -0.07 0.86 -0.79 0.65 
black 0.15 0.58 -0.37 0.67 
christian 0.07 0.75 -0.38 0.52 
gpaHI 0.17 0.38 -0.21 0.54 
junior -0.41 0.06 -0.84 0.02 
senior -0.24 0.37 -0.77 0.29 
constant 5.46 <0.001 4.75 6.18 
 
183 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.17: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $50      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.026 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC -47.39 0.18 -115.90 21.12 
internetC -74.66 0.02 -135.63 -13.70 
female 1.49 0.93 -33.80 36.78 
asian -21.02 0.37 -67.33 25.29 
black 9.29 0.70 -38.33 56.91 
christian -4.35 0.86 -53.55 44.85 
gpaHI 9.80 0.57 -23.98 43.57 
junior -36.65 0.07 -76.44 3.13 
senior -17.97 0.53 -73.71 37.76 
constant 160.55 <0.001 90.76 230.33 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.45 0.12 -1.02 0.12 
internetC -0.89 <0.001 -1.29 -0.50 
female 0.13 0.46 -0.22 0.49 
asian -0.12 0.72 -0.79 0.54 
black 0.25 0.33 -0.25 0.76 
christian 0.04 0.87 -0.41 0.49 
gpaHI 0.12 0.52 -0.24 0.48 
junior -0.49 0.02 -0.90 -0.08 
senior -0.16 0.57 -0.71 0.39 
constant 5.44 <0.001 4.75 6.13 
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Table 3.18: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $50 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 218.67 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.06 (Individuals) and 0.66 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.06 (Individuals) and 0.64 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC 41.20 0.05 1.67 80.74 
internetC 25.74 0.02 5.09 46.38 
female 76.52 <0.001 41.06 111.97 
asian 46.88 0.06 0.47 93.29 
black 89.27 <0.001 50.30 128.23 
christian 92.77 <0.001 56.41 129.12 
gpaHI 82.14 <0.001 41.50 122.79 
junior 30.92 0.08 -3.04 64.88 
senior 53.71 0.04 4.88 102.54 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -64.55 0.11 -144.12 15.02 
internetC -91.62 <0.001 -138.70 -44.54 
female 9.34 0.37 -37.14 55.82 
asian -39.01 0.23 -112.27 34.24 
black 24.08 0.24 -23.03 71.19 
christian 21.87 0.24 -20.82 64.57 
gpaHI 11.26 0.36 -40.89 63.41 
junior -62.84 0.06 -125.56 -0.12 
senior -17.79 0.36 -94.53 58.95 
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Table 3.19: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $500      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet -312.64 <0.001 -517.78 -107.49 
female -46.35 0.43 -160.86 68.17 
asian 46.00 0.51 -91.37 183.37 
black 119.13 0.14 -40.33 278.59 
christian 35.95 0.63 -109.73 181.62 
gpaHI -56.32 0.25 -151.98 39.34 
junior 7.76 0.93 -159.75 175.27 
senior 26.61 0.68 -98.74 151.96 
constant 756.43 <0.001 487.57 1025.30 
LnSigma 
Internet -1.02 <0.001 -1.39 -0.64 
female -0.02 0.91 -0.45 0.40 
asian -0.10 0.74 -0.71 0.51 
black 0.11 0.68 -0.43 0.66 
christian 0.23 0.31 -0.22 0.68 
gpaHI 0.07 0.72 -0.30 0.43 
junior 0.24 0.41 -0.34 0.83 
senior 0.43 0.09 -0.06 0.93 
constant 6.76 <0.001 6.08 7.43 
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Table 3.20: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $500      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.004 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC -222.31 0.09 -482.02 37.40 
internetC -312.52 <0.001 -507.14 -117.91 
female -68.65 0.28 -192.26 54.97 
asian 45.60 0.56 -107.64 198.84 
black 153.34 0.11 -33.01 339.68 
christian 30.30 0.68 -112.69 173.28 
gpaHI -29.32 0.57 -129.99 71.34 
junior -15.37 0.84 -163.16 132.42 
senior 25.80 0.73 -121.01 172.62 
constant 725.17 <0.001 454.18 996.16 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.72 0.05 -1.44 -0.00 
internetC -1.09 <0.001 -1.48 -0.70 
female -0.08 0.70 -0.50 0.34 
asian -0.18 0.55 -0.77 0.41 
black 0.18 0.51 -0.36 0.72 
christian 0.22 0.33 -0.23 0.67 
gpaHI 0.12 0.51 -0.25 0.50 
junior 0.12 0.67 -0.42 0.65 
senior 0.41 0.10 -0.08 0.90 
constant 6.75 <0.001 6.09 7.42 
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Table 3.21: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $500 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1073.09 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.16 (Individuals) and 0.61 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.12 (Individuals) and 0.59 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC -22.45 0.36 -117.66 72.75 
internetC -30.57 0.23 -87.15 26.01 
female 177.29 0.02 38.04 316.53 
asian -8.44 0.39 -121.57 104.68 
black 248.62 <0.001 96.91 400.33 
christian 282.50 <0.001 94.19 470.82 
gpaHI 224.01 0.06 2.50 445.52 
junior 31.71 0.35 -94.62 158.03 
senior 393.23 0.10 -70.45 856.91 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -667.21 <0.001 -899.68 -434.73 
internetC -653.20 <0.001 -786.72 -519.67 
female -32.15 0.39 -392.54 328.23 
asian -565.52 <0.001 -743.56 -387.48 
black 42.15 0.39 -320.42 404.72 
christian 180.75 0.29 -266.07 627.58 
gpaHI 147.12 0.35 -410.74 704.99 
junior -395.22 0.03 -733.11 -57.33 
senior 639.51 0.15 -255.98 1535.00 
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Table 3.22: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 5%      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is 0.364 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet 0.15 0.20 -0.08 0.38 
female -0.17 0.15 -0.41 0.06 
asian -0.10 0.53 -0.40 0.20 
black 0.03 0.85 -0.29 0.34 
christian -0.12 0.37 -0.39 0.15 
gpaHI 0.50 <0.001 0.20 0.80 
junior 0.11 0.47 -0.20 0.42 
senior 0.28 0.04 0.02 0.55 
constant 4.20 <0.001 3.70 4.71 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.12 0.43 -0.43 0.18 
female 0.04 0.83 -0.33 0.41 
asian 0.34 0.15 -0.12 0.79 
black 0.18 0.40 -0.24 0.59 
christian 0.22 0.27 -0.18 0.62 
gpaHI -0.73 <0.001 -1.04 -0.43 
junior 0.03 0.91 -0.45 0.50 
senior -0.40 0.04 -0.78 -0.01 
constant 0.30 0.27 -0.23 0.83 
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Table 3.23: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 5%      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.296 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.554 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC 0.25 0.13 -0.07 0.57 
internetC 0.12 0.30 -0.11 0.36 
female -0.18 0.14 -0.42 0.06 
asian -0.10 0.53 -0.40 0.20 
black 0.06 0.71 -0.26 0.38 
christian -0.12 0.36 -0.39 0.14 
gpaHI 0.53 <0.001 0.22 0.84 
junior 0.09 0.57 -0.23 0.42 
senior 0.30 0.02 0.04 0.55 
constant 4.16 <0.001 3.65 4.67 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.26 0.29 -0.73 0.22 
internetC -0.09 0.57 -0.41 0.23 
female 0.05 0.78 -0.32 0.43 
asian 0.34 0.15 -0.12 0.80 
black 0.13 0.54 -0.29 0.55 
christian 0.22 0.27 -0.17 0.62 
gpaHI -0.77 <0.001 -1.10 -0.44 
junior 0.03 0.91 -0.44 0.49 
senior -0.41 0.03 -0.79 -0.04 
constant 0.35 0.19 -0.18 0.88 
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Table 3.24: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 5% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1.30 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.80 (Individuals) and 0.81 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.76 (Individuals) and 0.83 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC -0.57 0.01 -1.00 -0.14 
internetC -0.56 <0.001 -0.85 -0.28 
female -0.58 <0.001 -0.75 -0.40 
asian -0.46 <0.001 -0.75 -0.17 
black -0.63 <0.001 -0.84 -0.42 
christian -0.59 <0.001 -0.78 -0.40 
gpaHI -0.34 <0.001 -0.47 -0.20 
junior -0.60 <0.001 -1.01 -0.19 
senior -0.38 <0.001 -0.59 -0.17 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC 0.06 0.39 -0.47 0.58 
internetC 0.06 0.39 -0.44 0.56 
female -0.08 0.30 -0.29 0.13 
asian -0.11 0.35 -0.53 0.31 
black 0.07 0.36 -0.23 0.38 
christian 0.02 0.40 -0.28 0.32 
gpaHI -0.41 <0.001 -0.61 -0.20 
junior 0.25 0.31 -0.43 0.93 
senior -0.25 0.14 -0.60 0.09 
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Table 3.25: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $102.00      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is 0.659 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet -0.09 0.40 -0.29 0.12 
female 0.12 0.25 -0.08 0.32 
asian -0.08 0.59 -0.35 0.20 
black -0.06 0.62 -0.30 0.17 
christian -0.13 0.28 -0.36 0.10 
gpaHI 0.28 0.01 0.07 0.50 
junior 0.17 0.18 -0.08 0.42 
senior 0.22 0.06 -0.01 0.45 
constant 101.58 <0.001 101.24 101.93 
LnSigma 
Internet 0.05 0.77 -0.25 0.35 
female -0.07 0.65 -0.39 0.25 
asian 0.54 0.03 0.04 1.03 
black 0.19 0.39 -0.25 0.63 
christian 0.52 <0.001 0.17 0.87 
gpaHI -0.40 <0.001 -0.69 -0.11 
junior -0.21 0.30 -0.62 0.19 
senior -0.34 0.04 -0.67 -0.01 
constant -0.08 0.76 -0.58 0.42 
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Table 3.26: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $102.00      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.384 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.698 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC -0.26 0.17 -0.62 0.11 
internetC -0.02 0.83 -0.22 0.18 
female 0.13 0.20 -0.07 0.33 
asian -0.06 0.64 -0.33 0.20 
black -0.06 0.57 -0.29 0.16 
christian -0.15 0.19 -0.37 0.07 
gpaHI 0.26 0.01 0.05 0.47 
junior 0.21 0.10 -0.04 0.46 
senior 0.23 0.05 -0.00 0.46 
constant 101.59 <0.001 101.26 101.92 
LnSigma 
internetNC 0.16 0.45 -0.26 0.57 
internetC -0.01 0.96 -0.33 0.31 
female -0.07 0.65 -0.40 0.25 
asian 0.54 0.04 0.03 1.04 
black 0.18 0.42 -0.26 0.63 
christian 0.57 <0.001 0.23 0.91 
gpaHI -0.37 0.01 -0.67 -0.07 
junior -0.23 0.29 -0.64 0.19 
senior -0.37 0.02 -0.69 -0.05 
constant -0.11 0.67 -0.61 0.39 
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Table 3.27: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $102.00 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1.26 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.74 (Individuals) and 0.72 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.68 (Individuals) and 0.71 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC -0.39 0.06 -0.79 -0.00 
internetC -0.31 0.02 -0.55 -0.06 
female -0.25 <0.001 -0.41 -0.09 
asian -0.26 0.06 -0.53 -0.00 
black -0.33 <0.001 -0.52 -0.14 
christian -0.35 <0.001 -0.54 -0.16 
gpaHI -0.14 0.07 -0.28 0.01 
junior -0.25 0.12 -0.57 0.06 
senior -0.13 0.21 -0.35 0.10 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC 0.03 0.40 -0.41 0.47 
internetC -0.01 0.40 -0.41 0.39 
female -0.03 0.38 -0.23 0.17 
asian -0.11 0.32 -0.44 0.22 
black 0.09 0.31 -0.16 0.34 
christian 0.14 0.23 -0.11 0.38 
gpaHI -0.22 0.10 -0.47 0.03 
junior -0.05 0.39 -0.63 0.53 
senior -0.22 0.21 -0.60 0.16 
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Table 3.28: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 57.1      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is 0.007 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet 3.01 <0.001 0.91 5.11 
female 0.93 0.30 -0.85 2.71 
asian -4.23 0.01 -7.53 -0.93 
black -3.99 <0.001 -6.05 -1.94 
christian -0.55 0.61 -2.67 1.58 
gpaHI 1.31 0.16 -0.52 3.14 
junior -0.67 0.65 -3.52 2.18 
senior 1.18 0.18 -0.57 2.93 
constant 49.55 <0.001 46.00 53.10 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.28 <0.001 -0.46 -0.09 
female -0.12 0.25 -0.31 0.08 
asian 0.85 <0.001 0.52 1.19 
black 0.70 <0.001 0.47 0.93 
christian 0.06 0.66 -0.22 0.35 
gpaHI -0.26 <0.001 -0.43 -0.09 
junior 0.08 0.55 -0.17 0.32 
senior -0.13 0.24 -0.36 0.09 
constant 1.83 <0.001 1.46 2.21 
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Table 3.29: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 57.1      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.009 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC 2.16 0.13 -0.67 4.99 
internetC 3.29 <0.001 1.17 5.41 
female 1.10 0.25 -0.76 2.96 
asian -4.20 0.01 -7.46 -0.94 
black -4.08 <0.001 -6.17 -2.00 
christian -0.63 0.56 -2.73 1.47 
gpaHI 1.20 0.20 -0.65 3.04 
junior -0.54 0.71 -3.42 2.33 
senior 1.05 0.26 -0.79 2.89 
constant 49.66 <0.001 46.13 53.18 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.33 <0.001 -0.56 -0.10 
internetC -0.26 0.02 -0.47 -0.05 
female -0.11 0.27 -0.31 0.09 
asian 0.85 <0.001 0.52 1.18 
black 0.70 <0.001 0.46 0.93 
christian 0.06 0.67 -0.23 0.36 
gpaHI -0.27 <0.001 -0.44 -0.10 
junior 0.07 0.58 -0.18 0.33 
senior -0.13 0.26 -0.35 0.10 
constant 1.84 <0.001 1.46 2.21 
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Table 3.30: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 57.1 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 9.17 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.22 (Individuals) and 0.48 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.18 (Individuals) and 0.42 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC -7.81 <0.001 -10.34 -5.27 
internetC -6.52 <0.001 -8.41 -4.64 
female -8.25 <0.001 -9.64 -6.85 
asian -8.42 <0.001 -10.98 -5.86 
black -9.19 <0.001 -10.72 -7.66 
christian -8.43 <0.001 -9.84 -7.02 
gpaHI -7.22 <0.001 -8.57 -5.86 
junior -7.49 <0.001 -9.81 -5.18 
senior -7.70 <0.001 -10.09 -5.31 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -1.18 0.10 -2.60 0.23 
internetC -0.52 0.34 -2.40 1.36 
female 0.00 0.40 -1.08 1.09 
asian 0.28 0.38 -1.36 1.92 
black 0.52 0.26 -0.59 1.64 
christian 0.08 0.39 -0.90 1.07 
gpaHI -0.97 0.10 -2.10 0.15 
junior -0.39 0.38 -2.74 1.95 
senior 0.16 0.40 -2.21 2.54 
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Table 3.31: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 61.7      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that Internet is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
Internet 3.55 <0.001 1.78 5.32 
female -0.02 0.98 -1.74 1.70 
asian -7.17 <0.001 -11.07 -3.28 
black -3.45 <0.001 -5.30 -1.61 
christian -0.68 0.48 -2.58 1.22 
gpaHI 2.60 <0.001 0.77 4.43 
junior 0.27 0.85 -2.47 3.01 
senior 1.32 0.14 -0.44 3.08 
constant 52.41 <0.001 49.42 55.40 
LnSigma 
Internet -0.19 0.05 -0.38 -0.00 
female -0.04 0.69 -0.24 0.16 
asian 1.05 <0.001 0.66 1.44 
black 0.56 <0.001 0.28 0.84 
christian 0.16 0.25 -0.11 0.44 
gpaHI -0.30 <0.001 -0.48 -0.12 
junior 0.01 0.94 -0.27 0.29 
senior -0.13 0.22 -0.34 0.08 
constant 1.75 <0.001 1.40 2.10 
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Table 3.32: Effective Literacy of Access to the Internet 
With and Without Caveat, for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 61.7      N=210 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Average) 
p-value for test of hypothesis that internetNC and internetC  are jointly zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
internetNC 2.56 0.11 -0.61 5.74 
internetC 3.89 <0.001 2.11 5.67 
female 0.15 0.87 -1.63 1.94 
asian -7.39 <0.001 -11.33 -3.45 
black -3.48 <0.001 -5.29 -1.67 
christian -0.91 0.30 -2.63 0.81 
gpaHI 2.51 <0.001 0.69 4.32 
junior 0.54 0.70 -2.24 3.33 
senior 1.17 0.19 -0.58 2.92 
constant 52.55 <0.001 49.70 55.39 
LnSigma 
internetNC -0.10 0.49 -0.39 0.19 
internetC -0.24 0.02 -0.45 -0.03 
female -0.05 0.62 -0.26 0.15 
asian 1.09 <0.001 0.71 1.46 
black 0.55 <0.001 0.28 0.83 
christian 0.22 0.08 -0.03 0.46 
gpaHI -0.30 <0.001 -0.48 -0.11 
junior -0.00 1.00 -0.29 0.29 
senior -0.12 0.23 -0.32 0.08 
constant 1.72 <0.001 1.40 2.03 
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Table 3.33: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 61.7 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 9.35 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 104 Internet 
Literacy index L = 0.27 (Individuals) and 0.51 (Internet)  
Literacy index W = 0.22 (Individuals) and 0.53 (Internet)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
internetNC -8.97 <0.001 -11.92 -6.02 
internetC -7.84 <0.001 -9.82 -5.86 
female -9.94 <0.001 -11.40 -8.47 
asian -11.90 <0.001 -15.11 -8.69 
black -10.23 <0.001 -11.62 -8.84 
christian -9.81 <0.001 -11.22 -8.40 
gpaHI -8.64 <0.001 -10.17 -7.11 
junior -8.39 <0.001 -10.50 -6.28 
senior -9.10 <0.001 -11.62 -6.59 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
internetNC -0.43 0.37 -2.57 1.71 
internetC -0.46 0.37 -2.72 1.80 
female 0.23 0.38 -1.12 1.59 
asian 1.82 0.15 -0.76 4.39 
black -0.19 0.38 -1.28 0.91 
christian -0.04 0.40 -1.30 1.22 
gpaHI -0.46 0.35 -2.19 1.26 
junior -1.05 0.27 -3.35 1.26 
senior 0.49 0.37 -1.95 2.94 
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Table 3.34:  Pooled Measures of L and W  Indices, Individual "Control" and Internet Scaffold 
 
Table 3.35: Pooled Measures of L Index, Comparing the Internet Scaffold to Individual Measures 
  
Question Type Correct Answer L W L W
fin1  - Savings Account 2% Numeracy $110.41 0.53 0.50 0.68 0.67
fin2  - Social Security Start Age Procedural 62 0.26 0.21 0.87 0.84
fin5  - Medicare Eligibility Procedural 65 0.16 0.16 0.82 0.80
fin7  - Real Interest Rate Numeracy $98.98 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28
fin9  - Savings Horizon Numeracy 4 months 0.77 0.74 0.84 0.83
fin10 - Stolen Credit Card Procedural $50 0.06 0.06 0.66 0.64
fin11 - Stolen Debit Card Procedural $500 0.16 0.12 0.61 0.59
fin13 - Nominal Interest Numeracy 5% 0.80 0.76 0.81 0.83
fin14 - Interest Rate Numeracy $102 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.71
fin15 - Remaining Life for Men Longevity Risk 57.1 years 0.22 0.18 0.48 0.42
fin16 - Remaining Life for Women Longevity Risk 61.7 years 0.27 0.22 0.51 0.53
*Pooled literacy measures of L  and W  are initally reported for each question in their respective section. Chapter 2 for 
indvidual measures and Chapter 3 for Internet.
Individual Internet
Literacy Measures Literacy Measures
Question Type Correct Answer L L +/-
fin1  - Savings Account 2% Numeracy $110.41 0.53 0.68 0.15
fin2  - Social Security Start Age Procedural 62 0.26 0.87 0.61
fin5  - Medicare Eligibility Procedural 65 0.16 0.82 0.66
fin7  - Real Interest Rate Numeracy $98.98 0.28 0.28 0.00
fin9  - Savings Horizon Numeracy 4 months 0.77 0.84 0.07
fin10 - Stolen Credit Card Procedural $50 0.06 0.66 0.60
fin11 - Stolen Debit Card Procedural $500 0.16 0.61 0.45
fin13 - Nominal Interest Numeracy 5% 0.80 0.81 0.01
fin14 - Interest Rate Numeracy $102 0.74 0.72 -0.02
fin15 - Remaining Life for Men Longevity Risk 57.1 years 0.22 0.48 0.26
fin16 - Remaining Life for Women Longevity Risk 61.7 years 0.27 0.51 0.24
*Pooled literacy measures of L are initally reported for each question in their respective section. Chapter 2 for indvidual 
measures and Chapter 3 for Internet measures. The "+/-" column is the difference of the treatment compared to the 
Individual "control" subjects.
Individual Internet
Literacy Measures Literacy Measures
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Appendix E: Experimental Instructions  
1. Instructions for Belief Elicitation, Lab Sessions Internet with No Caveat 
 This is a task where you will be paid according to how accurate your beliefs are about certain things. 
You will be presented with 11 questions and asked to place some bets on your beliefs about the answers to 
each question. You will actually be rewarded for your answer to one of these questions, so you should think 
carefully about your answer to each question. The question that is chosen for payment will be determined 
after everyone has made all decisions, and that process is explained below. 
 
 Here is an example of what the computer display of a question might look like. 
 
 
 
 
 The display on your computer will be larger and easier to read. You have 10 sliders to adjust, shown 
at the bottom of the screen, and you have 100 tokens to allocate across the sliders. Each slider allows you to 
allocate tokens to reflect your belief about the answer to this question. You must allocate all 100 tokens, and 
in this example we start with 0 tokens allocated to each slider. As you allocate tokens, by adjusting sliders, 
the payoffs displayed on the screen will change. Your earnings are based on the payoffs that are displayed 
after you have allocated all 100 tokens. 
 
 You can earn up to $50 in this task. 
 
 Where you position each slider depends on your beliefs about the correct answer to the question. 
Please note that the bars above each slider correspond to that particular slider. In the above example, the 
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tokens you allocate to each bar will naturally reflect your beliefs about the official unemployment rate for 
everyone 16 and over in February 2013. The first bar corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate 
is between 0% and 1.9%. The second bar corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate is between 
2% and 3.9%, and so on. Each bar shows the amount of money you could earn if the official 
unemployment rate is in the interval shown under the bar. 
 
 To illustrate how you use these sliders, suppose you think there is a fair chance the unemployment 
rate is just under 5%. Then you might allocate the 100 tokens in the following way: 50 tokens to the interval 
4% to 5.9%, 40 tokens to the interval 2% to 3.9%, and 10 tokens to the interval 0% to 1.9%. So you can see 
in the picture below that if indeed the unemployment rate is between 4% and 5.9% you would earn $39.50. 
You would earn less than $39.50 for any other outcome. You would earn $34.50 if the unemployment rate is 
between 2% and 3.9%, $19.50 if it is between 0% and 1.9%, and for any other unemployment rate you 
would earn $14.50.  
 
 
   
 You can adjust the allocation as much as you want to best reflect your personal beliefs about the 
unemployment rate. 
 
 Your earnings depend on your reported beliefs and, of course, the true answer. For instance, 
suppose you allocated your tokens as in the figure shown above. The true unemployment rate is actually 
7.7%, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. So if you had reported the beliefs shown above, you would 
have earned $14.50. 
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 Suppose you had put all of your eggs in one basket, and allocated all 100 tokens to the interval 
corresponding to unemployment rates between 4% and 5.9%. Then you would have faced the earnings 
outcomes shown below. 
 
 
 
 
  Note the “good news” and “bad news” here. If the unemployment rate is indeed between 4% and 
5.9%, you earn the maximum payoff, shown here as $50. But the true unemployment rate is 7.7%, so you 
would have earned nothing in this task.  
 
 Using the methodology described above we will ask you 11 questions today. Immediately before 
each section starting, you will be given that section’s questions on a piece of paper. You can write on these 
papers as needed. After everyone in the experiment has the appropriate question sheet in hand we will then 
open an Internet browser on your computer remotely, and allow access to the Internet for 15 minutes. It is 
a timed 15 minutes, after which the browsers on your computer will close automatically. It is during this 
time that you should research the section’s questions as efficiently as possible, and make notes as needed on 
the paper provided. Immediately after the Internet access ends, you will be asked to respond to the same 
questions using the computer interface.  
  
It is up to you to use your given time on the Internet as efficiently as possible to research the questions 
that will be handed out in advance. You should balance the information you find on the Internet with the 
strength of your personal beliefs and the possibility of them being wrong. There are three important points 
for you to keep in mind when making your decisions: 
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• Your belief about the correct answer to each question is a personal judgment after being 
given access to the Internet, and that depends on the information you have about the topic 
of the question.   
 
• Depending on your choices and the correct answer you can earn up to $50. 
 
• Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to gamble.   
 
The decisions you make are a matter of personal choice. Please work silently, and make your choices by 
thinking carefully about the questions you are presented with. 
 
 For some of the questions we will round the correct answer to the nearest amount shown under 
each bar. For example, the decision screen for the unemployment question might have shown 
unemployment rates of 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, 9%, 11%, 13%, 15%, 17% and 19% or more, as shown below. 
 
 
In this case, the correct answer of 7.7% would have been rounded to 7% rather than rounded to 9%, and 
the payment would have been $32.47. 
 
 When you are satisfied with your decisions, you should click on the Submit button and confirm 
your choices. When everyone is finished we will roll a 20-sided die to determine which question number 1 to 
11 will be played out. A re-roll will occur for numbers rolled of 12 through 20. The experimenter will record 
your earnings according to the correct answer and the choices you made. 
 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being here, as 
well as any other earnings in the session today. 
  
Are there any questions? 
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2. Instructions for Belief Elicitation, Lab Sessions Internet with Caveat 
 [This set of instructions was exactly the same as those listed above in this Appendix E, with the 
following exception shown in italics below starting on the third page of the instruction set. This addition was 
meant to remind the participants that they did not have to use the information they found on the Internet.] 
 
Using the methodology described above we will ask you 11 questions today. Immediately before 
starting this task you will be given the questions we’re asking you about on a piece of paper. You can write 
on the paper as needed. After everyone in the experiment has the question sheet in hand we will then open 
an Internet browser on your computer remotely, and allow access to the Internet for 15 minutes. It is a 
timed 15 minutes, after which the browsers on your computer will close automatically. You are not required to 
use any information found on the Internet, but it is during this time that you should research the section’s 
questions as efficiently as possible, and make notes as needed on the paper provided. Immediately after the 
Internet access ends, you will be asked to respond to the same questions using the computer interface.  
  
 It is up to you to use your given time on the Internet as efficiently as possible to research the 
questions that will be handed out in advance. Again, you are not required to answer the questions using the information 
that you find on the Internet. You should balance the information you find on the Internet with the strength of 
your personal beliefs and the possibility of them being wrong. There are three important points for you to 
keep in mind when making your decisions…  
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Chapter 4 - Extended and Effective Literacy of Exogenously Formed Groups 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of effective literacy is formally defined in the literature in terms of the literacy that 
applies to an individual in the context of and supplemented by the resources of their household. The 
concept was introduced by Basu and Foster (1998), as discussed in Section 1.2.1, in the context of national 
surveys of literacy. It introduced a new approach to evaluate the aggregate literacy level in a country or 
region. In the broader economics of the household literature this is related to the bargaining problem within 
the household; an extensive survey of this literature can be found in Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014). 
Effective literacy is defined in terms of a Leontief production technology: the effective literacy of a group of 
N individuals is the literacy of the maximally literate member of that group. If this measure is meant to 
define an upper bound, or a setting in which the maximally literate member of the group has dictatorial 
bargaining power, this would be an appropriate assumption. However, if we are interested in understanding 
the literacy of households, committees, or villages, then we must clearly worry about the “literacy 
production function” that takes as inputs the literacy of each of the members of those groups and 
determines what the joint decision is. This idea immediately resonates with emphasis in the household 
economics literature as well as the development literature on intra-household bargaining power. It is not at 
all obvious that the most literate person in the group will be able to have an effect on the group decision 
that is commensurate with their literacy, rather than reflect their bargaining power, which may be limited.  
One could go directly into the field and examine the effective financial literacy of endogenously 
formed groups, also estimating models of bargaining power, but this course would bring with it a large 
number of potential confounds. We instead begin in the laboratory to examine effective financial literacy of 
exogenously formed groups of 2 who are asked to answer the battery of financial literacy questions jointly.  
Those results will be compared to the control treatment, evaluated in Chapter 2. Since the groups are 
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constructed by randomly pairing students in the laboratory, we assume them to be strangers, so the results 
presented here can be viewed as looking at the pure group effect on effective literacy.  
4.2 Literature Review  
The concept of scaffolding was introduced in Chapter 1 to span a wide range of ways in which an 
individual agent might “exploit the external structure.” Language and social interaction between people has 
been a prominent example of that structure from the earliest days of the scaffolding literature. Similar ideas 
have appeared in different guises in various disciplines: the literature on the “wisdom of the crowds” and 
“groupthink,” reviewed in Section 1.2.1, are prime examples. The wisdom of the crowd results when social 
scaffolding produces a net gain in effective literacy, and groupthink arises when social scaffolding produces 
a net loss in effective literacy. 
4.3 Experimental Design 
The data presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are obtained in a common manner from experiments 
conducted with students at Georgia State University (GSU) in the Experimental Economics Center 
(ExCEN) over the period from November 2013 to March 2016. See Section 2.4 for a full description of the 
data.  
The results presented in Chapter 4 build on Chapter 2 and assess the effect that access to another 
person, as part of an exogenously formed group of two individuals, has on the financial literacy of the 
group. There were 7 sessions run in total involving groups; 2 sessions using the initial labels and 5 sessions 
using new labels. Again we focus our analysis on the 5 group sessions using the new labeling scheme to then 
compare the results with our control treatment of individuals presented in Chapter 2. The experiments 
involving groups presented with new labels were run in Sessions 21, 22, 23, 26, and 27 and had the 
following number of participants, respectively: 16, 22, 22, 28, and 34. Thus there were 122 individual 
participants in the group sessions in total, consisting of 61 exogenously formed groups with two members in 
each. 
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The sessions involving groups were run logistically in the same manner as the sessions involving 
individuals without Internet access. The one variation in protocol was that subjects in the group treatment 
were randomly assigned to exogenously formed groups comprised of two individuals and required to make a 
joint decision when answering the literacy questions. After the groups were assigned the experimenters 
allowed 5 minutes of introduction and casual talk to be exchanged between group members before 
continuing through the experimental instruction set with them. The instructions did not provide any 
guidance as to how the group was to arrive at the allocation of tokens to the belief questions. The 
experimental instruction text generally referred to the group as an agent, leaving it to the individuals to 
decide how to make the group decisions. The complete set of instructions for groups can be found in 
Appendix F.  
In the event that a correct answer was realized in the belief task, each member in the group would 
receive the full payment amount that was listed on the joint decision screen. This was done to keep 
incentive levels the same throughout all sessions.  
The two other tasks in the session were completed individually by every participant and not as 
members of a group. One of these tasks is to complete a standard socio-demographic survey. The other task 
is used to estimate a measure of an individual’s atemporal risk aversion using a battery of binary choices 
over risky lotteries. Following Harrison and Ulm (2016) we then use each individual subject’s risk 
preferences to recover latent beliefs using the scoring rules employed in the belief elicitation task for the 
various financial questions.  
In Chapters 2 and 3 the application to employ this method is straightforward as those treatments 
deal solely with individual participants making their own decisions in both the belief task and the risk task. 
However, the method is not as direct when recovering latent beliefs belonging to a group making a joint 
decision and having access to only individual risk measures. The method that is adopted here assigns the raw 
token allocation given by the group to each individual in that group, and then employs the recovery of latent 
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beliefs for each participant using their individual measure of risk.  This acknowledges that a joint decision 
was made by group members and that we then recover the latent beliefs of the group based on each 
member’s individual risk aversion. Hence we are recovering the latent beliefs that each subject agreed to 
when they agreed to a joint allocation of tokens. If the individuals within a group have different risk 
preferences, which is the usual case, then the recovered beliefs from the agreed group allocation of tokens 
will differ from each other.  
4.4 Results 
 The results from these experiments echo the experiments on the effect of Internet access. We find 
that having access to interacting with another person generally increases literacy.  
 Consider responses to the question about the savings account with 2% interest left to grow for five 
years shown in Figure 4.1, Table 4.1, and Table 4.2. From Figure 4.1 we see that the overall average beliefs 
for individuals was $110.7 and for groups was $110.5, with a p-value = 0.630 on a hypothesis testing if there 
is a difference in average responses. Here we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average response of 
individuals and groups are statistically different from one another.  We further observe from Figure 4.1 that 
the modal responses for both individuals and groups are in the bin that contains the true answer and that 
the underlying distributions are shaped similarly. However, groups appear to allocate more tokens on 
average to the bin containing the true answer than individuals. We can read off the average token allocations 
directly from the figure, or see a numeric representation of them using the L literacy index shown at the top 
of Table 4.2. Recall that the L literacy index is calculated by summing the average tokens in the bin 
containing the correct answer and dividing by 100. Thus the reported L literacy indices of 0.53 for 
individuals and 0.67 for groups in Table 4.2, correspond to an average token allocation of 53 and 67, 
respectively, in the bin containing the correct answer in Figure 4.1. Thus we see that bias is no different 
between individuals and groups, but confidence is, leading to an increase in literacy for groups.  
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The body of Table 4.1 displays the results from the interval regression with additional covariates. In 
the top panel of Table 4.1 we see that the overall average belief was $110.94; as usual, the constant refers to 
the “omitted category,” which is a White male underclassmen at GSU. We observe that students with a 
reported high grade point average hold beliefs that are on average $0.91 lower than the omitted category, 
and that this difference is statistically significantly different from zero (p-value < 0.001).  
 In the bottom panel of Table 4.1, the interpretation of the coefficients for dispersion is again 
immediate, because the dependent variable is in natural log units. Thus the coefficient estimate β implies a β 
× 100 percent change in the standard deviation of beliefs, σ, for a one unit change in that covariate. So the 
statistically significant effect (p-value < 0.001) of being in a group is interpreted as a 51% reduction in the 
standard deviation of beliefs compared to the omitted category. 
 The information in Table 4.1 below the title is generally self-explanatory. The p-value for group 
refers to a test of the hypothesis that the effect on the average and the standard deviation are jointly zero, 
and complements the corresponding hypothesis tests of the average or the standard deviation in the body of 
the table. Here the overall effect of being in a group is statistically significant and different from zero (p-
value < 0.001). Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of reports for each bin, side-by-side for individuals and 
those in groups, allowing a visual interpretation of differences in reports.  
 Table 4.2 provides an evaluation of the bias and imprecision of beliefs that is associated with 
demographics and being in a group, and is different from the estimates underlying Table 4.1. In the top 
panel of Table 4.2 we estimate the “total effect” of the covariate, and then compare the estimated average 
belief to the true value. The bottom panel of Table 4.2 compares the estimated standard deviation for each 
covariate to the overall pooled standard deviation. Thus we measure bias for the average, and relative 
imprecision for the standard deviation. These are not marginal effects: for each covariate of interest it is as if 
we use the average value of all other covariates for that covariate of interest. For females, for instance, the 
top panel of Table 4.2 shows that the difference between the average belief of a female is $0.16 greater than 
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the correct answer of $110.41, but this difference is not statistically significantly different from zero (p-value 
= 0.31). This is different from Table 4.1, where the coefficient shows the difference compared to the 
omitted category. Thus the p-values in Table 4.2 tell us what we want to know about bias for females, and 
the p-values in Table 4.1 tell us what we want to know about marginal differences in beliefs for females 
compared to the omitted category. 
 With this background, Table 4.2 shows us that there is no statistically significant evidence of bias 
from the correct answer at the 5% significance level for any demographic covariates, on whether or not in a 
group. In the bottom panel of Table 4.2 we see at the 5% significance level that students with junior class 
standing and those in a group exhibit less imprecision of beliefs compared to the average imprecision. For 
this question we see that “most GSU students get it and those in groups get it more because of increased 
precision.” This is also shown by the higher levels of the literacy indexes L and W of groups compared to 
individuals.  
 Responses to the question about the age at which one can start taking out Social Security benefits 
are displayed in Figure 4.2, Table 4.3, and Table 4.4. Both the individual subjects and the group subjects 
exhibit a wide range of beliefs about this question, for which the true answer is 62. This correct answer is 
(just) the modal belief of individuals, but even in that case we observe significant weight being attached to 
the next two bins corresponding to 64 and 66. The subjects responding in groups report similarly by placing 
the most weight in the first three bins, but the weight placed on 62 drops compared to individual subjects. 
The net effect is a decline in literacy for groups, using our two measures (Table 4.4). We see in Table 4.3 
that the overall effect of being in a group is statistically significantly different from zero (p-value < 0.001) 
even though the results in the table text are mixed. Here the marginal effect of being in a group on the 
average response is not statistically significantly different from the omitted category (top panel Table 4.3). 
However, being in a group implies a 38% reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs compared to the 
omitted category, which is statistically significant at the 5% level (bottom panel Table 4.3). The top panel of 
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Table 4.4 shows us that all of the covariates are statistically significantly biased from the correct answer (p-
value < 0.001). The bottom panel of Table 4.4 shows that groups and upperclassmen hold more precise 
beliefs than the average, although with the significant bias that both exhibit this is again not a welcome 
effect in terms of the quality of likely decisions contingent on these beliefs. 
 Responses to the comparable question about the age at which eligibility for Medicare starts are 
shown in Figure 4.3, Table 4.5, and Table 4.6. The correct response is 65, and that is the modal response of 
groups but not of individuals (Figure 4.3). We observe that individuals instead place the greatest weight on 
the age being 55, with other spikes at 61 and 65. Hence there is a noticeable increase in literacy according to 
the two measures when making decisions in a group (Table 4.6): when considering the L index, literacy 
increases 16 percentage points to 0.31 over the individuals measured. We find that the overall effect of being 
in a group is not statistically significantly different (p-value = 0.111) from the omitted category, even though 
the marginal effect of being in a group on the average belief is +1.76 was statistically significant at the 5% 
level (Table 4.5). The results from Table 4.6 are similar to the previous questions and again shows that all of 
the covariates are statistically significantly biased from the correct answer (p-value < 0.001). However, no 
covariates exhibit differing levels of imprecision relative to the average imprecision (bottom panel of Table 
4.6). 
 Responses to the question about the real interest rate are collated in Figure 4.4, Table 4.7, and Table 
4.8. They reveal that both individuals and groups have the correct answer, $98.98, as their modal response, 
and that groups place much more weight on the correct value than individuals (Figure 4.4). The top panel of 
Table 4.7 shows that groups, females, Christians, and students with a reported higher grade point average 
hold different beliefs than the omitted category, and that these differences are statistically significant at the 
5% level. Further, the text below the title of Table 4.7 shows the overall effect of being in a group is 
statistically significant and different from zero (p-value < 0.001). Groups place more weight on the true 
answer as shown by an L index which is 17 percentage points higher than individuals (Table 4.8). Again, all 
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covariates are statistically significantly biased from the correct answer (p-value < 0.001) with no covariates 
exhibiting differing levels of imprecision relative to the average imprecision at the 5% significance level 
(Table 4.8).   
Responses to the savings horizon question have some of the highest literacy measures and are 
shown in Figure 4.5, Table 4.9, and Table 4.10. Both individuals and groups report modal responses in the 
correct belief bin of 4 months (Figure 4.5). The groups place more weight on the correct bin, and that is 
about the only difference between the two histograms. Table 4.9 shows that the overall result and marginal 
effect of being in a group are not statistically significant.  Table 4.10 shows that only those in groups and 
Asians were unbiased from the correct answer at the 5% significance level (top panel) and that no covariate 
exhibited differing levels of imprecision (bottom panel). The implication is an increase in literacy for groups 
according to both of our measures (Table 4.10). 
 Responses to the question about liability for debt incurred on a stolen credit card are shown in 
Figure 4.6, Table 4.11, and Table 4.12. The correct answer is $50, but both individuals and groups place 
significant weight on the belief that it is zero; the only difference is that groups place greater weight on that 
biased belief of zero (Figure 4.6). We observe a significant bias from being in a group, and some evidence of 
increased confidence. But the beliefs are so poorly calibrated to start with, given the weight attached by both 
treatments to zero, that there cannot be much effect on literacy from being in a group since it is already 
close to being zero when responding as an individual (Table 4.12). 
 A similar pattern is exhibited in responses to the comparable question about liability from debt 
incurred on a debit card that is stolen, shown in Figure 4.7, Table 4.13, and Table 4.14. The difference is 
that individuals and groups put some weight on the correct belief of $500, and groups exhibit some 
evidence of increased confidence by allocating virtually zero tokens to the last 5 bins (Figure 4.7), leading to 
a modest increase in literacy from being in a group using either measure (Table 4.14). The additional 
confidence of groups is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) whether measured by the marginal effect 
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(Table 4.13) or the total effect (Table 4.14). Given that groups are unbiased from the correct answer, the 
additional precision of their beliefs enhances literacy.  
 Responses to the question about nominal interest are shown in Figure 4.8, Table 4.15, and Table 
4.16. We observe one clear mode at the correct belief of 5% for both individuals and groups, with more 
weight being placed in the correct bin by groups (Figure 4.8). There is a high level of corresponding literacy 
for both individuals and groups given by the L indices of 0.80 and 0.93, respectively (Table 4.16). Here is a 
case in which “everybody gets it on average” and the marginal effect (Table 4.15) of being in a group leads 
to greater confidence in beliefs.   
 Responses to the question about the value of a $100 principal in one year with an interest rate of 2% 
are shown in Figure 4.9, Table 4.17, and Table 4.18. The findings are similar to those applying to the 
previous question. Both individuals and groups exhibit a modal belief in the correct belief bin of $102, with 
more weight being placed on the correct bin by groups (Figure 4.9). There is a high level of literacy for both 
individuals and groups shown by the L indices of 0.74 and 0.90, respectively (Table 4.18). Again, here is a 
case that “everybody gets it on average” and the marginal effect (Table 4.17) of being in a group leads to an 
increase in confidence in beliefs. 
 The last two questions refer to beliefs about longevity risk for men and women. Responses are 
displayed in Figure 4.10, Table 4.19, and Table 4.20 for men, and Figure 4.11, Table 4.21, and Table 4.22 for 
women. The patterns in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 are similar for beliefs about men and women: 
individuals hold more diffuse beliefs. Although the beliefs of individuals assign greater weight to the 
responses closer to the correct response, they leave more weight on the lower, erroneous responses 
compared to groups. Group responses have a mode at the true belief and a test of differences in average 
responses between individuals and groups confirms that these two treatments hold different average beliefs 
for both men (p-value = 0.026, Figures 4.10) and women (p-value < 0.001, Figure 4.11) In both cases there 
are significant biases in beliefs, and in both cases this comes with an interaction between being in a group 
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and demographics. The marginal effect of being in a group for the belief about male longevity is +2.40 and 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.03), but the total effect of being in a group for the belief about male 
longevity is -7.06 and also statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). The corresponding group biases for the 
belief about female longevity are +2.95 and -8.45, and even more statistically significant. For both questions 
we see that groups do better than the omitted category, but are still biased away from the correct answer. 
The obvious demographic interaction, a priori, is with gender, and this appears to be the case for the belief 
about the longevity of men and women: the marginal effect of being female is the only demographic that 
was found to be statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) for both questions and resulted in a coefficient of -
3.95 when responding about male longevity and a coefficient of -4.29 when responding about female 
longevity.  For both questions the total effect of each demographic was negatively biased away from the 
correct answer and each estimate is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). Given the relatively diffuse 
beliefs for individuals and the increased confidence exhibited from being in a group, there is a slight positive 
change in literacy according to our two measures when responding in a group (Table 4.20 and Table 4.22). 
4.5 Conclusions 
 Table 4.23 displays a summary view of the pooled L and W indices for both our control subjects 
and those generated under the Group scaffold for each question. Table 4.24 then focuses only on the L 
index and assesses the changes when comparing the Group scaffold to the Individual literacy measures of 
our control subjects. In the fourth column of Table 4.24 are the pooled measures of the L index for 
individuals responding with only their private literacy. In the sixth column of Table 4.24 are the L index 
measures for the Group. Column seven is the “+/-” difference between the L index for those in a Group 
compared to individuals. We see “+/-“ values ranging from -0.05 for fin2, “the Social Security start” 
question, to +0.17 for fin7, “the real interest rate” question. The overall conclusion from these results is that 
effective literacy, at least in exogenously formed groups of two, results in generally higher literacy compared 
to individuals. Further, it appears that the greatest enhancements to literacy under this scaffold are related to 
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numeracy. Hence we again find that the social scaffold of being able to pool information with another 
person generally leads to enhanced literacy compared to when individuals must form beliefs alone. We also 
therefore demonstrate that effective literacy of a group generally exceeds the literacy of “statistically 
equivalent” individuals.  
An open question is whether larger, exogenously formed groups would do even better, and that 
remains an obvious extension for future research. A separate question is whether “naturally formed” groups, 
such as couples living together, would exhibit greater effective literacy than comparable individuals living 
alone. This question is addressed in chapter 5.  
222 
 
Figure 4.1: Elicited 
Beliefs about The 
Savings Account with 
2% Interest Question, 
  
  
  
 
   
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
   
  
  
   
  
 
   
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
   
  
  
   
  
 
   
   
   
  
   
  
Table 4.1: Effective Literacy 
of Exogenous Groups for 
the Question about the 
Savings Account with 2% 
I  N  L b l  
     
  
   
    
    
  
    
    
    
    
  
     
  
   
    
    
 
    
    
   
   
 
     
  
   
   
   
    
    
     
    
     
  
   
    
Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $110.41      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups -0.13 0.63 -0.66 0.40 
female -0.07 0.81 -0.62 0.48 
asian 0.76 0.10 -0.14 1.66 
black 0.09 0.77 -0.53 0.71 
christian 0.21 0.55 -0.48 0.89 
gpaHI -0.91 <0.001 -1.58 -0.23 
junior -0.32 0.40 -1.05 0.42 
senior 0.01 0.97 -0.67 0.70 
constant 110.94 <0.001 109.84 112.03 
LnSigma 
groups -0.51 <0.001 -0.76 -0.26 
female 0.18 0.18 -0.08 0.44 
asian 0.36 0.06 -0.02 0.75 
black 0.39 <0.001 0.09 0.69 
christian 0.19 0.15 -0.07 0.46 
gpaHI -0.16 0.22 -0.41 0.09 
junior -0.07 0.64 -0.38 0.24 
senior -0.11 0.54 -0.46 0.24 
constant 0.68 <0.001 0.33 1.04 
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Table 4.2: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $110.41 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 2.95 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.53 (Individuals) and 0.67 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.50 (Individuals) and 0.62 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups 0.12 0.31 -0.23 0.48 
female 0.16 0.28 -0.22 0.55 
asian 0.52 0.12 -0.14 1.17 
black 0.22 0.24 -0.21 0.65 
christian 0.27 0.16 -0.13 0.67 
gpaHI -0.22 0.22 -0.60 0.17 
junior -0.11 0.38 -0.77 0.56 
senior 0.07 0.39 -0.46 0.60 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -0.94 <0.001 -1.37 -0.51 
female 0.06 0.38 -0.35 0.47 
asian -0.40 0.15 -0.96 0.15 
black 0.25 0.22 -0.19 0.69 
christian 0.21 0.24 -0.21 0.63 
gpaHI -0.34 0.19 -0.87 0.20 
junior -0.62 0.05 -1.21 -0.02 
senior -0.34 0.31 -1.27 0.58 
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Table 4.3: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 62      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups -0.57 0.11 -1.25 0.12 
female 0.24 0.55 -0.55 1.03 
asian -0.94 0.23 -2.46 0.59 
black -0.74 0.32 -2.21 0.72 
christian -0.09 0.86 -1.03 0.86 
gpaHI 0.12 0.75 -0.64 0.88 
junior -0.48 0.31 -1.41 0.45 
senior -0.98 0.02 -1.77 -0.18 
constant 66.56 <0.001 65.28 67.85 
LnSigma 
groups -0.38 <0.001 -0.56 -0.20 
female 0.03 0.79 -0.18 0.23 
asian -0.19 0.26 -0.51 0.14 
black -0.08 0.51 -0.32 0.16 
christian -0.05 0.64 -0.26 0.16 
gpaHI 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.38 
junior -0.21 0.06 -0.42 0.01 
senior -0.27 <0.001 -0.46 -0.09 
constant 1.34 <0.001 1.04 1.65 
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Table 4.4: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Social Security Start Age, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 62 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 3.24 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.26 (Individuals) and 0.21 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.21 (Individuals) and 0.18 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups 3.22 <0.001 2.68 3.77 
female 3.63 <0.001 3.16 4.10 
asian 3.44 <0.001 2.54 4.34 
black 3.50 <0.001 3.03 3.96 
christian 3.54 <0.001 3.10 3.99 
gpaHI 3.72 <0.001 3.14 4.31 
junior 3.22 <0.001 2.49 3.94 
senior 2.98 <0.001 2.38 3.58 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -0.75 <0.001 -1.14 -0.36 
female 0.00 0.40 -0.39 0.39 
asian -0.10 0.39 -0.86 0.65 
black 0.03 0.39 -0.39 0.45 
christian -0.01 0.40 -0.40 0.37 
gpaHI 0.25 0.22 -0.20 0.71 
junior -0.59 0.02 -1.07 -0.11 
senior -0.52 0.01 -0.90 -0.13 
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Table 4.5: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 65      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is 0.111 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups 1.76 0.04 0.12 3.41 
female 0.10 0.91 -1.61 1.81 
asian -0.01 1.00 -2.62 2.60 
black -1.04 0.35 -3.23 1.15 
christian -0.14 0.87 -1.86 1.58 
gpaHI -0.21 0.79 -1.80 1.38 
junior -0.42 0.67 -2.31 1.47 
senior 1.37 0.16 -0.56 3.29 
constant 57.95 <0.001 55.40 60.50 
LnSigma 
groups 0.00 0.99 -0.12 0.12 
female -0.05 0.43 -0.16 0.07 
asian 0.07 0.47 -0.12 0.26 
black 0.08 0.33 -0.08 0.23 
christian -0.00 0.94 -0.13 0.12 
gpaHI -0.05 0.37 -0.16 0.06 
junior -0.08 0.29 -0.24 0.07 
senior 0.02 0.81 -0.13 0.16 
constant 1.65 <0.001 1.44 1.86 
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Table 4.6: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Medicare Eligibility, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 65 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 5.30 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.16 (Individuals) and 0.31 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.16 (Individuals) and 0.37 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups -5.96 <0.001 -7.16 -4.76 
female -6.97 <0.001 -7.81 -6.13 
asian -6.60 <0.001 -8.26 -4.94 
black -7.36 <0.001 -8.27 -6.45 
christian -7.22 <0.001 -8.08 -6.36 
gpaHI -6.94 <0.001 -7.95 -5.94 
junior -7.34 <0.001 -9.07 -5.62 
senior -5.86 <0.001 -7.38 -4.34 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -0.18 0.24 -0.52 0.17 
female -0.12 0.29 -0.41 0.18 
asian -0.11 0.37 -0.62 0.40 
black 0.12 0.30 -0.20 0.45 
christian 0.04 0.39 -0.26 0.34 
gpaHI -0.04 0.39 -0.38 0.31 
junior -0.22 0.34 -0.99 0.56 
senior -0.06 0.38 -0.47 0.35 
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Table 4.7: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $98.98      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups -1.11 <0.001 -1.88 -0.35 
female 0.65 0.04 0.02 1.28 
asian 0.39 0.51 -0.77 1.55 
black -0.47 0.35 -1.46 0.52 
christian 0.70 0.05 0.00 1.40 
gpaHI -0.60 0.04 -1.17 -0.04 
junior 0.19 0.70 -0.76 1.13 
senior -0.10 0.77 -0.79 0.58 
constant 100.66 <0.001 99.46 101.86 
LnSigma 
groups -0.14 0.32 -0.42 0.14 
female -0.02 0.85 -0.19 0.16 
asian -0.06 0.70 -0.36 0.24 
black -0.11 0.40 -0.35 0.14 
christian 0.06 0.61 -0.16 0.27 
gpaHI -0.10 0.24 -0.27 0.07 
junior -0.04 0.81 -0.34 0.26 
senior -0.11 0.32 -0.32 0.11 
constant 0.91 <0.001 0.60 1.21 
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Table 4.8: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Real Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $98.98 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 2.19 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.28 (Individuals) and 0.45 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.29 (Individuals) and 0.38 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups 1.00 <0.001 0.55 1.46 
female 1.80 <0.001 1.44 2.15 
asian 1.78 <0.001 1.12 2.45 
black 1.63 <0.001 1.28 1.99 
christian 1.81 <0.001 1.46 2.16 
gpaHI 1.44 <0.001 1.06 1.82 
junior 1.52 <0.001 0.92 2.13 
senior 1.56 <0.001 0.89 2.22 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -0.26 0.07 -0.53 0.01 
female -0.00 0.40 -0.16 0.16 
asian -0.13 0.31 -0.51 0.24 
black 0.02 0.39 -0.16 0.19 
christian 0.03 0.38 -0.14 0.19 
gpaHI -0.14 0.18 -0.37 0.08 
junior -0.28 0.06 -0.57 0.01 
senior -0.02 0.40 -0.41 0.36 
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Table 4.9: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 4 months (4m)      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is 0.462 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups -0.23 0.22 -0.60 0.14 
female 0.17 0.10 -0.03 0.37 
asian 0.04 0.76 -0.23 0.31 
black 0.56 0.02 0.08 1.04 
christian 0.17 0.26 -0.13 0.47 
gpaHI 0.11 0.46 -0.18 0.40 
junior -0.03 0.88 -0.45 0.39 
senior -0.09 0.58 -0.41 0.23 
constant 4.10 <0.001 3.76 4.44 
LnSigma 
groups -0.36 0.33 -1.08 0.36 
female 0.02 0.94 -0.41 0.45 
asian 0.68 0.07 -0.05 1.40 
black 1.43 <0.001 1.00 1.86 
christian 0.27 0.37 -0.32 0.86 
gpaHI 0.12 0.64 -0.38 0.61 
junior 0.38 0.29 -0.33 1.08 
senior -0.06 0.81 -0.56 0.44 
constant -0.83 0.04 -1.63 -0.03 
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Table 4.10: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Horizon, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 4 months (4m) 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 2.00 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.77 (Individuals) and 0.92 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.74 (Individuals) and 0.93 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups 0.33 0.06 -0.01 0.66 
female 0.69 <0.001 0.36 1.03 
asian 0.42 0.13 -0.14 0.98 
black 0.92 <0.001 0.52 1.31 
christian 0.87 <0.001 0.50 1.24 
gpaHI 0.70 <0.001 0.29 1.11 
junior 0.89 0.04 0.06 1.72 
senior 0.72 0.02 0.14 1.31 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -0.60 0.16 -1.47 0.27 
female -0.07 0.39 -0.63 0.49 
asian -0.41 0.33 -1.75 0.93 
black 0.26 0.25 -0.27 0.79 
christian 0.16 0.33 -0.37 0.69 
gpaHI -0.02 0.40 -0.69 0.66 
junior 0.47 0.28 -0.60 1.55 
senior 0.02 0.40 -0.87 0.91 
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Table 4.11: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $50      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is 0.228 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups -50.38 0.10 -110.85 10.08 
female 37.65 0.22 -23.04 98.35 
asian 3.50 0.94 -94.96 101.96 
black 52.67 0.17 -22.12 127.47 
christian 76.08 0.02 9.90 142.26 
gpaHI 50.44 0.13 -14.02 114.91 
junior -37.05 0.33 -112.29 38.19 
senior -68.67 0.10 -151.09 13.75 
constant 62.64 0.15 -22.61 147.89 
LnSigma 
groups -0.29 0.09 -0.63 0.05 
female 0.25 0.17 -0.11 0.61 
asian 0.03 0.95 -0.73 0.78 
black 0.24 0.36 -0.28 0.77 
christian 0.40 0.06 -0.02 0.83 
gpaHI 0.25 0.10 -0.04 0.54 
junior -0.05 0.79 -0.43 0.32 
senior -0.27 0.25 -0.72 0.19 
constant 4.97 <0.001 4.26 5.67 
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Table 4.12: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Credit Card, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $50 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 274.87 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.06 (Individuals) and 0.05 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.06 (Individuals) and 0.07 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups 82.84 0.01 21.99 143.69 
female 118.03 <0.001 66.80 169.25 
asian 69.63 0.08 -5.59 144.85 
black 127.33 <0.001 76.02 178.64 
christian 138.05 <0.001 87.41 188.69 
gpaHI 123.67 <0.001 60.86 186.48 
junior 75.22 0.04 5.68 144.76 
senior 63.07 0.08 -5.43 131.57 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -17.62 0.35 -88.59 53.35 
female 12.85 0.35 -38.43 64.13 
asian -43.83 0.25 -132.55 44.89 
black 17.27 0.31 -31.34 65.88 
christian 24.13 0.23 -21.52 69.78 
gpaHI 20.94 0.32 -40.22 82.09 
junior -25.73 0.32 -104.25 52.80 
senior -39.43 0.28 -130.31 51.46 
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Table 4.13: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $500      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups -224.52 0.02 -413.97 -35.08 
female 23.49 0.82 -182.23 229.21 
asian 84.75 0.65 -284.26 453.76 
black 126.78 0.36 -144.41 397.96 
christian 25.09 0.77 -146.60 196.78 
gpaHI 83.88 0.34 -88.81 256.58 
junior -223.93 0.02 -412.10 -35.76 
senior -26.06 0.88 -369.35 317.24 
constant 648.15 <0.001 316.97 979.32 
LnSigma 
groups -0.82 <0.001 -1.12 -0.53 
female -0.04 0.84 -0.44 0.36 
asian -0.54 0.12 -1.22 0.14 
black -0.30 0.25 -0.82 0.21 
christian 0.25 0.23 -0.15 0.64 
gpaHI 0.23 0.14 -0.08 0.55 
junior -0.11 0.57 -0.49 0.27 
senior 0.60 0.01 0.12 1.08 
constant 7.00 <0.001 6.35 7.64 
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Table 4.14: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Stolen Debit Card, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $500 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1241.33 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.16 (Individuals) and 0.21 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.12 (Individuals) and 0.15 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups -5.95 0.40 -100.99 89.09 
female 252.70 <0.001 71.93 433.46 
asian 20.21 0.39 -154.58 195.00 
black 321.56 <0.001 133.38 509.75 
christian 371.02 <0.001 134.80 607.25 
gpaHI 349.18 0.03 51.76 646.60 
junior 68.56 0.31 -114.94 252.06 
senior 586.43 0.11 -123.53 1296.38 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -715.55 <0.001 -867.57 -563.54 
female -71.33 0.38 -486.28 343.62 
asian -660.74 <0.001 -788.46 -533.02 
black -22.14 0.40 -432.52 388.24 
christian 158.59 0.33 -340.38 657.56 
gpaHI 170.35 0.35 -471.71 812.40 
junior -463.01 0.04 -879.02 -46.99 
senior 880.90 0.12 -222.43 1984.23 
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Table 4.15: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 5%      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups 0.31 <0.001 0.14 0.49 
female -0.12 0.17 -0.28 0.05 
asian -0.23 0.07 -0.48 0.02 
black -0.07 0.49 -0.25 0.12 
christian -0.08 0.39 -0.25 0.10 
gpaHI 0.15 0.11 -0.03 0.33 
junior 0.32 <0.001 0.10 0.54 
senior 0.28 0.02 0.04 0.51 
constant 4.50 <0.001 4.13 4.88 
LnSigma 
groups -0.64 <0.001 -1.02 -0.26 
female 0.07 0.72 -0.31 0.44 
asian 0.45 0.12 -0.11 1.02 
black 0.22 0.36 -0.25 0.68 
christian 0.13 0.58 -0.34 0.61 
gpaHI -0.46 0.01 -0.81 -0.10 
junior -0.80 <0.001 -1.19 -0.42 
senior -0.45 0.06 -0.91 0.02 
constant 0.24 0.50 -0.45 0.93 
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Table 4.16: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Nominal Interest, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 5% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1.09 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.80 (Individuals) and 0.93 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.76 (Individuals) and 0.92 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups -0.19 0.03 -0.35 -0.03 
female -0.47 <0.001 -0.65 -0.30 
asian -0.36 0.01 -0.63 -0.09 
black -0.47 <0.001 -0.65 -0.28 
christian -0.44 <0.001 -0.60 -0.28 
gpaHI -0.33 <0.001 -0.50 -0.17 
junior -0.14 <0.001 -0.23 -0.05 
senior -0.25 0.01 -0.45 -0.06 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -0.36 0.07 -0.73 0.02 
female 0.02 0.40 -0.22 0.26 
asian -0.14 0.29 -0.50 0.21 
black 0.07 0.34 -0.19 0.34 
christian 0.01 0.40 -0.20 0.22 
gpaHI -0.19 0.13 -0.44 0.06 
junior -0.52 <0.001 -0.75 -0.30 
senior -0.13 0.34 -0.59 0.33 
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Table 4.17: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: $102.00      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is < 0.001 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups 0.13 0.08 -0.01 0.28 
female -0.10 0.10 -0.22 0.02 
asian -0.03 0.80 -0.29 0.22 
black 0.05 0.71 -0.20 0.29 
christian -0.12 0.08 -0.24 0.01 
gpaHI 0.01 0.84 -0.13 0.16 
junior 0.10 0.24 -0.06 0.26 
senior 0.20 0.01 0.04 0.35 
constant 101.78 <0.001 101.50 102.07 
LnSigma 
groups -0.73 <0.001 -1.11 -0.35 
female 0.46 0.01 0.11 0.82 
asian 0.06 0.87 -0.62 0.73 
black -0.28 0.33 -0.84 0.28 
christian 0.46 0.02 0.06 0.85 
gpaHI -0.07 0.73 -0.44 0.30 
junior -0.40 0.10 -0.87 0.08 
senior -0.47 0.02 -0.88 -0.06 
constant -0.07 0.84 -0.76 0.62 
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Table 4.18: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Interest Rate, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: $102.00 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 1.06 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.74 (Individuals) and 0.90 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.68 (Individuals) and 0.86 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups -0.14 <0.001 -0.24 -0.04 
female -0.22 <0.001 -0.36 -0.07 
asian -0.31 0.06 -0.62 0.00 
black -0.20 <0.001 -0.35 -0.06 
christian -0.26 <0.001 -0.42 -0.10 
gpaHI -0.18 0.03 -0.34 -0.02 
junior -0.23 0.06 -0.46 0.01 
senior -0.07 0.27 -0.21 0.08 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -0.42 <0.001 -0.67 -0.17 
female 0.06 0.35 -0.17 0.28 
asian 0.07 0.38 -0.37 0.50 
black 0.00 0.40 -0.23 0.24 
christian 0.10 0.27 -0.13 0.33 
gpaHI -0.04 0.38 -0.30 0.22 
junior -0.19 0.29 -0.64 0.27 
senior -0.24 0.18 -0.61 0.13 
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Table 4.19: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 57.1      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is 0.030 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups 2.40 0.03 0.29 4.51 
female -3.95 <0.001 -6.02 -1.88 
asian -0.76 0.67 -4.32 2.79 
black -1.04 0.48 -3.89 1.82 
christian -0.05 0.97 -2.63 2.54 
gpaHI 1.30 0.23 -0.84 3.43 
junior -0.70 0.63 -3.52 2.13 
senior -1.42 0.29 -4.04 1.20 
constant 51.02 <0.001 47.55 54.49 
LnSigma 
groups -0.25 0.01 -0.46 -0.05 
female 0.33 <0.001 0.13 0.52 
asian 0.07 0.71 -0.31 0.45 
black 0.04 0.79 -0.28 0.36 
christian 0.00 0.99 -0.24 0.25 
gpaHI -0.27 <0.001 -0.46 -0.09 
junior 0.01 0.93 -0.25 0.28 
senior 0.14 0.21 -0.08 0.36 
constant 2.05 <0.001 1.65 2.45 
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Table 4.20: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Men, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 57.1 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 9.08 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.22 (Individuals) and 0.31 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.18 (Individuals) and 0.22 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups -7.06 <0.001 -8.74 -5.37 
female -9.77 <0.001 -11.33 -8.21 
asian -7.87 <0.001 -10.47 -5.26 
black -9.31 <0.001 -10.88 -7.73 
christian -8.84 <0.001 -10.27 -7.42 
gpaHI -8.02 <0.001 -9.45 -6.59 
junior -7.64 <0.001 -9.79 -5.48 
senior -10.02 <0.001 -13.12 -6.91 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -1.46 0.05 -2.83 -0.08 
female 0.41 0.31 -0.72 1.54 
asian -0.48 0.36 -2.57 1.60 
black 0.38 0.33 -0.80 1.56 
christian -0.03 0.40 -0.95 0.89 
gpaHI -1.10 0.07 -2.24 0.04 
junior -1.34 0.13 -3.06 0.38 
senior 1.25 0.25 -1.30 3.80 
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Table 4.21: Effective Literacy of Exogenous Groups 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Correct answer: 61.7      N=167 GSU undergraduates 
p-value for test of hypothesis that group is zero is 0.002 (Overall) 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
groups 2.95 <0.001 1.14 4.75 
female -4.29 <0.001 -6.16 -2.43 
asian -0.45 0.81 -4.05 3.15 
black 0.55 0.69 -2.17 3.27 
christian 0.39 0.74 -1.89 2.67 
gpaHI 1.45 0.14 -0.45 3.35 
junior 0.47 0.67 -1.69 2.63 
senior -0.38 0.78 -3.00 2.25 
constant 52.01 <0.001 48.53 55.49 
LnSigma 
groups -0.32 <0.001 -0.52 -0.12 
female 0.40 <0.001 0.19 0.60 
asian 0.01 0.97 -0.42 0.44 
black -0.11 0.50 -0.44 0.22 
christian -0.08 0.55 -0.33 0.18 
gpaHI -0.19 0.06 -0.40 0.01 
junior -0.16 0.19 -0.41 0.08 
senior 0.13 0.29 -0.11 0.36 
constant 2.15 <0.001 1.73 2.57 
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Table 4.22: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Women, New Labels 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 61.7 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 8.86 
Sample sizes: 106 Individuals and 61 Groups (hence 122 individuals) 
Literacy index L = 0.27 (Individuals) and 0.33 (Groups)  
Literacy index W = 0.22 (Individuals) and 0.27 (Groups)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
groups -8.45 <0.001 -10.10 -6.81 
female -11.51 <0.001 -13.05 -9.98 
asian -11.26 <0.001 -14.81 -7.72 
black -10.34 <0.001 -11.67 -9.00 
christian -10.18 <0.001 -11.48 -8.88 
gpaHI -9.67 <0.001 -11.27 -8.08 
junior -8.81 <0.001 -10.48 -7.14 
senior -11.00 <0.001 -14.03 -7.97 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
groups -1.70 0.05 -3.34 -0.06 
female 0.54 0.29 -0.75 1.82 
asian 1.33 0.30 -2.17 4.82 
black -0.23 0.36 -1.28 0.82 
christian -0.35 0.32 -1.37 0.68 
gpaHI -0.42 0.36 -2.23 1.40 
junior -2.11 <0.001 -3.60 -0.61 
senior 1.55 0.22 -1.19 4.28 
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Table 4.23: Pooled Measures of L and W  Indices, Individual "Control" and Group Scaffold 
 
 
Table 4.24: Pooled Measures of L Index, Comparing the Group Scaffold to Individual Measures 
 
Question Type Correct Answer L W L W
fin1  - Savings Account 2% Numeracy $110.41 0.53 0.50 0.67 0.62
fin2  - Social Security Start Age Procedural 62 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.18
fin5  - Medicare Eligibility Procedural 65 0.16 0.16 0.31 0.37
fin7  - Real Interest Rate Numeracy $98.98 0.28 0.29 0.45 0.38
fin9  - Savings Horizon Numeracy 4 months 0.77 0.74 0.92 0.93
fin10 - Stolen Credit Card Procedural $50 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07
fin11 - Stolen Debit Card Procedural $500 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.15
fin13 - Nominal Interest Numeracy 5% 0.80 0.76 0.93 0.92
fin14 - Interest Rate Numeracy $102 0.74 0.68 0.90 0.86
fin15 - Remaining Life for Men Longevity Risk 57.1 years 0.22 0.18 0.31 0.22
fin16 - Remaining Life for Women Longevity Risk 61.7 years 0.27 0.22 0.33 0.27
*Pooled literacy measures of L  and W  are initally reported for each question in their respective section. Chapter 
2 for indvidual measures and Chapter 4 for Group measures. 
Individual Group
Literacy Measures Literacy Measures
Question Type Correct Answer L L +/-
fin1  - Savings Account 2% Numeracy $110.41 0.53 0.67 0.14
fin2  - Social Security Start Age Procedural 62 0.26 0.21 -0.05
fin5  - Medicare Eligibility Procedural 65 0.16 0.31 0.15
fin7  - Real Interest Rate Numeracy $98.98 0.28 0.45 0.17
fin9  - Savings Horizon Numeracy 4 months 0.77 0.92 0.15
fin10 - Stolen Credit Card Procedural $50 0.06 0.05 -0.01
fin11 - Stolen Debit Card Procedural $500 0.16 0.21 0.05
fin13 - Nominal Interest Numeracy 5% 0.80 0.93 0.13
fin14 - Interest Rate Numeracy $102 0.74 0.90 0.16
fin15 - Remaining Life for Men Longevity Risk 57.1 years 0.22 0.31 0.09
fin16 - Remaining Life for Women Longevity Risk 61.7 years 0.27 0.33 0.06
*Pooled literacy measures of L are initally reported for each question in their respective section. Chapter 2 for 
indvidual measures and Chapter 4 for Group measures. The "+/-" column is the difference of the treatment 
compared to the Individual "control" subjects.
Individual Group
Literacy Measures Literacy Measures
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Appendix F: Experimental Instructions  
1. Instructions for Belief Elicitation, Lab Sessions with Groups 
Group Beliefs 
 
 This is a task where your assigned group will be paid according to how accurate your beliefs are 
about certain things. You will be presented with 11 questions and asked to place some bets on your group’s 
beliefs about the answers to each question. You will actually be rewarded for your group’s answer to one of 
these questions, so you should think carefully about answering each question. The question that is chosen 
for payment will be determined after everyone has made all decisions, and that process is explained below. 
 
 Here is an example of what the computer display of a question might look like. 
 
 
 
 The display on the computer will be larger and easier to read. There are 10 sliders to adjust, shown 
at the bottom of the screen, and your group has 100 tokens to allocate across the sliders. Each slider allows 
the group to allocate tokens to reflect the group’s belief about the answer to this question. All 100 tokens 
must be allocated, and in this example we start with 0 tokens allocated to each slider. As tokens are 
allocated, by adjusting the sliders, the payoffs displayed on the screen will change. The earnings are based on 
the payoffs that are displayed after your group has allocated all 100 tokens. 
 
 While you will make all choices as a group, individually you can earn up to $50 in this task. 
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 Where your group positions each slider depends on your group’s beliefs about the correct answer to 
the question. Please note that the bars above each slider correspond to that particular slider. In the above 
example, the tokens the group allocates to each bar will naturally reflect your group’s beliefs about the 
official unemployment rate for everyone 16 and over in February 2013. The first bar corresponds to your 
group’s belief that the unemployment rate is between 0% and 1.9%. The second bar corresponds to your 
group’s belief that the unemployment rate is between 2% and 3.9%, and so on. Each bar shows the amount 
of money you as an individual could earn if the official unemployment rate is in the interval shown under 
the bar. 
 
 To illustrate how to use these sliders, suppose your group thinks there is a fair chance the 
unemployment rate is just under 5%. Then your group might allocate the 100 tokens in the following way: 
50 tokens to the interval 4% to 5.9%, 40 tokens to the interval 2% to 3.9%, and 10 tokens to the interval 
0% to 1.9%. So you can see in the picture below that if indeed the unemployment rate is between 4% and 
5.9% you as an individual would earn $39.50. You would earn less than $39.50 for any other outcome. You 
would earn $34.50 if the unemployment rate is between 2% and 3.9%, $19.50 if it is between 0% and 1.9%, 
and for any other unemployment rate you would earn $14.50.  
 
 
 
 
 The allocation of tokens can be adjusted as much as your group wants to best reflect your group’s 
beliefs about the unemployment rate. 
  
Your earnings depend on your group’s reported beliefs and, of course, the true answer. For instance, 
suppose your group allocated the tokens as shown in the previous figure. The true unemployment rate is 
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actually 7.7%, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. So if your group had reported the beliefs shown in 
the previous figure, each individual in the group would have earned $14.50. 
 
 Suppose your group had put all your eggs in one basket, and allocated all 100 tokens to the interval 
corresponding to unemployment rates between 4% and 5.9%. Then you and your group members would 
have faced the individual earning outcomes shown below. 
 
 
 
  Note the “good news” and “bad news” here. If the unemployment rate is indeed between 4% and 
5.9%, you earn the maximum payoff, shown here as $50. But the true unemployment rate is 7.7%, so you 
would have earned nothing in this task.  
 
 It is up to the group to balance the strength of your group’s beliefs with the possibility of them 
being wrong. There are three important points to keep in mind when making your group decisions: 
 
    • Your group’s belief about the correct answer to each question is a group judgment, which 
depends on the information that individuals in the group have about the topic of the question.   
 
    • Depending on your group’s choices and the correct answer you can individually earn up to 
$50.  So if your group has 2 individuals in it, each individual could earn up to $50. 
 
    • Your group’s choices might also depend on the group’s willingness to take risks or to 
gamble. 
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 The decisions your group makes are a matter of your group’s choice. Please work quietly with only 
the individual(s) that have been assigned to your group, and make your group choices by thinking carefully 
about the questions that are presented. 
 
For some of the questions we will round the correct answer to the nearest amount shown under 
each bar. For example, the decision screen for the unemployment question might have shown 
unemployment rates of 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, 9%, 11%, 13%, 15%, 17% and 19% or more, as shown below. 
 
 
 
In this case, the correct answer of 7.7% would have been rounded to 7% rather than rounded to 9%, and 
the payment would have been $32.47. 
 
 When the group is satisfied with its decisions, you should click on the Submit button and confirm 
the choices. When everyone is finished we will come to each group and roll a 20-sided die until a number 
between 1 and 11 comes up to determine which question will be played out for each group. The members 
from each group should select one person from their group to roll the die. The roll is binding for all 
individuals in the group, thus all group members will receive the same earnings payout. The experimenter 
will record your individual earnings according to the correct answer and the choices your group made. 
 
 All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the show-up fee that you receive just for being here, as 
well as any other earnings in the session today. 
 
 Are there any questions? 
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Chapter 5 – Extended and Effective Literacy of the Household35 
5.1 Introduction 
 Do households, as joint decision makers, exhibit an effective literacy that differs from individuals? 
We examine this question using a field sample that allows us to draw inferences about the adult population 
of Denmark. We compare the joint behavior of a household couple to two types of controls. One control is 
separate behavior of each individual in a couple, and the other is the behavior of individuals that are not 
members of a household couple. We undertake incentivized field experiments to estimate atemporal risk 
preferences and subjective beliefs about longevity and major health risks. We recruit subjects from the 
Danish Registry on the basis of administrative records showing their household status, among many other 
things. 
5.2 Theoretical Framework 
 As explained in prior chapters, we need to elicit risk preferences and subjective beliefs of subjects. 
The risk preferences will be used to recover latent beliefs from observed responses to the scoring rules used 
to elicit beliefs. We use the same method of recovering latent beliefs for individuals within households as we 
did for recovering beliefs for individuals within groups in Chapter 4.36 
Households function as institutions for the members that comprise them, thus the household itself 
is a scaffold that can be shared by its members. A household’s scaffold is quite apart from the social 
                                                 
35 This chapter is based on data collected by Steffen Andersen, Glenn Harrison, Morten Lau, and Jimmy Martínez-Correa in 
Denmark. They have generously agreed to allow the data to be analyzed here.  
36 In Chapters 2 and 3 the application to employ the recovery method by Harrison and Ulm (2016) is straightforward as those 
treatments deal solely with individual participants making their own decisions in both the belief task and the risk task. However, 
the method is not as direct when recovering latent beliefs belonging to a household making a joint decision and having access to 
only the individual risk measures for each member of the household. The method that is adopted here assigns the raw token 
allocation given by the household making a joint decision to each individual in that household, and then employs the recovery of 
latent beliefs for each household member using their individual measure of risk.  This acknowledges that a joint decision was 
made by household members and that we then recover the latent beliefs of the household based on each member’s individual risk 
aversion. Hence we are recovering the latent beliefs that each subject agreed to when they agreed to a joint allocation of tokens. If 
the individuals within the household have different risk preferences, which can be the case, then the recovered beliefs from the 
agreed household allocation of tokens will differ from each other. 
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interaction that defines the typical household, and the use of language within it; however, it adds structure to 
both. 
We seek to understand the significance of the distinction between having household couples make 
joint decisions and having them make separate decisions. In the second case, again for the typical 
household, we are counterfactually removing a key part of the household scaffold by limiting member 
access. Not all of it, but arguably a key component. 
Thinking of households as scaffolds leads one to immediately see the sense in which the “effective 
literacy” concept, introduced in Section 1.2.1, can take on many forms. One could immediately imagine 
other scaffolds akin to households, leading to various notions of effective literacy when different scaffolds 
are present. Committee deliberations, particularly if mediated by some formal mode of conduct such as 
Roberts Rules of Order, are one important example. Parliamentary debate is another. Trial testimony or jury 
deliberation is yet another. 
5.3 Data 
 We access two general classes of data. The first is a massive collection of administrative records best 
described as “the Danish Registry.” In fact, these data are a collection of many distinct databases kept for 
administrative purposes, and not one monolithic database. The second type of data we access consists of 
surveys and experiments conducted in the Danish population, using samples drawn from the Registry. In 
this case we get to ask the questions, and design the experimental tasks. Shared by both classes of data 
sources are the social security number of individuals, a unique identification number assigned to all legal 
residents of Denmark making it possible to merge experimental and administrative records. 
5.3.1 The Danish Registry 
 We collate several administrative databases in Denmark. Our data cover the universe of all Danes in 
the period between 1986 and 2012, and contain demographic, economic, educational and health 
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information. Central to each administrative register is the social security number of each individual, the 
CPR, making it possible for us to merge information between all registers of interest.37 
 We obtain demographic information from the Danish Civil Registration System (CPR Registeret). 
These records include the CPR of the individual, their name, residential address, gender, date of birth, 
marital history (number of marriages, divorces, and widowhoods). The demographic record also contain the 
unique household identification number, as well as CPR numbers of each individual in the household. Thus 
we can identify “family units” and correlate information from one member of the household with 
information about another member of the household. The sample contains the entire Danish population by 
each year, and provides a unique identifying number across individuals, households, generations and time.  
 We obtain income and wealth information from the records at the Danish Tax Authority (SKAT). 
These data contain total and disaggregated income and wealth information by CPR number for the entire 
Danish population. SKAT receives this information directly from the relevant third-party sources, because 
employers supply statements of wages paid to their employees, and financial institutions supply information 
to SKAT on their customers’ deposits, interest paid or received, security investments, and dividends. 
Because taxation in Denmark mainly occurs at the source level, this income information is highly reliable. 
 We obtain individual employment and unemployment spells from the Income Registry (Centrale 
Oplysningsseddelregister) at the Danish Tax Authority. Employment and unemployment spells are identified 
from the statement of wages paid to employees that employers are obliged to submit to the Danish tax 
authorities. We use this to calculate the fraction of days of the year that someone is not employed and do so 
for each individual.  
 The status of the individual as unemployed, self-employed or salaried is formally defined by Statistics 
Denmark as the individual’s employment status in week 48 in the year. An unemployed person is defined as 
                                                 
37 There are many more data registers available in Denmark beyond those that we use. 
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a person without a job, who is available for the labor market and receiving unemployment benefits. A self-
employed person is defined as an individual receiving the majority of their income from their own company. 
Salaried individuals are defined as obtaining the majority of their income from salaried work. The residual 
status are individuals who are not available for the formal labor market, either because they are on leave, on 
social welfare benefits, working illegally in informal labor market, students, home-based spouses or 
pensioners. 
 We obtain the level of education from information collected by the Danish Ministry of Education 
(Undervisningsministeriet). This register identifies the highest level of education, both formal and informal, and 
the resulting professional qualifications. On this basis we calculate the number of years of schooling. We 
also collate all grades received in the ninth grade, the final year of formal primary public schooling in 
Denmark, and just before some individual enters High School. These data contain grades in several different 
courses, and we rank all students in Denmark in each cohort from the worst to the best by a simple 
constructed simple geometric average. We only obtain these grades from 1994 on. 
 Finally, we obtain data on medical treatments and hospitalizations from the Danish National Board 
of Health (Sundhedsstyelsen). These data record individual medical treatments and discharges from hospitals. 
Diagnosis and treatment procedures are classified according to the ICD-10 system, which spans morbidities 
as well as mortalities. For mortalities, the ICD-10 codes also include detailed “event codes” that explain the 
manner in which certain deaths occurred. Based on hospitalization nights, we calculate the total number of 
days in hospital during the year. 
5.3.2 Experiments 
 The experimental design implements choice tasks for individuals that allow us to estimate, for that 
individual, the theoretical structure needed to measure literacy by eliciting subjective beliefs.  
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5.3.3 Sampling Procedures 
 For logistical reasons we restrict the sample to “greater Copenhagen,” to minimize travel distances 
to attend experimental sessions in Copenhagen. We use a family identification number to identify all family 
units in Denmark. In this context, a family unit is understood as a single or a couple38 living with or without 
children.39 In the beginning of 2014 this is a universe in Denmark of N = 2,916,677 family units that we 
could potentially sample from, consisting of 5,627,235 individuals.   
 We restrict this sample in several ways: 
• We exclude family units with more than 10 members (30 family units removed). 
• We exclude children from the sample since we only want to recruit adults making the economic 
decisions in the family unit (0 family units removed, but 1,389,749 children living at home removed). 
• We exclude family units in which the oldest person is a minor (probably people living in dorms or 
children fleeing from their parents; 16,058 family units removed). 
• We exclude family units in which a spouse is less than 18 years of age (we cannot recruit minors into 
our experiments; 293 family units removed). 
• We exclude family units in which the youngest adult is older than 67 years (544,314 family units 
removed). 
• We exclude family units with one adult, and where the adult is married (these family units are 
probably separated from their spouse, or “between spouses”, and done so to ensure the recruitment 
of 2 adults in a household, so we have a clear separation with the controls of a single individual; 
81,118 family units removed). 
• From the remaining population, for logistical reasons we exclude households not living in greater 
Copenhagen, defined as households located with municipality codes higher than 200 (1,533,364 
family units removed). 
 
After making these exclusions we are left with 1,070,279 individuals in 741,500 of three types of family 
units:  
1. Family units with one adult that is not married (N = 412,721); 
2. Family units with two adults that are not married (N = 189,658); and 
3. Family units with two adults that are married, including registered partnerships (N = 467,900). 
                                                 
38  A couple is defined as two people who live together and form a couple of one of the following four types: married couples; 
registered partnership (introduced on 1 October 1989), which can include same-sex couples; cohabiting couples definition #1 
(samlevende par in Danish, two people that are not married or in a registered partnership with each other, but have at least one child 
in common registered with a social security number); and cohabiting couples definition # 2 (samboende par, two adult persons of 
the opposite sex who have at most 15 years of age difference and that have no children registered with a social security number, 
and as far as social security number can say, they are not closely related to each other, in the sense of being siblings or parent-
child). 
39 Children living at home are counted as part of their parents’ families if they live at the same address as at least one parent; are 
under 25 years old; have never been married; do not have a child or children registered; and are not part of a co-habiting couple. 
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We define single individuals as family units of type 1, and define households as family units of types 2 and 3. 
From this sample we will compare the joint decisions of a household couple to two types of controls. One 
control is the separate behavior of each individual in a couple, and the other is the behavior of the single 
individuals that are not members of a household couple. 
5.3.4 Experimental Tasks 
 The experimental tasks presented to our subjects are based on designs developed elsewhere, and 
successfully applied to the Danish population or other field subjects. Each subject faces two tasks, in 
addition to several other tasks40 of no relevance here. The two task are as follows: 
• An atemporal risk choice tasks consisting of 60 pairs of lotteries in the gain domain, designed to provide 
evidence of risk aversion as well as the tendency to make decisions consistently with EUT or RDU 
models. The battery based on designs from Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994), Loomes and Sugden 
(1998) and Cox and Sadiraj (2008, p. 33). We explain the logic of these designs in Appendix C. The 
analysis of risk attitudes is given these choices follows Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008) 
and Harrison and Rutström (2008). 
• A subjective belief elicitation task consists of 9 applications of the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) applied 
to continuous distributions. We examine general economic and health literacy, but also look at 
knowledge of prison sentencing rates of participants found guilty of two types of crime. The economic 
literacy questions include two questions asked by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2008) in the Health & 
Retirement Survey (HRS) of 2004 in the United States to characterize financial literacy, as well as two 
questions which ask about expected lifetimes of men and women. These span economic and health 
literacy, since they are critical inputs into retirement planning, or the lack thereof. We ask four 
specifically health-related mortality questions, about the prevalence of deaths from diseases of the heart, 
                                                 
40 One task elicited time preferences, following Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2008, 2014). Another task elicited 
intertemporal risk preferences, also known as correlation aversion, following Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2018). 
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cancers, smoking, and vehicle crashes due to alcohol. Finally, we ask one question on the perception of 
prison sentencing rates of participants found guilty of property crime (e.g., burglary and theft) and one 
question on the perception of prison sentencing rates of participants found guilty from non-property 
crime (e.g., homicide, assault, violence, rape and indecent exposure). In the Danish criminal system there 
is a primary charge and crime that one is ever found guilty of, and it is that crime that is referred to here. 
 We ask 9 subjective belief elicitation questions that were held constant for each subject, since several 
of the questions related to each other, and this ensures maximal control for possible order effects across 
treatments. The correct answers to all questions were documented in the event that any subject wanted to 
verify the source. We reference them here as Q1 through Q9 for convenience. The maximum earnings in 
each decision task is 1,000 kroner for individuals and 2,000 kroner for households. Each individual and 
household is given a 10% chance of being paid in this part of the experiment (i.e., for their responses to the 
subjective belief questions). The subjective belief questions asked of all subjects were as follows: 
Ql. Interest Compounding.  
 “Suppose you had 1,000 kroner in a savings account and the interest rate is 2% per year and you 
never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you have in this account in 
total?”  
 
The correct answer is 1,104 kroner. Responses were elicited between 1,050 kroner and 1,150 kroner in 
intervals of 10 kroner. 
 
Q2. Real Interest Rate.  
 “Suppose you had 2,000 in a savings account. The interest rate on your savings account was 1% per 
year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, what would be the real value of the money in this 
account?”  
 
The correct answer is 1,980 kroner. Responses were elicited between 1,950 kroner and 2,050 kroner in 
intervals of 10 kroner. 
 
Q3. Expected Lifetime for Men.  
 “Based on 2012-13 statistics, if a man lived to be 20 in Denmark, how many more years would he 
expect to live? Note that this is not the age he would die at, but how many more years he would expect to 
live.”  
 
The correct answer is 58.4 years. Responses were elicited in decades. The source for the correct answer was 
www.statistikbanken.dk. 
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Q4. Expected Lifetime for Women.  
 “Based on 2012-13 statistics, if a woman lived to be 20 in Denmark, how many more years would 
she expect to live? Note that this is not he age she would die at, but how many more years she would expect 
to live.”  
 
The correct answer is 62.4 years. Responses were elicited in decades. The source for the correct answer was 
www.statistikbanken.dk. 
 
Q5. Deaths from Heart Disease.  
 “What percentage of deceased people died from diseases of the heart in Denmark in 2011?”  
 
The correct answer is 14.4%. Responses were elicited in deciles. The source for the correct answer was 
www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/emner/doedsfald-og-middellevetid/doedsfald.aspx. 
 
Q6. Deaths from Cancer.  
 “What percentage of deceased people died from neoplasms (cancers) in Denmark in 2011?”  
 
The correct answer is 29.0%. Responses were elicited in deciles. The source for the correct answer was  
www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/emner/doedsfald-og-middellevetid/doedsfald.aspx. 
 
Q7. Deaths from Smoking.  
 “What percentage of deaths from all causes are attributed to smoking in Denmark in 2000?”  
 
The correct answer is 21.5%. Responses were elicited in deciles. The source for the correct answer was 
http://sundhedsstyrelsen.dk/da/sundhed/tobak/tal-og-
undersoegelser/~/media/4BB9830541C84E23968A206B7EDABBC4.ashx?m=.pdf. 
 
Q8. Property Criminal Activity.  
 “What percentage of people found guilty of property crimes (e.g. burglary and theft) in Denmark in 
2012 were sentenced to prison?”  
 
The correct answer is 13.9%. Responses were elicited in deciles. The source for the correct answer was 
http://www.dst.dk/pukora/epub/upload/17959/sy.pdf. 
 
Q9. Non-Property Criminal Activity.   
 “What percentage of people found guilty of violent and sexual crimes (e.g. homicide, assault, 
violence, rape and indecent exposure) in Denmark in 2012 were sentenced to prison?”  
 
The correct answer is 41.8%. Responses were elicited in deciles. The source for the correct answer was 
http://www.dst.dk/pukora/epub/upload/17959/sy.pdf. 
 
 The first four questions are obvious adaptations of questions reviewed in Chapter 2 about financial 
literacy and longevity risk. The next three questions elicit beliefs about basic health risks and their correlates. 
One is the general risk of heart disease, another is the general risk of cancers, the two leading causes of 
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death in the Denmark.41 Then we turn to the role of smoking in deaths. The final two questions consider 
beliefs about the risk of receiving a prison sentence in Denmark if convicted of property crimes (Q8) or 
violent and sexual crimes (Q9). These were controls for a separate experiment in which these questions were 
asked of known criminals. 
5.4 Results 
 We start by examining the effects of our three types of decision maker on preferences and beliefs of 
a “representative” decision maker, just to focus attention on the general pooled results. We then reconsider 
those results from estimates at the individual level. 
5.4.1 Subjective Beliefs  
 Tables 5.1 through 5.9, and Figures 5.1 through 5.9, provide an aggregate, unconditional summary of 
the responses to each question. This allows us to assess overall levels of literacy, before the conditional, 
nuanced analysis in Tables 5.10 through 5.27, and Figures 5.10 through 5.18, of the effects of socio-
demographic characteristics and our core treatments. In effect, the conditional analysis just tells us 
deviations from the overall average of the unconditional analysis, so the two analyses are complementary. 
 Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show that adult Danes have high literacy with respect to nominal interest 
earnings on savings accounts: the striking, modal response in Figure 5.1 was in the correct response interval. 
Literacy with respect to real interest rates is lower, as shown in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2, and is generally 
biased. Although the modal response was again in the correct response interval, there is a much higher level 
of imprecision than for nominal interest rates and the average is biased. The literacy index W drops from 
0.46 for the nominal interest rate question to 0.27 for the real interest rate question. The average responses 
for the nominal interest rate question, without adjustment for risk preferences, are not statistically 
                                                 
41 As reported in (“Europe in Figures - Eurostat Yearbook - Statistics Explained”) section 3.2 Causes of Death.  
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significantly different from the true responses, but are statistically significantly biased for the real interest 
rate question.  
 Tables 5.3 and 5.4, and Figures 5.3 and 5.4, show generally well-calibrated beliefs about longevity 
risk for men and women in Denmark. The average responses, without adjustment for risk preferences, are 
right at the true responses, and not statistically significantly different from them. The true response interval 
for men is the modal response, and for women it is effectively the modal response: for women, the true 
response of 58.8 is right at the border of the intervals 50 to 59 and 60 to 69. 
 Literacy rates for adult Danes plummet, however, when we consider health risks and the perception 
of prison sentencing rates if found guilty of crime. 
 For the mortality risk of heart disease, cancer and smoking, Danes are both unbiased and imprecise 
in their subjective perceptions. Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, and Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, show that they overstate 
each of these health risks on average: by 15.5 percentage points, 4.8 percentage points, and 6.8 percentage 
points, respectively. In all three cases this difference just falls within a 95% confidence interval. This bias is 
of great significance if the decision-making agents, individuals or households, violate the Reduction of 
Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom. If they behave consistently with ROCL, then their weighted average 
mortality risk is unbiased in these three cases. If they violate ROCL, however, then other aspects of the 
belief distribution than the mean become a factor in decision-making: in most models in which ROCL is 
violated, the lack of confidence in the mean belief is the driver of “uncertainty aversion” in decision-making. 
 In the case of the perception of prison sentencing rates if found guilty of a crime, Tables 5.8 and 5.9, 
and Figures 5.8 and 5.9, show that Danes again overestimate the risk of getting a prison sentence. For 
property crimes the actual rate of receiving a prison sentence if found guilty is only 13.9%, but the average 
perceived sentencing rate is 37%, a massive 23.1 percentage points difference. The average perceived 
sentencing rate for non-property crime, specifically violent and sexual crimes, is not off by as much, but this 
270 
 
is accompanied by a strikingly diffuse belief. In general, the average Dane has “no clue” what the risk of 
imprisonment is if found guilty for major crimes: as noted earlier, in a separate project these beliefs are 
being compared with those that have received a prison sentence for a crime in Denmark, to see if they are 
better calibrated. 
 Turning now to the detailed, conditional results, we want to see what demographic characteristics 
account for bias and imprecision in beliefs, and of course the effect of making separate or joint household 
reports. The demographic measures are each generally defined as binary measures as follows: singles is 1 
for individuals defined as family units of type 1, separate and joint are households defined as family units 
of types 2 and 3, with the former making decisions separately and the latter making joint decisions, female 
is a 1 for females, young is someone under 30, middle is someone between 30 and 40, old is someone over 
50, married is someone that is legally married or in a registered partnership, highschool is someone that 
has completed a high-school diploma, college is for someone that has completed at least 3 additional years 
of education after high school (this can include technical school training), and owner is someone that pays 
property tax on a dwelling (house, apartments, cottages, etc.). The final demographic inc_rank is a non-
binary variable that varies between 0 and 1 with a median value of 0.5. It is a constructed variable that 
indicates the income rank position in the population; those with higher values and closer to 1 are individuals 
that have higher incomes relative to others.  
 Although not the most interesting example in terms of behavior, because of the relatively high 
literacy, consider Table 5.10 and Figure 5.10, for the question about nominal interest rates. The body of 
Table 5.10 has the same structure as Table 5.1, but with additional covariates. From Table 5.1 we see that 
the overall average belief was 1103.17 kroner: this is different from the coefficient on the constant term in 
the top panel of Table 5.10, 1095.93 kroner, because the covariates in Table 5.10 do not all have averages of 
zero. As usual, the constant refers to the “omitted category,” which is a single decision-maker who is male, 
unmarried, between ages 41 and 49, and so on; we refer to this omitted category as “singles” for short, with 
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the understanding that it also involves certain values for other covariates. We observe that separated 
households report beliefs that are 3.40 kroner lower than singles, but that this difference is not statistically 
significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.18). There are several demographics that are statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level; young Danes, those with at least 3 years of college, and those with 
children. In each case, the coefficient of those estimates is positive and is closer to the correct answer.  
 In the bottom panel of Table 5.10, the interpretation of the coefficients for dispersion is immediate, 
because the dependent variable is in natural log units. Thus the coefficient estimate β implies a β × 100 
percent change in the standard deviation of beliefs, σ, for a one unit change in that covariate. So the 
statistically significant effect of being middle-aged or not (in the case the one unit is the value 1) is 
interpreted as a 22% reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs compared to the omitted category. 
 The information in Table 5.10 below the title is generally self-explanatory. The p-values for Separate 
and Joint refer to tests of the hypothesis that the effect on the average and the standard deviation are jointly 
zero, and complements the corresponding hypothesis tests of the average or the standard deviation in the 
body of the table. Figure 5.10 shows the distribution of reports for each bin, side-by-side for the Singles, 
Separate and Joint samples, allowing a visual interpretation of differences in reports. 
 Table 5.11 provides a more focused evaluation of the bias and imprecision of beliefs that is 
associated with demographics, and is different from the estimates underlying Table 5.10. In the top panel of 
Table 5.11 we estimate the “total effect” of the covariate, and then compare the estimated average belief to 
the true value. The bottom panel of Table 5.11 compares the estimated standard deviation to the pooled 
standard deviation. Thus we measure bias for the average, and relative imprecision for the standard 
deviation. These are not marginal effects: for each covariate of interest it is as if we use the average value of 
all other covariates for that covariate of interest. For females, for instance, the top panel shows that the 
difference between the average belief of a female is 0.34 less than the correct answer. This is different from 
Table 5.10, where the coefficient shows the difference compared to the omitted category; in Table 5.11 we 
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implicitly allow females to have the age, marital status, education level, for instance, that females have, not 
the values of those covariates that the omitted category has. Thus the p-values in Table 5.11 tell us what we 
want to know about bias for females, and the p-values in Table 5.10 tell us what we want to know about 
marginal differences in beliefs for females. 
 With this background, Table 5.11 shows us that there is a statistically significant bias at the 5% 
significance level in the literacy of households with respect to nominal interest rates when they make 
separate decisions, but not when they make joint decisions. Nor is there any bias for single individuals or 
any other covariates. Here we see that “most Danes get it,” which is also shown by the higher levels of the 
literacy indices L and W. In the bottom panel of Table 5.11 we see at the 5% significance level that middle-
aged and old Danes have statistically significantly different precisions of beliefs compared to the average 
imprecision of beliefs. Here middle-age Danes exhibit less imprecision in beliefs and old Danes exhibit 
more imprecision of beliefs compared to the average imprecision. For the income rank estimate we see the 
estimated average bias away from the correct answer of 1104 kroner is 1.12 which is for a person with an 
average income ranking, but is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Here the 95% confidence 
interval is between -1.97 and 4.22 is reported over all income ranking.   
 When we consider literacy with respect to real interest rates, we find a general bias from the correct 
answer and in the same direction for all Danes, no matter what household treatment they are in, or their 
demographic profile. Only college graduates and those in the higher income bracket hold these biased 
beliefs with greater precision than others. 
 Turning to literacy with respect to longevity risk, we find the first significant effect of our 
treatments, shown most clearly in Tables 5.15 and 5.17. In this case singles and separated households have 
biased beliefs, underestimating the longevity of both men and women. But households making joint 
decisions, while they have the same bias, do not have a statistically significant bias in general (p-value = 0.30 
in the remaining life for men and p-value = 0.18 in the remaining life for women). The subtlety here is that 
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“households” as we have defined them include married households and other households recognized as a 
household in Denmark even if they are not legally married. The subtlety arises because married decision-
makers have a statistically significant bias (p-value = 0.04 for both questions); thus the non-married 
households making joint decisions are the ones that are clearly unbiased. For the longevity risk for men, the 
exceptions to this tendency are young and college-educated Danes who do not exhibit a statistically 
significant bias at the 5% significance level. Only college-educated Danes exhibit a statistically significantly 
greater precision in their beliefs, which as just noted are unbiased. For the longevity risk for women, we see 
a similar pattern in terms of demographics, except that it is young and middle-aged Danes, and college-
educated that exhibit no statistically significant bias at the 5% significance level. Additionally, Danes in 
higher income brackets exhibit no statistically significant bias. However, young Danes and those in higher 
income brackets would not be statistically significant at the 10% significance level.  
 Literacy with respect to the risks of death from heart diseases is poor, as noted earlier. From Table 
5.19 we see that every demographic and household treatment exhibits the same qualitative bias, and it is 
statistically significant in all cases. Given this bias away from the correct answer for all covariates, the 
illiteracy is exacerbated by a greater precision of beliefs, which we see for households making joint decisions, 
married Danes, and middle-age. Young Danes, on the other hand, have a statistically significant increase in 
the imprecision of their beliefs, which is not a bad thing for their overall literacy given that they are biased. 
This signals that they “know they don’t know the correct answer” thus report more diffused beliefs. 
 The pattern of illiteracy for the risks of death from cancer is similar to heart disease, but nuanced in 
some respects. At the 5% significance level, the top panel of Table 5.21 shows that households making a 
separate decision have a statistically significant bias of 6.83 percentage points away from the correct answer. 
Singles and households making a joint decision are unbiased from the correct answer, although, singles 
would be deemed to have biased beliefs if evaluated at the 10% level. Additionally, middle-aged Danes and 
those with a high income rank do not exhibit significant bias from the correct answer. Only middle-aged 
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Danes exhibit no statistically significant bias (p-value = 0.12), although they also have more imprecision of 
beliefs (p-value = 0.04). Returning to households, we see the importance of considering both the bias and 
precision of beliefs. Households making joint decisions have a sizeable bias, as noted, but they have much 
greater precision about those beliefs (p-value < 0.001). Thus the net effect of the bias may be offset by 
“excess” confidence in that belief. The greater precision is barely significant for those that are married (p-
value = 0.09), so this suggests that the greater precision (of biased beliefs) is concentrated in the households 
making joint decisions that are not legally married. 
 We see a similarly nuanced pattern with respect to the risks of death from smoking, shown in Table 
5.23. Again there is a general pattern of bias, overestimation of the risks. But it is less significant for young 
or middle-aged Danes, with p-values of 0.13 and 0.24, respectively.  
 Finally, with respect to the perception of prison sentencing rates if found guilty for crimes, we see 
again a general bias across almost all demographics and treatments. For property crimes (Table 5.25), no 
covariates show a statistically significantly level of precision of their biased beliefs compared to the average 
imprecision. Figure 5.17 shows this result as a diffuse belief. The results are very similar for non-property 
crimes (Table 5.27). However, younger Danes have statistically insignificant bias from the correct answer (p-
value = 0.06), and are the only demographic to be unbiased at the 5% significance level. 
5.4.2 Atemporal Risk Preferences 
 Figures 5.19 and 5.20 display estimates of atemporal risk preferences using a RDU specification, 
with the Prelec probability weighting function as a benchmark. These estimates assume homogeneity and 
risk preferences across the three types of decision makers. We conclude that the representative single 
individual who is not a member of a household does not behave consistently with EUT (p-value = 0.0002 
on the hypothesis that ω(p)=p), although the quantitative magnitude of probability weighting is not great. 
We also find that representative couples that make separate decisions do not behave consistently with EUT (p-
275 
 
value = 0.029). These two types of representative decision makers also have roughly the same preferences, 
even though a formal hypothesis test of equality has a p-value of only 0.038, driven by the φ parameter. 
 However, the striking finding is the differences when representative couples make a single, joint 
household decision. For these decisions we cannot reject the hypothesis that atemporal risk preferences are 
consistent with EUT (p-value = 0.28). Moreover, their preferences are significantly different from those of 
comparable households making individual, separate decisions (p-value < 0.001). Figure 5.19 shows that the 
joint household decision generates significantly less risk aversion from utility curvature than the other two 
types of decision maker. Figure 5.20 shows that the extent of probability weighting is not great, and is 
roughly the same as for singles. But the precision of these estimates of probability weighting does not justify 
a rejection of EUT. 
 We undertake comparable estimation of risk preferences at the level of the individual decision maker. 
These estimates were then used to recover the latent subjective beliefs reported in Tables 5.1 through 5.27 
and Figures 5.1 through 5.18.  
5.5  Conclusions 
This chapter builds directly on the previous chapters and transitions from conventional laboratory 
experiments at Georgia State University’s ExCEN laboratory to an artefactual field experiment in the greater 
Copenhagen metropolitan area with a subject pool of adult Danes recruited from the Registry. In Chapter 4 
we examined literacy when students are paired together in an exogenously formed groups of 2 individuals. 
This chapter naturally extends that design to include endogenously formed households and asks if 
households as joint decision makers exhibit an effective literacy that differs from individuals. We compare 
the joint behavior of a Danish household couple to two types of controls; one control is the separate 
behavior of each individual in a couple, and the other is the behavior of individuals that are not in a 
household.  
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As these data were collected for a different project, a total of 9 subjective belief elicitation tasks were 
asked, of which 4 questions overlap with previous chapters and include topics of rates of interest, inflation, 
and longevity risk. The remaining 5 questions include topics of basic health risks and beliefs about the risk 
of receiving a prison sentence in Denmark if convicted of property crimes or violent or sexual “non-
property” crimes. We initially focus on the 4 overlapping questions in detail.   
When examining the question about the savings account with 2% interest we see some of the 
highest reported levels of literacy for adult Danes. Singles and households making joint decisions exhibited 
no statistically significant bias from the correct answer. However, the total effect of households making 
separate decisions did show bias and they were the least confident in their response, having a standard 
deviation of 42 kroner. Further, the percentage of raw token allocations to the bin containing the correct 
answer, the L literacy index, is 0.51 for singles, 0.49 for households making separate decisions, and 0.62 for 
households making joint decisions. Adult Danes score similarly in this index compared with the population 
of undergraduate students at GSU on a comparable question (fin1), with GSU students scoring L literacy 
index values of 0.53 for single individuals and 0.67 for exogenously formed groups of two individuals.  
Next we look at the question about the real interest rate for the Danes. We observe that singles and 
households making decisions separately or jointly all exhibited statistically significant bias from the correct 
answer. Households that made joint decisions appear more confident when compared to singles or 
households making separate decisions. This is confirmed in the bottom panel of Table 5.12: households 
making joint decisions exhibit a 31% reduction in the standard deviation of beliefs compared to singles; 
however, this is not statistically significant at the 5% level. The Danish population score L literacy indices of 
0.30 for singles, 0.35 for households making separate decisions, and 0.46 for households making joint 
decisions. Again we see that households making joint decisions are better off than those making individual 
decisions. As a further comparison, using the sample of undergraduate students at GSU responding to a 
comparable question (fin7) we found L literacy index values of 0.28 for single individuals and 0.45 for 
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exogenously formed groups consisting of two individuals. The naturally formed household groups in 
Denmark making joint decisions are comparably literate under this measure as anonymously paired group of 
GSU students in the laboratory. 
Moving on to the last two overlapping questions between the two studies, we turn to literacy with 
respect to longevity risk for men and women. In Denmark we find that singles and households making 
separate decisions have biased beliefs, underestimating the longevity of both men and women. However, 
households making joint decisions do not exhibit a statistically significant bias in general for either question. 
Danes score L literacy indices of 0.41 for singles, 0.45 for households making separate decisions, and 0.46 
for households making joint decisions for the question about the remaining life for men. For the question 
about remaining life for women, Danes score higher L literacy indices of 0.45 for singles, 0.56 for 
households making separate decisions, and 0.51 for households making joint decisions. Using the sample of 
undergraduate students at GSU responding to comparable questions for longevity risk for men (fin15) and 
women (fin16) we find lower levels of literacy in the GSU student population. For the question regarding 
longevity risk in men, the GSU sample had L literacy index values of only 0.22 for single individuals and 
0.31 for exogenously formed groups. For the question regarding longevity risk in women, the GSU sample 
had L literacy index values of only 0.27 for single individuals and 0.33 for exogenously formed groups. 
Danes, in general, perform better than GSU students for these questions. The naturally formed household 
groups in Denmark making joint decisions are more than 1.48 times more literate in the longevity risk of 
men and almost 1.55 times more literate in the longevity risk of women under this measure than an 
anonymously paired group of GSU students in the laboratory. 
The next three questions address basic health risks in Denmark and included questions about the 
percentage of deaths attributed to heart disease, cancer, and smoking in a given year. For the heart disease 
question, we observe that singles and households making decisions separately or jointly all exhibited 
statistically significant bias from the correct answer. In each case the magnitude of the overestimation was 
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around 15 percentage points higher than the correct answer. For the question about deaths from cancer, we 
observe that singles and households making a joint decision are unbiased from the correct answer, and that 
households making joint decisions benefited from having more confidence in their unbiased belief. For the 
smoking question, we see a similar pattern of bias that is statistically significant for singles and households 
making separate decisions, overestimating the risk of death from smoking by 6 and 8 percentage points 
respectively. We see the following levels of L literacy indices respectively for singles, households making 
separate decisions, and households making joint decisions for the following questions: deaths from heart 
disease of 0.21, 0.18, and 0.18; deaths from cancer of 0.21, 0.21, and 0.32; and deaths from smoking of 0.21, 
0.25, and 0.23.  
The final two questions ask about the rates of prison sentencing in Denmark for people that were 
found guilty of property crimes (e.g. burglary and theft) and for “non-property” crimes (e.g. homicide, 
assault, violence, rape and indecent exposure). For both questions we find that singles, households making 
separate decisions, and households making joint decisions all exhibit bias from the correct answer and 
overestimate the actual sentencing rates. However, this general bias is more a result of a lack of confidence 
than a precisely held, biased belief. These diffuse beliefs lower literacy levels, and is consistent with Danes 
“knowing that they don’t know” what the actual sentencing rate is for either type of crime. We see the 
following levels of L literacy indices respectively for singles, households making separate decisions, and 
households making joint decisions for the following questions: sentencing rate for property crimes of 0.13, 
0.18, and 0.18; and for non-property crimes of 0.08, 0.06, and 0.10. The question regarding the sentencing 
rate for non-property crime had the lowest levels of literacy out of all nine questions asked.  
Finally, Figures 5.21 and 5.22 present some overall displays of bias and confidence. Although not a 
substitute for the detailed evaluations of marginal and total effects from the main analysis, these serve to 
provide a high-level view of results. Bias is measured by comparing the average response, denoted by the 
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appropriate label with the true value shown in a dashed red line. The “lack of confidence” is simply the 
standard deviation of beliefs.  
Figure 5.21 shows the overall bias (y-axis) and lack of confidence (x-axis) for each question. These 
results collate those from Tables 5.1 through 5.9, and refer to the belief estimates pooled over all treatments. 
In that sense they refer to the pooled responses for this sample (no population weights have been applied), 
and provide a context to evaluate the comparative treatment effects shown in Figure 5.22. 
Statistically significant findings are indicated by a bold label. In Figure 5.21 this refers solely to bias, 
and indicates an average belief that has a 95% confidence interval that does not include the true value. 
Hence this is a one-sided hypothesis test at the 5% level. Only three questions generate responses that are 
not significantly biased: the remaining life of men, the fraction of deaths from smoking, and the extent of 
sentencing for property crime. 
In Figure 5.22 statistical significance refers to the joint effect of the household treatment on bias and 
confidence, and refer to the p-values shown in the top panels of Tables 5.10, 5.12, and so on. We only 
observe the joint household decision as being significantly different from the single individuals control, and 
for only three questions: the fraction of deaths from heart diseases, the fraction of deaths from cancer, and 
the extent of sentencing for non-property crime. Of course, these comparative effects are relative to the six 
questions for which the pooled response is statistically significantly biased, shown in Figure 5.21. Hence, 
with overall bias for the remaining life of women (Figure 5.21), the fact that there is no statistically 
significant difference for the household treatments compared to the single individuals control means that 
there is also bias for households in that instance (Figure 5.22).  
The upshot is that there is considerable bias across the different treatments and questions. It is not 
the case that households make better joint decisions across the board, even if they do make better decisions 
in certain domains. Moreover, as stressed throughout, one should not examine bias without also examining 
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confidence. The existence of bias is less problematic for decision-making if it is accompanied by an 
“appropriate” lack of confidence in beliefs. Of course, that conclusion rests on whether the agent exhibiting 
bias applies the Reduction of Compound Lotteries to their subjective belief distribution: if they do, then any 
bias is problematic.  
In summary, Table 5.28 displays a view of the pooled L and W indices for our control subjects of 
single (not married, living alone) individuals, as well as the two treatment groups of married or registered 
partnership households that were either assigned to make decisions jointly together or separate from each 
other. Table 5.29 then focuses only on the L index, and assesses the changes when comparing literacy 
measures between the control group of single individuals against married or registered partnership 
households making decisions jointly or separate from each other. Over the 4 questions that are classified as 
numeracy and longevity risk, and have direct overlap the previous thesis chapters, we see a similar story. 
Joint decisions made by couples resulted in higher L indices than either singles or separated couples 
responding using only their private literacy, for the numeracy questions, here Q1 and Q2. However, this 
result does not hold when examining longevity risk.   
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Tables and Figures 
  Table 5.1: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest 
 
Average: 1103.2 kroner      Standard deviation: 18.7 kroner 
Correct answer: 1104 kroner      N=282 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.52 and W = 0.46 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 1103.17 <0.001 1100.79 1105.56 
LnSigma 
constant 2.93 <0.001 2.81 3.04 
Sigma 
sigma 18.72   16.69 20.99 
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Table 5.2: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Real Interest Rate 
 
Average: 1990.2 kroner      Standard deviation: 18.6 kroner 
Correct answer: 1980 kroner      N=222 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.36 and W = 0.27 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 1990.17 <0.001 1987.83 1992.52 
LnSigma 
constant 2.93 <0.001 2.82 3.04 
Sigma 
sigma 18.65   16.71 20.81 
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Table 5.3: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Men 
 
Average: 53.6 years      Standard deviation: 18.4 years 
Correct answer: 58.4 years      N=222 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.44 and W = 0.36 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 53.56 <0.001 51.22 55.89 
LnSigma 
constant 2.91 <0.001 2.79 3.03 
Sigma 
sigma 18.36   16.30 20.67 
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Table 5.4: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Women 
 
Average: 57.7 years      Standard deviation: 19.0 years 
Correct answer: 62.4 years      N=223 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.51 and W = 0.44 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 57.71 <0.001 55.32 60.10 
LnSigma 
constant 2.94 <0.001 2.82 3.06 
Sigma 
sigma 18.98   16.84 21.39 
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Table 5.5: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about Deaths from Heart Disease 
 
Average: 29.9%      Standard deviation: 16.7% 
Correct answer: 14.4%      N=223 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.19 and W = 0.12 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 29.95 <0.001 28.00 31.89 
LnSigma 
constant 2.82 <0.001 2.72 2.91 
Sigma 
sigma 16.71   15.21 18.36 
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Table 5.6: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about Deaths from Cancer 
 
Average: 33.8%      Standard deviation: 17.2% 
Correct answer: 29.0%      N=221 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.23 and W = 0.15 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 33.75 <0.001 31.72 35.78 
LnSigma 
constant 2.84 <0.001 2.75 2.94 
Sigma 
sigma 17.17   15.61 18.88 
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Table 5.7: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about Deaths from Smoking 
 
Average: 28.3%      Standard deviation: 18.4% 
Correct answer: 21.5%      N=222 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.23 and W = 0.15 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 28.32 <0.001 26.05 30.60 
LnSigma 
constant 2.91 <0.001 2.81 3.02 
Sigma 
sigma 18.38   16.55 20.41 
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Table 5.8: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about Property Criminal Activity 
 
Average: 37.0%      Standard deviation: 22.9% 
Correct answer: 13.9%      N=221 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.16 and W = 0.10 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 36.99 <0.001 34.21 39.76 
LnSigma 
constant 3.13 <0.001 3.07 3.20 
Sigma 
sigma 22.92   21.48 24.46 
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Table 5.9: Interval Regression Estimates for 
the Question about Non-Property Criminal Activity 
 
Average: 55.6%      Standard deviation: 28.4% 
Correct answer: 41.8%      N=222 adult Danes 
Literacy indices L = 0.08 and W = 0.04 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
constant 55.63 <0.001 52.05 59.22 
LnSigma 
constant 3.35 <0.001 3.29 3.40 
Sigma 
sigma 28.36   26.86 29.95 
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Table 5.10: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest 
 
Correct answer: 1104 kroner      N=222 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 1095.9 kroner  Standard deviation: 37.6 kroner 
Separate: Average: 1092.5 kroner  Standard deviation: 42.4 kroner  p-value: 0.224 
Joint: Average: 1095.1 kroner  Standard deviation: 29.4 kroner  p-value: 0.313 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate -3.40 0.18 -8.40 1.61 
joint -0.85 0.71 -5.34 3.64 
female 0.72 0.70 -2.88 4.31 
young 9.39 <0.001 3.41 15.38 
middle 3.64 0.18 -1.66 8.93 
old 5.21 0.08 -0.57 10.99 
married -2.08 0.42 -7.18 3.02 
highschool -1.88 0.61 -9.14 5.38 
college -4.04 0.02 -7.55 -0.52 
kids 4.52 <0.001 1.86 7.19 
inc_rank 10.52 0.07 -0.66 21.70 
constant 1095.93 <0.001 1084.86 1107.00 
LnSigma 
separate 0.12 0.57 -0.30 0.54 
joint -0.25 0.35 -0.76 0.27 
female 0.11 0.34 -0.12 0.35 
young -0.54 0.02 -1.00 -0.09 
middle -0.22 0.37 -0.69 0.25 
old 0.33 0.06 -0.01 0.67 
married 0.02 0.91 -0.35 0.40 
highschool -0.12 0.53 -0.48 0.25 
college 0.19 0.21 -0.11 0.49 
kids -0.10 0.32 -0.30 0.10 
inc_rank -1.26 <0.001 -1.97 -0.54 
constant 3.63 <0.001 2.96 4.30 
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Table 5.11: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Savings Account with 2% Interest 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 1104 kroner 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 18.72 
Literacy index L = 0.51 (Singles), 0.49 (Separate) and 0.62 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.43 (Singles), 0.42 (Separate) and 0.57 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles 2.98 0.10 -0.52 6.48 
separate -5.11 0.01 -8.98 -1.23 
joint 1.70 0.32 -3.16 6.56 
female -0.34 0.39 -3.94 3.25 
young 2.20 0.22 -1.70 6.10 
middle 2.77 0.16 -1.24 6.78 
old -2.58 0.19 -6.68 1.51 
married -2.57 0.15 -6.15 1.02 
highschool -0.53 0.36 -2.99 1.93 
college -1.41 0.27 -4.55 1.72 
kids 1.85 0.17 -0.96 4.66 
inc_rank 1.12 0.31 -1.97 4.22 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles -2.21 0.18 -5.64 1.23 
separate 1.57 0.22 -1.30 4.44 
joint -1.85 0.31 -7.04 3.34 
female 1.13 0.30 -1.85 4.10 
young -4.83 0.07 -9.87 0.21 
middle -6.98 0.02 -12.39 -1.57 
old 3.10 0.04 0.25 5.96 
married 0.93 0.33 -1.98 3.84 
highschool -0.76 0.33 -3.18 1.66 
college -0.79 0.35 -3.81 2.23 
kids -2.33 0.12 -5.27 0.60 
inc_rank -2.70 0.13 -6.23 0.83 
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Table 5.12: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about the Real Interest Rate 
 
Correct answer: 1980 kroner      N=222 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 1998.9 kroner  Standard deviation: 23.8 kroner 
Separate: Average: 1993.4 kroner  Standard deviation: 23.3 kroner  p-value: 0.398 
Joint: Average: 1993.2 kroner  Standard deviation: 17.4 kroner  p-value: 0.200 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate -5.54 0.16 -13.19 2.11 
joint -5.69 0.16 -13.61 2.23 
female 4.13 0.09 -0.68 8.93 
young -1.44 0.74 -10.07 7.19 
middle -0.41 0.90 -7.09 6.26 
old -1.29 0.71 -8.06 5.49 
married -1.52 0.68 -8.73 5.69 
highschool 1.39 0.71 -5.97 8.76 
college -5.87 0.02 -10.64 -1.09 
kids 1.25 0.53 -2.66 5.17 
inc_rank -5.46 0.30 -15.80 4.89 
constant 1998.90 <0.001 1988.91 2008.88 
LnSigma 
separate -0.02 0.91 -0.41 0.37 
joint -0.31 0.19 -0.78 0.16 
female 0.17 0.20 -0.09 0.42 
young 0.18 0.44 -0.27 0.64 
middle 0.18 0.33 -0.19 0.55 
old 0.09 0.59 -0.24 0.41 
married 0.04 0.79 -0.28 0.37 
highschool 0.05 0.79 -0.28 0.37 
college -0.27 0.04 -0.52 -0.02 
kids 0.06 0.39 -0.08 0.21 
inc_rank -0.57 0.04 -1.10 -0.04 
constant 3.17 <0.001 2.66 3.67 
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Table 5.13: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Real Interest Rate 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 1980 kroner 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 18.65 
Literacy index L = 0.30 (Singles), 0.35 (Separate) and 0.46 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.21 (Singles), 0.27 (Separate) and 0.37 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles 15.37 <0.001 11.37 19.38 
separate 7.09 <0.001 3.56 10.61 
joint 7.92 <0.001 3.50 12.33 
female 13.10 <0.001 9.43 16.78 
young 11.98 <0.001 6.31 17.65 
middle 11.95 <0.001 4.14 19.75 
old 7.77 <0.001 4.46 11.08 
married 6.97 <0.001 3.82 10.12 
highschool 9.77 <0.001 7.33 12.22 
college 7.19 <0.001 4.60 9.78 
kids 10.85 <0.001 7.12 14.58 
inc_rank 7.33 <0.001 4.27 10.38 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles 0.55 0.37 -2.38 3.48 
separate 0.09 0.40 -2.99 3.17 
joint -3.27 0.20 -8.71 2.17 
female 1.75 0.18 -0.95 4.45 
young 1.48 0.33 -3.08 6.04 
middle 2.38 0.33 -5.04 9.79 
old -0.72 0.36 -3.69 2.25 
married -1.15 0.30 -4.16 1.87 
highschool -0.63 0.34 -2.85 1.58 
college -3.46 0.01 -6.02 -0.91 
kids 0.71 0.35 -1.98 3.40 
inc_rank -3.97 0.02 -7.22 -0.72 
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Table 5.14: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Men 
 
Correct answer: 58.4 years      N=223 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 44.1 years  Standard deviation: 26.3 years 
Separate: Average: 42.1 years  Standard deviation: 29.7 years  p-value: 0.399 
Joint: Average: 45.1 years  Standard deviation: 29.2 years  p-value: 0.399 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate -2.03 0.54 -8.58 4.51 
joint 1.00 0.79 -6.52 8.51 
female -1.66 0.40 -5.49 2.18 
young 2.51 0.42 -3.56 8.59 
middle -4.26 0.31 -12.45 3.94 
old -3.35 0.16 -8.05 1.35 
married 5.47 0.09 -0.94 11.89 
highschool 5.44 0.28 -4.38 15.26 
college 5.71 <0.001 1.56 9.85 
kids -1.97 0.18 -4.87 0.93 
inc_rank 4.08 0.36 -4.63 12.79 
constant 44.11 <0.001 31.11 57.10 
LnSigma 
separate 0.12 0.56 -0.28 0.52 
joint 0.10 0.66 -0.35 0.56 
female 0.12 0.38 -0.15 0.40 
young 0.05 0.83 -0.43 0.54 
middle 0.33 0.31 -0.31 0.98 
old 0.37 0.03 0.03 0.71 
married -0.37 0.05 -0.75 0.00 
highschool -0.39 0.01 -0.69 -0.08 
college -0.20 0.18 -0.50 0.09 
kids 0.15 0.26 -0.11 0.42 
inc_rank -0.38 0.26 -1.04 0.28 
constant 3.27 <0.001 2.68 3.87 
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Table 5.15: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Men 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 58.4 years 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 18.36 
Literacy index L = 0.41 (Singles), 0.45 (Separate) and 0.46 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.33 (Singles), 0.37 (Separate) and 0.37 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles -5.57 <0.001 -9.37 -1.76 
separate -5.64 <0.001 -9.17 -2.11 
joint -1.97 0.30 -7.24 3.29 
female -6.35 <0.001 -9.97 -2.73 
young -3.27 0.16 -8.08 1.55 
middle -6.76 0.04 -12.77 -0.74 
old -5.97 <0.001 -9.82 -2.11 
married -3.65 0.04 -6.95 -0.35 
highschool -3.52 <0.001 -5.74 -1.30 
college -1.16 0.27 -3.69 1.38 
kids -5.31 <0.001 -7.95 -2.66 
inc_rank -3.21 0.07 -6.51 0.10 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles -0.20 0.40 -3.67 3.28 
separate -0.03 0.40 -3.27 3.21 
joint 0.10 0.40 -5.34 5.54 
female 1.58 0.23 -1.42 4.58 
young -0.98 0.37 -5.65 3.68 
middle -2.19 0.32 -8.91 4.52 
old 2.20 0.15 -0.86 5.26 
married -0.34 0.39 -3.64 2.96 
highschool -1.95 0.13 -4.48 0.58 
college -3.79 0.03 -7.12 -0.46 
kids -1.14 0.31 -4.36 2.07 
inc_rank -2.00 0.22 -5.58 1.58 
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Table 5.16: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about the Remaining Life for Women 
 
Correct answer: 62.4 years      N=223 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 45.2 years  Standard deviation: 43.2 years 
Separate: Average: 41.2 years  Standard deviation: 43.2 years  p-value: 0.380 
Joint: Average: 43.3 years  Standard deviation: 48.6 years  p-value: 0.299 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate -4.02 0.15 -9.55 1.52 
joint -1.90 0.61 -9.17 5.37 
female -1.49 0.42 -5.09 2.12 
young 1.29 0.65 -4.37 6.96 
middle -2.81 0.56 -12.16 6.55 
old -3.94 0.13 -9.06 1.18 
married 8.43 0.01 1.90 14.96 
highschool 10.10 0.06 -0.48 20.68 
college 4.97 0.06 -0.25 10.19 
kids -2.77 0.13 -6.37 0.82 
inc_rank 3.53 0.40 -4.68 11.74 
constant 45.23 <0.001 32.06 58.41 
LnSigma 
separate 0.00 1.00 -0.37 0.37 
joint 0.12 0.60 -0.32 0.56 
female -0.09 0.58 -0.39 0.22 
young -0.33 0.14 -0.77 0.11 
middle 0.28 0.41 -0.40 0.97 
old 0.23 0.25 -0.16 0.61 
married -0.34 0.08 -0.72 0.04 
highschool -0.38 0.02 -0.69 -0.06 
college -0.32 0.08 -0.68 0.03 
kids 0.16 0.31 -0.15 0.46 
inc_rank -0.57 0.12 -1.29 0.15 
constant 3.77 <0.001 3.21 4.32 
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Table 5.17: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about the Remaining Life for Women 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 62.4 years 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 18.98 
Literacy index L = 0.45 (Singles), 0.56 (Separate) and 0.51 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.37 (Singles), 0.49 (Separate) and 0.43 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles -4.21 0.04 -8.10 -0.32 
separate -5.50 <0.001 -8.91 -2.09 
joint -3.82 0.18 -9.82 2.19 
female -6.66 <0.001 -10.21 -3.12 
young -4.54 0.06 -9.11 0.03 
middle -4.91 0.12 -11.06 1.25 
old -5.49 <0.001 -9.38 -1.60 
married -3.76 0.04 -7.23 -0.30 
highschool -3.07 0.01 -5.33 -0.80 
college -0.97 0.29 -3.39 1.44 
kids -5.06 <0.001 -7.90 -2.23 
inc_rank -2.98 0.09 -6.40 0.43 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles -0.70 0.37 -4.36 2.96 
separate -0.54 0.38 -3.92 2.83 
joint 2.08 0.30 -3.28 7.44 
female 0.72 0.36 -2.26 3.71 
young -2.11 0.26 -6.65 2.44 
middle -2.69 0.30 -9.68 4.31 
old 2.07 0.18 -1.18 5.32 
married 0.36 0.39 -3.10 3.83 
highschool -2.21 0.10 -4.79 0.37 
college -4.67 0.01 -8.17 -1.17 
kids -0.84 0.35 -3.98 2.30 
inc_rank -2.01 0.23 -5.71 1.69 
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Table 5.18: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about Deaths from Heart Disease 
 
Correct answer: 14.4%      N=221 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 33.9%  Standard deviation: 20.4% 
Separate: Average: 38.3%  Standard deviation: 20.8%  p-value: 0.352 
Joint: Average: 38.1%  Standard deviation: 18.5%  p-value: 0.045 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate 4.40 0.19 -2.13 10.93 
joint 4.15 0.26 -3.14 11.44 
female 1.48 0.44 -2.31 5.27 
young 0.23 0.96 -8.06 8.52 
middle -6.46 0.06 -13.25 0.33 
old -1.47 0.62 -7.30 4.36 
married -2.88 0.42 -9.88 4.12 
highschool -2.76 0.36 -8.66 3.13 
college 3.04 0.17 -1.32 7.41 
kids -1.30 0.49 -5.04 2.43 
inc_rank -4.95 0.35 -15.26 5.36 
constant 33.95 <0.001 24.37 43.53 
LnSigma 
separate 0.02 0.88 -0.23 0.27 
joint -0.09 0.54 -0.40 0.21 
female 0.04 0.64 -0.14 0.23 
young 0.00 0.99 -0.30 0.31 
middle -0.39 <0.001 -0.65 -0.13 
old -0.12 0.38 -0.38 0.15 
married -0.26 0.05 -0.52 -0.00 
highschool 0.08 0.58 -0.21 0.38 
college -0.06 0.60 -0.29 0.16 
kids 0.05 0.35 -0.05 0.15 
inc_rank -0.13 0.52 -0.54 0.27 
constant 3.01 <0.001 2.61 3.42 
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Table 5.19: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Deaths from Heart Disease 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 14.4% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 16.71 
Literacy index L = 0.21 (Singles), 0.18 (Separate) and 0.18 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.13 (Singles), 0.11 (Separate) and 0.10 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles 14.95 <0.001 11.29 18.62 
separate 15.88 <0.001 13.08 18.67 
joint 15.85 <0.001 12.10 19.60 
female 16.72 <0.001 13.78 19.66 
young 17.47 <0.001 12.44 22.49 
middle 9.75 <0.001 5.46 14.05 
old 15.45 <0.001 12.79 18.10 
married 15.30 <0.001 12.98 17.62 
highschool 15.30 <0.001 13.22 17.38 
college 16.22 <0.001 13.67 18.76 
kids 15.04 <0.001 12.04 18.03 
inc_rank 13.43 <0.001 10.47 16.39 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles 2.09 0.12 -0.59 4.77 
separate -0.64 0.35 -3.16 1.87 
joint -2.67 0.04 -5.17 -0.17 
female 0.75 0.33 -1.72 3.21 
young 3.12 0.04 0.21 6.03 
middle -3.63 <0.001 -5.26 -2.00 
old -1.58 0.20 -4.27 1.10 
married -2.70 0.01 -4.68 -0.72 
highschool -0.09 0.40 -1.74 1.56 
college -0.74 0.30 -2.65 1.17 
kids 0.24 0.38 -1.45 1.94 
inc_rank -1.60 0.14 -3.76 0.56 
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Table 5.20: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about Deaths from Cancer 
 
Correct answer: 29.0%      N=222 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 39.3%  Standard deviation: 23.2% 
Separate: Average: 44.1%  Standard deviation: 26.0%  p-value: 0.259 
Joint: Average: 40.5%  Standard deviation: 15.4%  p-value: < 0.001 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate 4.81 0.17 -2.09 11.72 
joint 1.26 0.71 -5.42 7.94 
female 1.75 0.35 -1.91 5.40 
young -2.73 0.49 -10.48 5.03 
middle -2.58 0.49 -9.95 4.79 
old -2.29 0.40 -7.67 3.09 
married -3.11 0.35 -9.57 3.35 
highschool -1.15 0.73 -7.67 5.37 
college 1.30 0.53 -2.80 5.40 
kids -0.90 0.40 -3.02 1.21 
inc_rank -6.70 0.11 -14.94 1.53 
constant 39.27 <0.001 29.27 49.26 
LnSigma 
separate 0.12 0.37 -0.14 0.37 
joint -0.41 <0.001 -0.68 -0.14 
female -0.03 0.74 -0.20 0.14 
young -0.03 0.84 -0.34 0.27 
middle -0.13 0.40 -0.43 0.17 
old -0.15 0.22 -0.39 0.09 
married -0.13 0.34 -0.40 0.14 
highschool -0.22 0.09 -0.49 0.04 
college 0.06 0.61 -0.15 0.26 
kids -0.17 0.02 -0.32 -0.03 
inc_rank 0.06 0.78 -0.39 0.52 
constant 3.14 <0.001 2.74 3.55 
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Table 5.21: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Deaths from Cancer 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 29.0% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 17.17 
Literacy index L = 0.21 (Singles), 0.21 (Separate) and 0.32 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.13 (Singles), 0.13 (Separate) and 0.22 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles 3.72 0.06 -0.00 7.43 
separate 6.83 <0.001 3.60 10.07 
joint 2.07 0.13 -0.60 4.75 
female 5.79 <0.001 3.02 8.55 
young 5.82 0.04 0.50 11.15 
middle 3.38 0.20 -2.18 8.93 
old 4.70 <0.001 1.92 7.48 
married 4.65 <0.001 2.13 7.18 
highschool 4.33 <0.001 2.24 6.43 
college 4.60 <0.001 1.89 7.31 
kids 4.11 <0.001 1.94 6.28 
inc_rank 2.25 0.12 -0.63 5.12 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles 1.31 0.25 -1.29 3.90 
separate 1.17 0.26 -1.30 3.64 
joint -6.74 <0.001 -8.68 -4.79 
female -0.56 0.36 -3.11 1.98 
young 2.35 0.19 -1.46 6.17 
middle -1.48 0.28 -4.93 1.97 
old -1.03 0.28 -3.40 1.34 
married -1.95 0.09 -4.16 0.27 
highschool -0.68 0.30 -2.51 1.14 
college -0.20 0.39 -2.65 2.26 
kids -2.01 <0.001 -3.44 -0.58 
inc_rank -1.89 0.10 -4.10 0.33 
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Table 5.22: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about Deaths from Smoking 
 
Correct answer: 21.5%      N=221 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 36.6%  Standard deviation: 14.2% 
Separate: Average: 36.4%  Standard deviation: 12.3%  p-value: 0.374 
Joint: Average: 31.5%  Standard deviation: 9.9%  p-value: 0.381 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate -0.11 0.97 -5.78 5.56 
joint -5.05 0.14 -11.78 1.68 
female 5.28 0.03 0.41 10.15 
young -2.94 0.41 -9.99 4.11 
middle -1.12 0.79 -9.39 7.15 
old 2.59 0.41 -3.61 8.79 
married 3.85 0.19 -1.91 9.61 
highschool -2.08 0.50 -8.15 3.99 
college -0.28 0.91 -5.21 4.65 
kids 0.60 0.61 -1.72 2.91 
inc_rank -14.29 <0.001 -24.83 -3.76 
constant 36.55 <0.001 26.93 46.17 
LnSigma 
separate -0.14 0.23 -0.38 0.09 
joint -0.36 0.05 -0.72 0.00 
female 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.48 
young -0.01 0.93 -0.35 0.32 
middle 0.02 0.91 -0.32 0.36 
old -0.11 0.47 -0.39 0.18 
married 0.35 <0.001 0.08 0.62 
highschool 0.24 0.10 -0.04 0.51 
college 0.02 0.91 -0.25 0.28 
kids -0.16 0.11 -0.35 0.04 
inc_rank -0.12 0.63 -0.63 0.38 
constant 2.65 <0.001 2.16 3.14 
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Table 5.23: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Deaths from Smoking 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 21.5% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 18.38 
Literacy index L = 0.21 (Singles), 0.25 (Separate) and 0.23 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.13 (Singles), 0.16 (Separate) and 0.15 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles 6.28 <0.001 2.59 9.98 
separate 8.14 <0.001 4.60 11.68 
joint 4.97 0.06 0.07 9.86 
female 9.66 <0.001 6.19 13.13 
young 3.18 0.13 -0.97 7.34 
middle 3.15 0.24 -2.97 9.26 
old 9.50 <0.001 5.98 13.01 
married 8.54 <0.001 5.07 12.01 
highschool 6.02 <0.001 3.56 8.47 
college 5.57 <0.001 2.43 8.71 
kids 7.05 <0.001 4.41 9.69 
inc_rank 3.56 0.06 0.04 7.08 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles -0.40 0.38 -2.80 2.01 
separate 0.57 0.37 -2.54 3.69 
joint -0.78 0.38 -5.81 4.24 
female 1.29 0.24 -1.27 3.85 
young -2.64 0.12 -6.01 0.72 
middle -1.59 0.31 -6.05 2.88 
old 0.82 0.35 -2.23 3.87 
married 0.93 0.34 -2.19 4.05 
highschool -0.03 0.40 -2.23 2.17 
college -0.16 0.40 -2.90 2.58 
kids -1.01 0.29 -3.51 1.48 
inc_rank -0.86 0.34 -3.98 2.26 
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Table 5.24: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about Property Criminal Activity 
 
Correct answer: 13.9%      N=222 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 38.5%  Standard deviation: 28.0% 
Separate: Average: 38.2%  Standard deviation: 28.7%  p-value: 0.250 
Joint: Average: 32.1%  Standard deviation: 23.7%  p-value: 0.089 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate -0.31 0.95 -9.46 8.85 
joint -6.42 0.24 -17.16 4.32 
female -3.70 0.23 -9.70 2.30 
young 1.65 0.74 -8.18 11.49 
middle 1.93 0.72 -8.76 12.63 
old 3.21 0.42 -4.59 11.01 
married -3.29 0.47 -12.18 5.59 
highschool 5.30 0.28 -4.27 14.86 
college 3.04 0.38 -3.73 9.81 
kids 3.07 0.10 -0.63 6.76 
inc_rank -8.08 0.27 -22.35 6.19 
constant 38.52 <0.001 24.20 52.84 
LnSigma 
separate 0.03 0.80 -0.17 0.22 
joint -0.17 0.25 -0.46 0.12 
female -0.16 0.03 -0.31 -0.02 
young 0.09 0.46 -0.15 0.33 
middle 0.13 0.24 -0.09 0.35 
old 0.01 0.91 -0.19 0.22 
married 0.08 0.47 -0.14 0.29 
highschool -0.05 0.69 -0.32 0.21 
college 0.01 0.89 -0.16 0.18 
kids -0.01 0.90 -0.13 0.12 
inc_rank -0.24 0.27 -0.66 0.19 
constant 3.33 <0.001 2.96 3.70 
 
312 
 
 
313 
 
 
 
Table 5.25: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Property Criminal Activity 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 13.9% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 22.92 
Literacy index L = 0.13 (Singles), 0.18 (Separate) and 0.18 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.07 (Singles), 0.11 (Separate) and 0.11 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles 25.28 <0.001 20.75 29.81 
separate 23.98 <0.001 19.60 28.37 
joint 17.47 <0.001 12.01 22.92 
female 21.60 <0.001 17.93 25.27 
young 25.05 <0.001 18.45 31.64 
middle 26.82 <0.001 18.44 35.21 
old 21.70 <0.001 17.66 25.75 
married 20.85 <0.001 16.83 24.87 
highschool 23.91 <0.001 21.01 26.82 
college 24.91 <0.001 21.24 28.58 
kids 24.88 <0.001 21.17 28.58 
inc_rank 22.85 <0.001 18.60 27.11 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles -0.33 0.38 -2.60 1.94 
separate 1.13 0.25 -1.16 3.43 
joint -3.02 0.09 -6.44 0.40 
female -1.59 0.12 -3.61 0.43 
young 1.68 0.23 -1.43 4.80 
middle 0.68 0.37 -2.76 4.13 
old -0.50 0.37 -2.98 1.98 
married 0.02 0.40 -2.35 2.39 
highschool -0.50 0.33 -2.04 1.04 
college -0.80 0.29 -2.78 1.17 
kids -0.16 0.39 -2.25 1.93 
inc_rank -0.93 0.31 -3.49 1.64 
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Table 5.26: Effective Households Literacy for 
the Question about Non-Property Criminal Activity 
 
Correct answer: 41.8%      N=221 adult Danes 
Singles: Average: 42.0%  Standard deviation: 30.3% 
Separate: Average: 38.5%  Standard deviation: 31.9%  p-value: 0.263 
Joint: Average: 40.5%  Standard deviation: 25.1%  p-value: 0.015 
 
Parameter Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Average 
separate -3.50 0.58 -15.83 8.83 
joint -1.46 0.83 -14.53 11.60 
female -1.72 0.66 -9.39 5.96 
young -2.05 0.78 -16.21 12.10 
middle -4.91 0.47 -18.30 8.48 
old 0.36 0.95 -11.51 12.23 
married 12.40 0.05 0.21 24.60 
highschool 9.12 0.12 -2.32 20.56 
college 0.02 1.00 -8.27 8.31 
kids -1.47 0.68 -8.51 5.57 
inc_rank 5.18 0.59 -13.42 23.78 
constant 41.95 <0.001 23.23 60.68 
LnSigma 
separate 0.05 0.59 -0.13 0.24 
joint -0.19 0.10 -0.41 0.04 
female -0.11 0.13 -0.25 0.03 
young -0.09 0.49 -0.36 0.17 
middle -0.10 0.40 -0.32 0.13 
old 0.01 0.95 -0.26 0.28 
married -0.07 0.48 -0.27 0.12 
highschool 0.02 0.85 -0.18 0.21 
college -0.03 0.67 -0.19 0.12 
kids 0.01 0.94 -0.16 0.17 
inc_rank 0.03 0.83 -0.27 0.34 
constant 3.41 <0.001 3.06 3.76 
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Table 5.27: Literacy Bias and Imprecision, by Demographics, 
for the Question about Non-Property Criminal Activity 
 
Bias is relative to the correct answer: 41.8% 
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision: 28.36 
Literacy index L = 0.08 (Singles), 0.06 (Separate) and 0.10 (Joint)  
Literacy index W = 0.04 (Singles), 0.03 (Separate) and 0.06 (Joint)  
 
Demographic Estimate p-value 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper 
Bias from the True Response 
singles 8.72 <0.001 2.66 14.78 
separate 15.38 <0.001 9.76 21.00 
joint 19.24 <0.001 12.57 25.91 
female 12.82 <0.001 7.91 17.72 
young 7.38 0.06 0.03 14.72 
middle 11.24 0.04 0.73 21.76 
old 16.43 <0.001 11.06 21.80 
married 19.39 <0.001 14.45 24.33 
highschool 15.10 <0.001 11.27 18.93 
college 15.65 <0.001 10.83 20.47 
kids 14.55 <0.001 9.88 19.22 
inc_rank 17.82 <0.001 12.23 23.41 
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs 
singles 0.13 0.40 -2.33 2.60 
separate 1.11 0.26 -1.27 3.49 
joint -4.32 0.02 -7.63 -1.01 
female -1.00 0.26 -3.17 1.16 
young -1.46 0.25 -4.42 1.51 
middle 0.25 0.40 -3.73 4.23 
old 0.33 0.38 -2.00 2.67 
married -1.15 0.27 -3.74 1.43 
highschool -0.26 0.38 -1.98 1.46 
college -0.66 0.33 -2.81 1.49 
kids -0.30 0.39 -2.79 2.19 
inc_rank -0.26 0.39 -2.84 2.33 
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Table 5.28: Pooled Measures of L and W  Indices, Single Individual and Households Making Joint 
or Separated Decisions 
  
Table 5.29: Pooled Measures of L Index, Comparing the Single Individual to Households Making 
Joint or Separated Decisions Measures 
   
Question Type Correct Answer L W L W L W
Q1 - Savings Account 2% Numeracy 1,104 kroner 0.51 0.43 0.62 0.57 0.49 0.42
Q2 - Real Interest Rate Numeracy 1,980 kroner 0.30 0.21 0.46 0.37 0.35 0.27
Q3 - Remaining Life for Men Longevity Risk 58.4 years 0.41 0.33 0.46 0.37 0.45 0.37
Q4 - Remaining Life for Women Longevity Risk 62.4 years 0.45 0.37 0.51 0.43 0.56 0.49
Q5 - Deaths from Heart Disease Health 14.40% 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.11
Q6 - Deaths from Cancer Health 29.0%. 0.21 0.13 0.32 0.22 0.21 0.13
Q7 - Deaths from Smoking Health 21.50% 0.21 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.16
Q8 - Property Criminal Activity Crime 14% 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.11
Q9 - Non-Property Criminal Activity Crime 41.80% 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.03
Single Joint Separate
Literacy Measures Literacy Measures Literacy Measures
*Pooled literacy measures of L  and W  are initally reported for each question in their respective table in Chapter 5. "Single" (not married, 
living alone) control subjects. "Joint" (married or registered partnership) making decisions together jointly. "Separate" (married or 
registered partnership) making decisions separately from one another
Question Type Correct Answer L L +/- L +/-
Q1 - Savings Account 2% Numeracy 1,104 kroner 0.51 0.62 0.11 0.49 -0.02
Q2 - Real Interest Rate Numeracy 1,980 kroner 0.30 0.46 0.16 0.35 0.05
Q3 - Remaining Life for Men Longevity Risk 58.4 years 0.41 0.46 0.05 0.45 0.04
Q4 - Remaining Life for Women Longevity Risk 62.4 years 0.45 0.51 0.06 0.56 0.11
Q5 - Deaths from Heart Disease Health 14.40% 0.21 0.18 -0.03 0.18 -0.03
Q6 - Deaths from Cancer Health 29.0%. 0.21 0.32 0.11 0.21 0.00
Q7 - Deaths from Smoking Health 21.50% 0.21 0.23 0.02 0.25 0.04
Q8 - Property Criminal Activity Crime 14% 0.13 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.05
Q9 - Non-Property Criminal Activity Crime 41.80% 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.06 -0.02
*Pooled literacy measures of L  are initally reported for each question in their respective table. The "+/-" column is the difference of the 
treatment compared to the single (not married, living alone) "control" subjects. "Joint" (married or registered partnership) making 
decisions together jointly. "Separate" (married or registered partnership) making decisions separately from one another
Single Joint Separate
Literacy Measures Literacy Measures Literacy Measures
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Appendix G: Danish Households, Sample Frame for Experiments 
1. Allocation of Subjects to Sampling Frames 
 We distinguish between 3 groups in our laboratory experiment with a total goal of 360 subjects: 
 
 Group 1 (G1): Single adults             (120 subjects from Fam1) 
 Group 2 (G2): Households - Individual Decisions   (120 subjects from Fam 2 and Fam 3) 
 Group 3 (G3): Households - Joint Decisions           (120 subjects from Fam 2 and Fam 3) 
2. Allocation to Recruitment Treatment 
 The 120 individuals in G1 are randomly allocated across three recruitment treatments:  
 
• I_1500, in which each individual will have a 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kroner 
• I_2000, in which each individual will have a 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,000 kroner 
• I_2500, in which each individual will have a 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,500 kroner 
 
The 240 individuals (120 households) in G2 and G3 are randomly allocated across three recruitment 
treatments: 
 
• H_1500, in which each individual in the household will have a 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kroner 
• H_2000, in which each individual in the household will have a 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,000 kroner 
• H_2500, in which each individual in the household will have a 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,500 kroner 
 
Hence, we operate with one set of recruitment treatments for individuals in G1 and another set of 
treatments for households (G2 and G3), but where each individual is randomly allocated across the same 
three treatments. 
 
 We make a distinction between sessions in which subjects, including household couples, make 
individual decisions (G1 and G2) and sessions in which couples in a households make joint decisions (G3). 
For logistical reasons we separate sessions with individual and joint household decision tasks.  
3. Summary of the Design: Target Number of Subjects per Group and Treatment  
 26 sessions were run over the course of 13 days: 20 sessions with individual decisions and 5 sessions 
with joint household decisions. The planned sessions by day consisted of the following:  
 
Day 1 
The sample in each session is composed of 12 subjects from G1. The subjects are paid the following 
recruitment fees: 
Day 1:   Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kr. (I_1500) 
 
Day 2 
The sample in each session is composed of 12 subjects (6 households) from G2. The subjects are paid the 
following recruitment fees: 
Day 2:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,500 kr. (H_2500 & I_2500) 
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Day 3 - Day 6 
The sample in each session is composed of 12 subjects from G1. The subjects are paid the following 
recruitment fees: 
Day 3:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kr. (I_1500) 
Day 4:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,000 kr. (I_2000) 
Day 5:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,500 kr. (I_2500) 
Day 6:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kr. (I_1500) 
 
Day 7 - Day 10 
The sample in each session is composed of 12 subjects (6 households) from G2. The subjects are paid the 
following recruitment fees: 
Day 7:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kr. (H_1500 & I_1500) 
Day 8:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,000 kr. (H_2000 & I_2000) 
Day 9:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,500 kr. (H_2500 & I_2500) 
Day 10: Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kr. (H_1500 & I_1500) 
  
Day 11 - Day 13 
The sample in each session is composed of 20 subjects (10 households) from G3. The subjects are paid the 
following recruitment fees: 
Day 11:   Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 1,500 kr. (H_1500) 
Day 12:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,000 kr. (H_2000) 
Day 13:  Each individual gets 1 in 4 chance of receiving 2,500 kr. (H_2500) 
  
 
Table G1 quickly summarizes the design envisioned by group and treatments.  
 
Table G1 - Summary of the Design: Target Number of Subjects per Group and Treatment 
 
4. Recruitment, Acceptance and Show Up Rates 
Statistics Denmark mailed several thousand letters to potential participants inviting them to be in the 
study. Table G2 shows how many letters were sent out, and the acceptance and show up rate by group and 
treatment. 
 
TREATMENT
G1 G2 G3
I_1500 72 0 0
I_2000 24 0 0
I_2500 24 0 0
H_1500 0 48 40
H_2000 0 24 40
H_2500 0 48 40
Total 120 120 120
Number of Subjects by 
Group
324 
 
Table G2 - Summary of Recruitment, Acceptance and Show Up Rates 
   
  
TREATMENT
G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3
I_1500 1,269 0 0 44 0 0 35 0 0
I_2000 520 0 0 31 0 0 25 0 0
I_2500 660 0 0 51 0 0 42 0 0
H_1500 0 1,600 1,800 0 40 52 0 38 41
H_2000 0 1,600 840 0 38 30 0 37 19
H_2500 0 908 1,372 0 38 66 0 31 62
Total 2,449 4,108 4,012 126 116 148 102 106 126
Number of Invitations by 
Group
Number of Accepted by 
Group
Number Showed Up by 
Group
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Appendix H: Danish Household, Experimental Parameters 
 There are five decision tasks in the experimental design that are presented in the following order to 
all individual subjects and households: (1) atemporal risk aversion choice tasks, (2) time preference choice 
tasks, (3) intertemporal risk aversion choice tasks, (4) subjective belief questions, and (5) survey questions. 
We focus here solely on the atemporal risk aversion task. The subjective belief elicitation task is documented 
in the main text. 
 
We have a battery of 60 lottery pairs, presented to subjects in random order.  
 
 Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994) constructed lotteries to carefully test the “comonotonic 
independence” axiom of RDU. Their main lottery pairs consist of 6 sets of 4 pairs. The logic of their design 
can be seen by considering the first set, from Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994, Fig. 3.1). The second and 
third prizes in each pair stay the same within the set of 4 choice pairs. The only thing that varies from pair to 
pair is the monetary value of the first prize, and that is common to the “safe” and “risky” lottery within each 
pair.42  Since the first listed prize is a common consequence in both lotteries within a pair, it should not 
affect choices under EUT. In the 1st pair the first prize is only $0.50, and is the lowest ranked prize for both 
lotteries. The first prize increases to $3.50 for the 2nd pair, and is again the lowest ranked prize for both 
lotteries: so rank-dependence should have no effect on choice patterns as the subject moves from the 1st to 
the 2nd pair. But when we come to the 3rd pair the first prize is $6.50, which makes it the second highest 
ranked prize for both lotteries; this is where RDU could have a different prediction than EUT, depending on 
the extent and nature of probability weighting. Finally, in the 4th pair the common consequence is the 
highest ranked prize for both lotteries, again allowing RDU to predict something different from EUT (and 
from the choices in the 3rd pair). Note that this design does not formally require an RDU decision-maker to 
choose differently than an EUT decision-maker; it simply encourages it for a priori reasonable levels of 
probability weighting. We employ all 24 of their main lottery pairs, and scale the prizes considerably. 
 
 Loomes and Sugden (1998) pose an important design feature for common ratio tests: variation in 
the “gradient” of the EUT-consistent indifference curves within a Marschak-Machina (MM) triangle. The 
reason for this is to generate some choice patterns that are more powerful tests of EUT for any given risk 
attitude. That is, under EUT the slope of the indifference curve within a MM triangle is a measure of risk 
aversion. So there always exists some risk attitude such that the subject is indifferent, and evidence of 
common ratio violations has virtually zero power (EUT does not, then, predict 50:50 choices, as some 
casually claim). We use 30 lottery pairs from their design. 
 
 A final battery of 6 lottery pairs is designed to test the premise of the calibration puzzle posed by 
Hansson (1988) and Rabin (2000): that subjects exhibit small-stakes risk aversion for “all wealth” (or for a 
large enough finite range of wealth levels). Cox and Sadiraj (2008, pg. 33) proposed a very simple test for 
this idea. You give people choices between safe and risky lotteries, where the safe lotteries are certain 
amounts of money, and the risky lotteries are a 50:50 chance of +x/-y either side of the certain amount of 
money in the safe lottery. Hold x and y constant for choices that vary the safe prize level, and let x>y so that 
the Expected Value of this risky lottery is slightly above the safe lottery level. The idea here is to see the safe 
lottery as “lab wealth,” and then see if subjects are risk averse as we vary lab wealth. For instance, one might 
have +x/-y as +$15/-$10, then consider one binary choice in which the safe lottery is $20 and one binary 
choice in which the safe lottery is $100. So the subject would make two choices: take $20 for certain, or take 
a 50:50 chance of $10 or $35; and take $100 for certain, or take a 50:50 chance of $90 or $115. The 
                                                 
42 What is “safe” and what is “risky” is not so obvious when one allows for probability weighting, but this is how the lotteries are 
labeled. 
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Hansson-Rabin premise is that one gets risk aversion in both cases, with a majority of people picking the 
safe lottery.43  
 
 The experimental design includes three treatments for individuals and two treatments for 
households, where the treatments vary the scale of prizes in lottery tasks. The three treatments for 
individuals are designed to give a risk neutral individual approximately 850 kroner in the low income 
treatment, 1,225 kroner in the medium income treatment and 1,700 kroner in the high income treatment. 
The two treatments for households are designed to give a risk neutral household approximately 1,700 
kroner in the low income treatment and 2,550 kroner in the high income treatment. These treatments are 
randomly allocated between individuals and households. Each individual and household is given a 10% 
chance of being paid in this part of the experiment. 
  
  
                                                 
43 Wilcox (2013) independently implemented the same idea with Chapman University students, and found striking evidence 
against the calibration premise. We have replicated his design with GSU students, and obtained the same findings, reported in  
Harrison, Lau, Ross, and Swarthout (2017). Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt and Uteeyo (2013) implemented this design in two experiments in 
Calcutta. A third experiment, involving a casino in Europe, entailed some experimental procedures that are non-standard. The raw 
data for the two Calcutta experiments had sample sizes of 30 and 40, respectively. In one case they observed clear evidence of risk 
neutrality or risk-loving behavior; this is their +30/-20 case. In the other case they observed less clear evidence that depends on 
how one interprets indifference choices; this is their +90/-50 case. They interpret their data as saying that 43% to 48% of subjects 
in the +30/20 case satisfy the calibration premise, and that 81% or so satisfy it in the +90/-50 case. We disagree with these 
interpretations, for reasons that are not critical here. 
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Chapter 6 – Summary and Extensions for Future Research 
6.1 Summary 
The concept of literacy has grown from “reading literacy” to now encompass many different 
domain-specific topics and skill sets, such as health literacy, financial literacy, and computer literacy. The 
way concepts of literacy are discussed, examined, measured, and communicated has also evolved. Reading 
literacy measures began as a simple metric of counting the number of individuals in a country that could 
read certain text, and dividing that count by the total population to compute the percentage of literate 
individuals. However, this approach ignores situations in which an illiterate person has access to a literate 
person that could read to them. This was the premise of research in development economics that 
introduced the measure of effective literacy, which accounts for potential positive externalities that could 
arise from an illiterate person having access to a literate person. In the psychology literature this is referred 
to as a social scaffold.   
This dissertation expands on the idea of effective literacy and introduces a concept of extended 
literacy in Chapter 1, which applies to a decision-maker having access to an external scaffold during the 
decision-making process. The scaffolds we consider include access to the internet, access to an anonymous 
person as part of a group, and access to a household member. The research presented here measures 
extended financial literacy under these various scaffolds and compares those measures to a group of 
participants that did not have access to a scaffold, thus were responding using only their “private” literacy. 
The main contribution of this dissertation is that it is the first and only extension to consider the effects of 
scaffolds as it pertains to financial literacy. 
Financial literacy reflects an individual’s knowledge about financial matters, including the 
management of risks. The research presented here assesses subjects’ knowledge about interest and inflation, 
budgeting, and longevity risk. The techniques used to measure literacy move beyond multiple choice 
questions or “fill in the blank” responses, and reflects state-of-the-art advances in subjective belief elicitation 
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that allow for the recovery of each decision-maker’s entire underlying subjective distribution, while 
controlling for their attitude to risk. This method ascertains how precise an individual’s knowledge is in 
response to a question to a known, true answer. This method allows the construction of literacy and welfare 
measures in addition to a rich characterization of the belief distribution underlying an individual’s elicited 
response, a test for any bias, and an evaluation of their confidence of response with respect to a known, 
true, answer.   
Table 6.1 displays a summary view of the financial literacy questions and the associated pooled L 
and W indices across the results previously shown as standalones in Tables 2.39, 3.34, and 4.23 from 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The financial literacy questions are further classified as either pertaining to 
numeracy, procedural, and longevity risk, to allow a more nuanced evaluation of which scaffolds perform 
better under what circumstances. The numeracy questions ask people to perform various calculations 
relating to financial concepts that include simple interest, compound interest, the real rate of interest 
adjusting for inflation, and budgeting. The procedural questions relate to financial literacy with a range of 
policy implications: the age that one is eligible for Medicare or social security, and consumer protection 
issues around fraudulent charges on debit and credit cards. The longevity risk questions are important for 
retirement planning purposes. 
Table 6.2 is like Table 6.1, but it focuses only on the L index and the changes to it when compared 
to the Individual literacy measures. Table 6.2 is an aggregation of Tables 3.35 and 4.24. In the fourth column 
of Table 6.2 the pooled measures of the L index are for individuals responding with only their private 
literacy. In the sixth and eighth columns are the L index measures for the Internet and the Group 
treatments, respectively. Column seven (nine) is the “+/-” difference between L index for those with 
Internet (Group) access compared to individuals without. We see “+/-“ values for the Internet treatment 
that range from -0.02 for fin14, “the interest rate” question, all the way to +0.66 for fin3, “the Medicare 
eligibility” question. And for the Group treatment we see values ranging from -0.05 for fin2 to +0.17 for 
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fin7. It appears that the Internet scaffold enhances literacy the most for procedural questions, while the 
Group scaffolds enhances literacy the most for numeracy questions. Neither scaffold appears to have 
diminished literacy in an economically appreciable manner.  
 Tables 6.3 through 6.13 display a summary view of how measures of literacy are enhanced or 
diminished with respect to various demographics and treatments. While the L index accounted for pooled 
results only, the thesis also examined bias from the true, objective response and additional imprecision of 
beliefs held by different demographics. These results were displayed in the Tables in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, 
and are collated here. Take for example the estimates shown in Table 6.3 for fin1 the “savings account at 
2%” question. We know that the correct answer is $110.41, and would like to know if there are any 
particular demographics that are biased from the correct answer. To do that, in the top panel we estimate 
the “total effect” of the covariate, and then compare the estimated average belief of the covariate to the 
correct answer. Consider the covariate female: we see that the estimated average of being female is an 
upward bias of $1.33 over the correct answer of $110.41, and that this result is statistically significant at the 
5% level. We can read down this column and also see statistical evidence of bias from the correct answer for 
Asians, Black, Christians and Seniors, and no evidence of bias for those with a high GPA or juniors.  
The bottom panel of Table 6.3 displays the additional imprecision of beliefs, where we compare the 
estimated standard deviation for each covariate to the overall pooled standard deviation. The pooled 
imprecision over all individuals is 3.38. The estimated standard deviation for the covariate female is 
statistically significant different at the 5% level, and is 1.24 less than the overall. Thus females exhibit a 
greater confidence in beliefs, but that increased confidence may be costly because they are also biased from 
the true answer. 
Moving over to the Internet scaffold in Table 6.3, we interpret these results similarly. Here we note 
that evidence of statistical bias from the correct answer is beginning to disappear for several demographics: 
Asian, Black, Christian, and Seniors, for instance. It is still there for female, although the absolute bias from 
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the true answer has decreased and even flipped signs. The additional imprecision of beliefs is 3.18 for the 
pooled Internet treatment, hence it seems that access to the Internet as a scaffold increases confidence. 
Finally, in the Group scaffold section of Table 6.3 we notice for each demographic that all evidence of 
statistical bias from the correct answer has disappeared. For this numeracy type question, being in a group 
greatly enhances literacy and reduces imprecision.  
Tables 6.4 through 6.13 present the results for fin2 through fin16 in the same manner.  Using 
controlled laboratory and artefactual field experiments with real rewards and incentivized elicitation of 
beliefs, we find that the scaffolds investigated in this research reliably enhance literacy as compared with “private 
literacy” measures of participants without access to a scaffold.  
6.2 Extensions  
There are many possible extensions of the research presented in this thesis. 
One extension would be to calibrate differences between the elicited responses about beliefs from 
incentivized experiments with survey responses to hypothetical questions. One reason to do this would be 
to judge if the latter are reliable indicators of the former, although that is not the most important reason for 
making this comparison a priori, given the wealth of evidence of hypothetical bias across a wide range of 
elicitation tasks.44 Rather, the challenge is to design complementary surveys and experiments that can be 
used together, with the latter being used to calibrate the former to correct for hypothetical bias. It is typically 
not feasible, logistically or financially, to undertake experiments with thousands of respondents, although it 
is feasible to conduct surveys with larger samples.45 The idea is to take a sub-sample and conduct 
experiments in which one considers hypothetical bias and the connection to observable demographics, and 
then use those data to statistically calibrate the respondents that only did the survey (e.g., Blackburn, 
                                                 
44 There is a vast literature on this topic. For instance, see Neill et al. (1994); Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström (1995); 
Cummings et al. (1997); Harrison et al. (1999); Nape et al. (2003); Harrison (2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2014b). 
45 There exists a scalable piece of software that is already built and lives on an internet server that can implement this logistically. 
As long as there is an internet connection available and a computer running a modern internet browser, someone could 
participate in an elicitation anywhere across the globe. 
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Harrison, and Rutström (1994), Harrison, Beekman, Brown, Clements, McDaniel, Odom and Williams 
(1999), Harrison (2006a, 2006b)).  
Another extension would be to examine the interaction between the cognitive demand of the 
elicitation task and the literacy measures observed by participants with varying levels of cognitive skill. In 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, for example, the elicited responses were obtained from university students at Georgia 
State, who have passed high school and are enrolled at an institution of higher education. Thus, one would 
presume these are individuals with higher cognitive skills. While a cognitive skills test was beyond the scope 
of this research, it would be interesting to capture that data and analyze if students with lower cognitive 
skills performed differently than those students with higher cognitive skills. After controlling for cognitive 
ability, one could also compare the responses obtained by the subjective belief elicitation framework to 
other methods (multiple choice, fill in the blank, yes/no, etc.) that are also incentivized.    
Another extension would be to consider households making joint decisions, and augment those 
experiments with additional tasks that allow one to identify the “bargaining power” of each adult member of 
the household. Recognizing that this bargaining power might be domain-specific, in the sense that one 
household member might be more influential when it comes to financial decisions and the other household 
member might be more influential when it comes to lifestyle decisions, one can then better explain how 
joint decisions are arrived at. This information might also help identify more efficient interventions to 
improve household literacy. This extension would be particularly important for applications in developing 
countries, where the bargaining power of women is often sharply diminished by cultural and historical 
circumstances (e.g., Summers (1994)). 
Another extension would be to use the insights gained in the experimental treatments of chapters 3, 
4 and 5 to design “behaviorally smart” interventions to improve literacy. We know from these results that 
individuals with certain demographics have a statistical tendency to be less literate than others: can we then 
efficiently target individuals with those demographics with interventions to improve their literacy, avoiding 
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the time and pecuniary cost of interventions for others? We could also test an individual’s awareness of bias, 
or lack thereof, to speak to the level of naivety or sophistication they have. More generally, can we examine 
which interventions (e.g., access to internet or access to someone in a group) might be more effective for 
certain demographic sub-samples and levels of sophistication? 
Another extension would be to examine literacy over the life-cycle. There is evidence that 
individuals have relatively well calibrated beliefs about mortality risks for people their age and younger, but 
relatively poorly calibrated beliefs about mortality risks for people much older than them (Harrison and 
Rutström 2006). This is not surprising, given the role that peer experience and own experience plays in 
forming risk perceptions. But it points to a dimension in which literacy interventions might focus: events of 
significance in the future. The debate over risk perceptions about the health consequences of smoking is an 
important example. Most people start smoking when they are around 13 or 14, but bear the morbidity and 
mortality consequences many decades later. How might one improve literacy at the age when decisions of 
this kind are made, particularly when they lead to decades of dependence (e.g., (Harrison (2017))? 
Finally, it would be valuable to extend the approach adopted here to health literacy, which has a 
large literature of its own (e.g., Baker (2006); Benjamin (2010); Huber, Shapiro II, and Gillaspy (2012)). 
Clearly some of the “financial literacy” questions we considered, such as longevity risk, overlap with “health 
literacy.” But a more detailed investigation of health literacy with the same methods would be warranted. 
One significant extension of the methodology used here would be to consider the elicitation of bivariate 
risks at the same time: what is the subjective covariance (or correlation) between financial risks and health 
risks? Or between mortality and morbidity risks, since things that do not kill someone often leave them 
needing medical care.  
 With the tools and the methods of subjective belief elicitation developed and firmly in place to 
rigorously measure literacy there are many interesting questions to be researched in various domains.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 6.1: Pooled Measures of L and W  Indices by Treatment 
 
 
Table 6.2: Pooled Measures of L Index, Comparison to the Individual Measures by Treatment 
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Table 6.3: Summary of Results for the "Savings Account 2%" Question (fin1) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC -1.07 **
InternetC -0.43
Group 0.12
female 1.33 ** -0.40 * 0.16
asian 2.02 *** -0.15 0.52
black 1.30 ** -0.23 0.22
christian 1.34 *** -0.19 0.27
gpaHI -0.10 -0.39 ** -0.22
junior 0.57 -0.35 -0.11
senior 1.08 ** -0.66 0.07
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 3.38 3.18 2.95
InternetNC -0.69
InternetC -0.13
Group -0.94 ***
female -1.24 ** 0.10 0.06
asian -0.33 -0.06 -0.40
black 0.34 0.28 0.25
christian -0.62 0.23 0.21
gpaHI -1.45 *** -0.59 ** -0.34
junior -1.86 *** -0.98 *** -0.62 **
senior -1.49 *** 0.17 -0.34
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.18 (Individuals), 3.3 
(Internet), and 4.2 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of $110.41
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.4: Summary of Results for the "Social Security Start Age" Question (fin2) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC 0.30 *
InternetC 0.63 ***
Group 3.22 ***
female 4.67 *** 1.99 *** 3.63 ***
asian 2.67 *** 1.79 *** 3.44 ***
black 3.03 *** 2.22 *** 3.50 ***
christian 4.33 *** 2.24 *** 3.54 ***
gpaHI 4.55 *** 2.02 *** 3.72 ***
junior 4.04 *** 1.58 *** 3.22 ***
senior 3.38 *** 1.75 *** 2.98 ***
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 3.58 3.17 3.24
InternetNC -1.51 **
InternetC -1.43 ***
Group -0.75 ***
female -0.31 -0.01 0.00
asian -0.89 -0.11 -0.10
black 0.35 0.12 0.03
christian -0.14 0.08 -0.01
gpaHI 1.06 0.11 0.25
junior -1.21 *** -0.46 -0.59 **
senior -0.95 ** -0.48 ** -0.52 *
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.20 (Individuals), 3.6 
(Internet), and 4.4 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of 62 years old
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.5: Summary of Results for the "Medicare Eligibility" Question (fin5) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC -1.47 **
InternetC -0.71 ***
Group -5.96 ***
female -4.05 ** -3.78 *** -6.97 ***
asian -6.05 *** -3.98 *** -6.60 ***
black -7.19 *** -4.61 *** -7.36 ***
christian -6.42 *** -4.48 *** -7.22 ***
gpaHI -6.05 *** -3.98 *** -6.94 ***
junior -6.23 *** -3.93 *** -7.34 ***
senior -4.25 *** -3.10 *** -5.86 ***
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 5.30 5.38 5.30
InternetNC -1.39
InternetC -2.98 ***
Group -0.18
female -0.81 -0.16 -0.12
asian -0.51 0.04 -0.11
black -0.13 0.24 0.12
christian -0.69 0.08 0.04
gpaHI -0.93 -0.04 -0.04
junior -0.26 0.39 -0.22
senior 0.07 -0.60 -0.06
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.22 (Individuals), 3.9 
(Internet), and 4.6 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of 65 years old
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.6: Summary of Results for the "Real Interest Rate" Question (fin7) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC 1.59 ***
InternetC 1.64 ***
Group 1.00 ***
female 2.28 *** 2.08 *** 1.80 ***
asian 1.86 *** 1.55 *** 1.78 ***
black 1.50 *** 2.10 *** 1.63 ***
christian 2.31 *** 2.14 *** 1.81 ***
gpaHI 0.88 1.55 *** 1.44 ***
junior 0.64 1.61 *** 1.52 ***
senior 1.45 1.47 *** 1.56 ***
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 2.24 2.12 2.19
InternetNC -0.14
InternetC -0.15
Group -0.26 *
female 0.36 -0.01 0.00
asian 0.20 -0.10 -0.13
black 0.37 0.05 0.02
christian 0.24 0.04 0.03
gpaHI -0.17 -0.17 * -0.14
junior -0.54 * -0.16 -0.28 *
senior 0.23 0.04 -0.02
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.24 (Individuals), 3.12 
(Internet), and 4.8 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of $98.98
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.7: Summary of Results for the "Savings Horizon" Question (fin9) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC 0.28 **
InternetC 0.47 ***
Group 0.33 *
female -0.15 0.63 *** 0.69 ***
asian 0.06 0.52 ** 0.42
black 0.31 0.86 *** 0.92 ***
christian 0.35 ** 0.87 *** 0.87 ***
gpaHI -0.24 0.66 *** 0.70 ***
junior 0.29 0.96 *** 0.89 **
senior 0.09 0.64 *** 0.72 **
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 2.25 1.82 2.00
InternetNC -0.91 ***
InternetC -0.51 **
Group -0.60
female -2.07 *** -0.11 -0.07
asian -1.80 *** -0.18 -0.41
black -1.46 *** 0.21 0.26
christian -1.69 *** 0.21 0.16
gpaHI -2.08 *** -0.03 -0.02
junior -1.56 *** 0.54 0.47
senior -1.88 *** -0.06 0.02
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.26 (Individuals), 3.15 
(Internet), and 4.10 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of 4 months
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.8: Summary of Results for the "Stolen Credit Card" Question (fin10) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC 41.20 **
InternetC 25.74 **
Group 82.84 ***
female 49.49 76.52 *** 118.03 ***
asian 48.64 46.88 * 69.63 *
black 94.04 89.27 *** 127.33 ***
christian 121.69 ** 92.77 *** 138.05 ***
gpaHI 50.58 82.14 *** 123.67 ***
junior -32.14 30.92 * 75.22 **
senior -11.28 53.71 ** 63.07 *
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 283.08 218.67 274.87
InternetNC -64.55
InternetC -91.62 ***
Group -17.62
female -88.13 9.34 12.85
asian -94.16 -39.01 -43.83
black -45.69 24.08 17.27
christian -68.02 21.87 24.13
gpaHI -113.26 11.26 20.94
junior -135.51 * -62.84 * -25.73
senior -118.13 -17.79 -39.43
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.28 (Individuals), 3.18 
(Internet), and 4.12 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of $50
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.9: Summary of Results for the "Stolen Debit Card" Question (fin11) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC -22.45
InternetC -30.57
Group -5.95
female -262.98 177.29 ** 252.70 ***
asian -48.68 -8.44 20.21
black 274.27 * 248.62 *** 321.56 ***
christian 334.97 * 282.50 *** 371.02 ***
gpaHI -53.61 224.01 * 349.18 **
junior -63.79 31.71 68.56
senior 413.88 393.23 * 586.43
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 1495.55 1073.09 1241.33
InternetNC -667.21 ***
InternetC -653.20 ***
Group -715.55 ***
female -1075.55 *** -32.15 -71.33
asian -1120.63 *** -565.52 *** -660.74 ***
black -823.68 *** 42.15 -22.14
christian -349.52 180.75 158.59
gpaHI -821.32 *** 147.12 170.35
junior -906.41 *** -395.22 ** -463.01 **
senior -42.25 639.51 880.90
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.30 (Individuals), 3.21 
(Internet), and 4.14 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of $500
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
341 
 
Table 6.10: Summary of Results for the "Nominal Interest" Question (fin13) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC -0.57 ***
InternetC -0.56 ***
Group -0.19 **
female -0.66 ** -0.58 *** -0.47 ***
asian -0.59 * -0.46 *** -0.36 ***
black -0.43 * -0.63 *** -0.47 ***
christian -0.68 *** -0.59 *** -0.44 ***
gpaHI -0.25 -0.34 *** -0.33 ***
junior -0.03 -0.60 *** -0.14 ***
senior -0.11 -0.38 *** -0.25 ***
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 1.24 1.30 1.09
InternetNC 0.06
InternetC 0.06
Group -0.36 *
female -0.06 -0.08 0.02
asian 0.17 -0.11 -0.14
black -0.22 0.07 0.07
christian 0.38 0.02 0.01
gpaHI -0.56 * -0.41 *** -0.19
junior -0.75 *** 0.25 -0.52 ***
senior -0.42 -0.25 -0.13
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.32 (Individuals), 3.24 
(Internet), and 4.16 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of 5%
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.11: Summary of Results for the "Interest Rate" Question (fin14) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC -0.39 *
InternetC -0.31 **
Group -0.14 ***
female -0.06 -0.25 *** -0.22 ***
asian -0.42 * -0.26 * -0.31 *
black -0.11 -0.33 *** -0.20 ***
christian -0.31 ** -0.35 *** -0.26 ***
gpaHI 0.04 -0.14 * -0.18 **
junior 0.02 -0.25 -0.23 *
senior 0.10 -0.13 -0.07
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 1.25 1.26 1.06
InternetNC 0.03
InternetC -0.01
Group -0.42 ***
female -0.52 ** -0.03 0.06
asian -0.06 -0.11 0.07
black -0.67 *** 0.09 0.00
christian -0.02 0.14 0.10
gpaHI -0.80 *** -0.22 * -0.04
junior -0.92 *** -0.05 -0.19
senior -0.83 *** -0.22 -0.24
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.34 (Individuals), 3.27 
(Internet), and 4.18 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of $102
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.12: Summary of Results for the "Remaining Life for Men" Question (fin15) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC -7.81 ***
InternetC -6.52 ***
Group -7.06 ***
female -8.19 *** -8.25 *** -9.77 ***
asian -7.15 *** -8.42 *** -7.87 ***
black -7.56 *** -9.19 *** -9.31 ***
christian -5.49 *** -8.43 *** -8.84 ***
gpaHI -1.81 -7.22 *** -8.02 ***
junior -3.24 -7.49 *** -7.64 ***
senior -6.18 ** -7.70 *** -10.02 ***
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 9.70 9.17 9.08
InternetNC -1.18 *
InternetC -0.52
Group -1.46 **
female -1.78 0.00 0.41
asian -1.68 0.28 -0.48
black -2.17 * 0.52 0.38
christian -2.60 ** 0.08 -0.03
gpaHI -5.34 *** -0.97 * -1.10 *
junior -3.08 * -0.39 -1.34
senior -2.03 0.16 1.25
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.36 (Individuals), 3.30 
(Internet), and 4.20 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of 57.1 years
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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Table 6.13: Summary of Results for the "Remaining Life for Women" Question (fin16) 
  
Bias from True Response
InternetNC -8.97 ***
InternetC -7.84 ***
Group -8.45 ***
female -11.55 -9.94 *** -11.51 ***
asian -12.58 -11.90 *** -11.26 ***
black -9.57 -10.23 *** -10.34 ***
christian -8.65 -9.81 *** -10.18 ***
gpaHI -4.53 -8.64 *** -9.67 ***
junior -7.15 -8.39 *** -8.81 ***
senior -8.78 -9.10 *** -11.00 ***
Additional Imprecision of Beliefs
Impercision 9.53 9.35 8.86
InternetNC -0.43
InternetC -0.46
Group -1.70 **
female -1.86 0.23 0.54
asian 0.68 1.82 1.33
black -2.59 ** -0.19 -0.23
christian -2.65 ** -0.04 -0.35
gpaHI -5.18 *** -0.46 -0.42
junior -3.67 *** -1.05 -2.11 ***
senior -2.04 0.49 1.55
NB: Estimates taken from thesis Tables: 2.38 (Individuals), 3.33 
(Internet), and 4.22 (Group)
Bias is realative to the correct answer of 61.7 years
Additional imprecision is relative to the average imprecision
Individual Internet Group
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